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ABSTRACT 
THE EMERGENCE AND EVOLUTION OF A POLITICIZED MARKET:  
THE PRODUCTION AND CIRCULATION OF KURDISH MUSIC IN TURKEY !
Kuruoğlu, Alev Pınar 
Ph.D., Department of Management 
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Güliz Ger 
!
 This dissertation explicates the emergence and evolution of a market for 
Kurdish music in Turkey. Using ethnographic methods, I start by detailing the illegal 
circulation of cassettes during the restrictive and strife-laden period of the 1970s, 
80s, and 90s. Through the resistive practices of circulation - recording, hiding, 
playing, and exchanging cassettes – cassettes became saturated with emotions, 
established shared emotional repertoires, and habituated individuals and collectives 
into common emotional dispositions. An emotional structure was generated, and 
accompanied the emergence of a sense of “us,” the delineation of the “other,” and the 
resistive relationship between the two. I thus demonstrate the entwinement of 
materiality with emotions, and the structuring potentiality that this entwinement 
generates. In the second part, I ethnographically explore the trajectory of the market 
after legalization in 1991. Situated within a context characterized by the socio-
political dynamics of domination and stigmatization, I detail how market producers 
collectively construct an oppositional “market culture” by framing their market-
related experiences, as well as by interacting with and borrowing ideological codes 
from the neighboring Kurdish political movement. These frames become entrenched 
as a political-normative logic, shaping artistic production and business decisions. 
This emergent logic negotiates societal-level conflict and stigma, and also resolves 
the market-level tension between artistic and commercial concerns. Finally, I explore 
the segmentation of the market in conjunction with changes in the socio-political 
atmosphere in the 2000s. I discuss how segmentation also corresponds to competing 
social imaginaries of a Kurdish public. !
KEYWORDS: Materiality, Circulation, Emotional Structures, Resistance, 
Community Market Formation, Framing, Political Normativity, Institutionalization, 
Social Movements, Market Culture, Stigmatization, Domination, Segmentation. 
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!
ÖZET 
BİR PİYASANIN SİYASİLEŞEREK GELİŞMESİ: 
TÜRKİYE’DE KÜRTÇE MÜZİK ÜRETİMİ VE DOLAŞIMI 
!
Kuruoğlu, Alev Pınar 
Doktora, İşletme Bölümü 
Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Güliz Ger 
 Bu tezde, Türkiye’deki Kürtçe müzik piyasasının oluşumu ve gelişimi 
etnografik metodlarla incelenmektedir. İlk kısımda, 1970, 80 ve 90lardaki kısıtlamalı 
ve çatışmalı ortamda, müzik kasetlerinin yasadışı yollarla dolaşımlarını araştırıyor, 
bu dolaşımın ortaya çıkardığı “duygusal ekonomi”yi tarif ediyorum. Kasetlerin 
dolaşımları sürecinde (müzik kaydedilirken ve çalınırken, kasetler saklanırken, 
alışveriş veya değiş-tokuş edilirken) açığa çıkardıkları duygular ile yüklendiklerini, 
bu şekilde ortak duygusal repertuvarlar ve yönelimler oluşmasına, ve bir “duygusal 
yapılanma”ya vesile olduklarını anlatıyorum. Bu yapılanmanın hem “topluluk” 
hissini oluşturmaya, hem de “öteki”ni - bu durumda, devleti - tanımlamaya ve ona 
karşı direnmeye tekabül ettiğini belirtiyorum. İkinci kısımda, 1991de Kürtçe müzik 
üretiminin yasallaşmasından sonra piyasanın gelişimini takip ediyorum. Tahakküm, 
ötekileştirme ve damgalama ilişkileri üzerinden tarif ettiğim bir bağlamda, piyasa 
aktörlerinin kolektif olarak karşıt bir “piyasa kültürü”nü nasıl inşa ettiklerini 
inceliyorum. Bunu, hem kendi piyasa içi tecrübelerini, hem de piyasayla yakın ilişki 
içerisindeki Kürt siyasi hareketindeki bazı yerleşik ideolojik kodları çerçeveleyerek 
yaptıklarını anlatıyorum. Aktörlerin kurguladığı çerçevelerin, piyasada zamanla 
yerleşerek siyasi-normatif bir “kurumsal mantık” oluşturduğunu, bu mantığın da hem 
sanatsal hem de işletme ile ilgili kararları şekillendirdiğini belirtiyorum. Bu siyasi-
normatif mantık ile hem toplumsal düzeydeki çatışmaların piyasadaki yansımalarının 
hedef alındığını, hem de piyasa düzeyindeki estetik-sanatsal kaygılar arasındaki 
çatışmanın çözümlendiğini anlatıyorum.  Son olarak da, piyasanın 2000li yıllarda, 
sosyo-politik ortamdaki değişikliklerle beraber bölümlenmesini inceliyorum. Bu 
bölümlenmenin aynı zamanda birbiriyle yarışan farklı Kürt toplumu tahayülleri ile de 
örtüştüğünü belirtiyorum.  !
ANAHTAR KELİMELER: Materyal Kültür, Dolaşım, Duygusal Yapılanmalar, 
Direniş, Toplum Tahayyülü, Tahakküm, Siyasi Normativite, Çerçeveleme, Piyasa 
Oluşumu, Piyasa Kültürü,  Kurumsallaşma, Sosyal hareketler, Bölümlenme 
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CHAPTER 1 
!
INTRODUCTION 
!
!
This dissertation is concerned with how cultural products “circulate” — through 
illegal practices as well as formal markets — under restrictive circumstances. 
Resistance, collective identity, emotional structures, and political-norms that shape 
markets and market activities are the themes that unify the two interrelated (but also 
distinct) studies that form this dissertation. Spanning a time period from the 1970s to 
the current day, I present an account on the production and circulation of Kurdish 
music in Turkey. A two-year fieldwork, comprising data gathered through in-depth 
interviews, observations, unstructured conversations, archives of print and online 
magazines and newspapers, as well as social media commentary, informed this 
research. In the three chapters that comprise the body of the dissertation, I detail how 
the circulation of material objects generate emotional structures that shape resistive 
communities; how actors who were habituated into these emotional structures, also 
influenced by a political movement, collaboratively shape a politically charged 
market culture; and how a market becomes segmented with shifts in the social-
political environment. 
$1
 A formal and legal market for Kurdish music is relatively new. The 
production, performance, broadcast, and sales of Kurdish music was banned for the 
better part of the 20th Century. Nonetheless, music was rarely, if ever, absent from the 
lives of Kurds. Pirated radio broadcasts, 45 rpms recorded and sold during 
intermittent periods of less restricted periods, and local performances of oral 
traditions as well as popular/protest music colored the soundscapes until the 1970s. 
With the 1970s, cassette technology entered the picture. Thus commenced an era of 
intense, far-reaching circulation of local as well as smuggled recordings. In 1991 the 
constitutional ban on music circulation was partially lifted, allowing performance 
and sales, but not broadcast. Unofficial restrictions, surveillance, and censorship, 
however, remained. Actors who engaged with music production and performance, 
throughout these periods, were subject to stigma (Link and Phelan 2001), particularly 
enforced through “terrorism” narratives employed by authorities in describing and 
punishing such acts. These “terrorism” narratives moreover prevalently circulated 
through mainstream media, and colored the mainstream public opinion as such. It is 
against this backdrop that Kurdish music was played, performed, and exchanged; 
initially illegally and through dispersed efforts; and later through a legal and 
centralized market.  
 In the second chapter of this dissertation, titled “An emotional economy of 
mundane objects,” I construct an oral-historiographical account of the illegal 
circulation of Kurdish music cassettes throughout the strife-leaden 1970s, 80s, and 
90s. I detail how the circulation of a mundane object - such as the music cassette - 
has the potentiality to play a part in the generation of community and resistance, a 
process of great political import. I draw from material culture studies, noting that 
$2
objects, in their materiality, “objectify” identities, relationships, symbols, values, 
meanings, power, and tensions (Craig 2011; Douny 2011; Holttinen 2014; Kravets 
and Örge 2010; Madianou and Miller 2011; Miller 1987, 1998, 2005) and also 
constitute the imagined communities (Anderson 1983) within which they circulate 
(Aronczyk and Craig 2012; Lee and LiPuma 2002). Emotionality, while implied as 
the “nature” of relationships that is materialized, is nonetheless not explicated. 
Inspired by Sara Ahmed’s (2004) model of an affective economy - of bodies 
becoming “sticky” with the emotions they awaken in those they encounter and, 
through circulation, “sticking” certain bodies together while setting other bodies 
“outside;” I seek to understand how mundane objects might hold similar affective 
potentialities. Thus, the second chapter is driven by the following research question: 
How does a nexus of emotionality and materiality emerge and serve to generate 
community and resistance? 
I trace an answer to this inquiry through the emotionally charged narratives 
on four practices of circulation- recording, owning/storing/destroying, listening, and 
exchanging cassettes, detecting the way that emotions move and “stick” with and 
onto the cassettes with each practice. The metaphor of “stickiness” illustrates that 
emotionality becomes intertwined with materiality, and circulates with the circulating 
object(s); drawing people into shared ways of being and doing, and intensifying 
through time, thickening the threads that bind people together and strengthening the 
walls that set them apart from the others. Narratives on circulation are peppered with 
emotions that seep into the present; with joyful experiences of communing - such as 
gatherings with families and friends, hearing music in one’s native tongue stories 
exist alongside fearful, angry, and sorrowful stories of sacrifice and violent 
$3
encounters with the agencies of the state. Communality with other Kurds, as well as 
the resistive boundaries towards the state - which dominates and stigmatizes - are 
concomitantly “felt” through circulation. Thus, cassettes simultaneously materialize 
relationships that are unifying and separative; communal and resistive.  
As the cassettes circulate, the number of people who share similar 
experiences and emotions increase - common orientations and dispositions are 
generated - and hence, an emotional structure emerges: in other words, an emotional 
“habitus” (Kane 2001) is shaped, in part, by the circulation of cassettes. This 
structure in turn disposes individuals to relate to their surroundings in certain ways: 
in particular, to take a resistive stance, and to continue to indulge in circulation.  In 
other words, these practices of circulation are influential in cultivating a “collective 
identity” (Hunt and Benford 2004; Jenkins 2008; Melucci 1995; Polletta and Jasper 
2001; Simon and Klandermans 2001) that is grounded not only in shared ethnic 
background, but also shaped by this “structured and structuring” (Swartz 1997) 
emotional habitus (Calhoun 2001; Kane 2001; Kuruoğlu and Ger 2014). 
	
 Concomitantly, I note that illegal circulation also played a part in Kurds 
perceiving of themselves, “marked,” individually but also as a community, as 
terrorists— in other words, stigmatized (Link and Phelan 2001) and dominated 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) by the forceful policies and agencies of the state. The 
tactical (De Certeau 1988), infrapolitical (J.C. Scott 1990) and grassroots forms of 
resistance that I detail in chapter 2 emerge in response to these “felt” realizations of 
stigma and domination - but that is not the only response that was relevant in the 
Kurdish context. Tactical resistance, as noted by Scott (J.C. 1990), often forms the 
underpinning of larger-scale collective action - indeed, an armed Kurdish political 
$4
movement also gained strength during the late 1970s and early 1980s.  In chapter 2, I 
acknowledge, but do not detail, that activists of the emergent Kurdish movement also 
saw music as a powerful way to ideologically educate, politicize, and mobilize the 
people. In chapter 3, I take into account that the Kurdish political movement interacts 
with music production, performance, and circulation in cultivating a politicized 
collective identity (Simon and Klandermans 2001) that is constitutive of both 
producers and consumers in the market. I explicate the involvement of the Kurdish 
movement - both in its appropriation of musical performance and circulation for its 
political agenda, and also on its ideological influence upon the actors who are 
involved (in both illegal and legal) music performance, production, and circulation. 	

	
 In the 1990s, after legalization, while illegal circulation continued, a large 
portion of new music started to be recorded professionally in studios; produced and 
distributed through music production companies in Unkapanı, Istanbul — the 
headquarters of music production in Turkey. The production of Kurdish music thus 
became centralized and formalized. As such, the emotional economy of music 
circulation encountered the dynamics of the formal market. I detect that a politicized 
collective identity grounded in an emotional structure; market experiences and 
grievances related to stigma and domination; and ideology espoused by the armed 
Kurdish movement all had “structuring” influence on the legal market activities. This 
is the focus of the third chapter, in which I inquire: How does a market, whose 
producer and consumer constituency is subject to sociocultural and political 
dynamics of domination and stigmatization, emerge and evolve? How do market 
actors (in particular, producers) navigate this process?	

	
 In this chapter, I revisit illegal circulation with the understanding that it 
served as a backdrop for the formal market. From the object and emotion-centered 
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view of chapter 2, however, I shift the focus to the rhetorical devices - frames - that 
operate at a more cognitive level: how actors’ grievous experiences are processed and 
turned into political-normative tenets that shape market activity: how 
“consciousness” of being part of a political community is awakened; producer-
activist identities constructed; and business as well as artistic decisions are made 
with political agendas in mind.  I detail how, accordingly, a politicized “market 
culture” (Abolafia 1998; Ho 2009; Penaloza 2000; Spillman 1999; Zelizer 2010) 
emerges and is framed by actors.  Market culture, as conceptualized by Spillman 
(1999), is constituted by three elements: the object of market exchange; a social 
imaginary of producers and consumers - i.e., the collectivity comprised by the parties 
to exchange; and the norms of exchange. By tracing the evolution of political-
normative structures through the field-level frames (Goffman 1976; Lounsbury et al. 
2003) employed by market actors, I explore the emergence of a new market culture. I 
find that the frames shaping the market culture were influenced by both the 
neighboring Kurdish political movement, as well as shaped by actors’ “local” 
experiences (Scott 1998) in the marketplace, particularly in their dealings with the 
state. I also note that these political-normative frames help to negotiate the additional 
tension between artistic concerns -  “the logic of art”,  and commercial concerns - 
“the logic of commerce” (Bourdieu 1996; Caves 2000; Glynn and Lounsbury 2005). 
In this field characterized by restrictions, this tension is resolved by attributing both 
artistic merit and sales success to furthering the pro-Kurdish political agenda.	

	
 I thus detail how market actors - producers, in particular - co-produced an 
emergent market culture, while facing restrictions from the state and lacking 
recognition within mainstream culture. Bridging social-movements and institutional 
theory perspectives on market formation, I trace how actors generate, adapt, and 
$6
articulate political-normative frames. These frames, I note, become entrenched as 
“proto-institutional” logics (Lawrence et al. 2002) that shape the “norms” of 
production and exchange in a marketplace - such as the prevalence of collaborations 
and informal networks, political alliances, and the forgoing of commercial interests; 
influence the meanings and roles attributed to the object(s) of exchange - the music 
that is the object of exchange is likewise politicized, and associated with a markedly 
“Kurdish” resistance; and, finally, construct the marketplace as constituting a social 
imaginary of a resistive and pro-movement “Kurdish nation.” As such, I complement 
two streams of research: (1) The institutional/legitimation perspectives on market 
formation, which focus on the institutional (i.e., external) structures and thus 
inadequately address the (field-level) issues of collective identity and culture in the 
marketplace; and which also do not account for stigma and domination as a source of 
institutional conflict. (2) Consumer research literature on oppositional/counter-
cultural communities, which lacks studies that explicitly focus on the role of market 
producers in shaping collective identity, resistance, and normative-political activity. 	

	
 Following the early 2000s, however, changes in the political-societal 
environment led to significant changes in the field of Kurdish music production, as 
well: looser restrictions - such as a decrease in instances of censorship and criminal 
charges, an increasing number of venues for performance and sales, and the 
legalization of Kurdish language broadcast - meant that actors who were not 
motivated by a pro-Kurdish political agenda also started to operate within the field. 
In chapter 4, I identify the different collectivities - and correspondingly, different 
market segments - that emerge in the marketplace. I note that the employment of 
different logics is linked with different organizational practices, and thus 
segmentation within the market (Goodrick and Reay 2011; Kraatz and Block 2008; 
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Marquis and Lounsbury 2007; Thornton, Jones, and Kury 2005). I also link 
segmentation to different market cultures, and thus, different social imaginaries - 
thus, to different and sometimes competing ideals of “Kurdish society.” 
Segmentation in the market culture not only corresponds to multiple collectives with 
their internal alignments, but it also (re)produces boundaries amongst these different 
collectivities - with some boundaries more impenetrable than others. Thus, in 
addition to the delineation of the external “other,” which was the topic particularly of 
chapter 2, I look into the delineation of internal “other(s),” and competing 
imaginings of Kurdish political identities.  	

	
 Chapter 4 also inquires into the conditions wherein a legitimacy-challenged 
market may find inclusion into mainstream culture. A changing socio-political 
environment, combined with market actors’ efforts to employ ideological frames that 
are more “palatable,” aesthetic qualities that have found some popularity in 
mainstream culture; and an accompanying market imaginary that is more accessible 
for mainstream Turkish audience may lead to greater recognition and representation. 
Thus, in addition to changing socio-political conditions, I suggest that the adoption 
of less oppositional and more mainstream - i.e., palatable - political frames may be 
necessary to gain mainstream acceptance.	

 The organization of this dissertation is as follows: I will be detailing the 
methodology and the research context that pertains to the whole dissertation after this 
introduction section. Chapter 2, which is derived from a published article, will have 
its own introduction, theoretical framework, findings, and discussion sections. 
Chapter 3 and 4 share an introduction and theoretical framework  (presented in 
chapter 3) and have separate findings and discussion sections. The final chapter of 
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the dissertation consists of a concluding remarks on the whole dissertation, and a 
reflection on the limitations of this research.   
!
!
1.1 Research Context: Music and the Kurds of Turkey 
The context of “Kurdish music circulation” - both through illegal practices, and 
through an (emergent) legal market - was appropriate for addressing the research 
questions I pose throughout chapters 2, 3, and 4. In the very beginning of the 
research, not knowing much about the history of Kurdish music circulation in 
Turkey, I thought this context was appropriate in order to gain a deeper 
understanding of the creation of a new market - a reasonable idea, I thought, 
considering that the legal market had commenced quite recently, in 1991. However, 
as I conducted fieldwork, I not only found that an illegal market preceded the legal 
one, I also found that the legal market was highly charged with “politics.” My 
research questions were thus shaped considerably throughout the time I spent in the 
field, and by particularities of the context, rather than being set a priori. Ustuner and 
Holt (2007: 47) have noted that “contexts matter when they harbor underlying 
structures that differently affect” the phenomena in study. The dominated-dominating 
relationship amongst the Kurdish constituency and the Turkish state, and the 
emergence of a Kurdish movement (outside of the market) in response to this 
relationship, are some contextual particularities that greatly shaped the dynamics of 
market formation. In this section, I present a brief overview of the historical 
development of the “Kurdish issue,” particularly as it pertains to and influences the 
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production and performance of music. I also provide further contextual details where 
necessary throughout the findings.  
 Kurdish music is situated within a complicated regional history, with 
demands and negotiations concerning decentralized administration and autonomy 
ongoing to this day. After WWI, the new borders drawn by the Allied Forces split the 
Kurdish population into four different countries in the Middle East. Kurds remained 
a stateless ethnic, multi-dialectic, multi-sectarian, tribal, and feudal community, 
amidst a wave of global nationalist movements. With the establishment of the 
Republic of Turkey in 1923, non-Muslim religious minorities, in accordance with the 
newly-signed Lausanne Treaty, were granted rights to establish their own religious, 
educational, and social welfare institutions (Toktaş and Aras 2009). However, 
Muslim peoples, including the Kurds, were not officially recognized as minorities 
and were not granted such rights. Constitutional law and assimilative policies aimed 
to homogenize the young nation. These included mandatory Turkish-language formal 
education as well as bans on publishing and broadcasting in Kurdish language.  
 While Kurdish nationalist uprisings in the 1920s and 1930s were terminated 
by the Turkish state, the late 1960s and 1970s presented political opportunities that 
allowed the emergence of numerous pro-Kurdish organizations, many of which also 
engaged in the production and circulation of music. The Kurdish resistance 
culminated in the emergence of the PKK (Partiya Karkaren Kurdi, The Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party), which was established in the late 1970s. The 1970s was a time of 
general political unrest that ended with a military coup d’état in 1980 and, 
subsequently, a new, more controlling constitution. Starting in 1984, the PKK was 
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involved in combat with the Turkish military and attacks on civilian outposts. By the 
late 1980s, the PKK, emically termed a “freedom movement,” had become classified 
as a “terrorist organization” (Romano 2006). In addition to the armed conflict 
between the PKK and the Turkish military, a state of consistent tension characterized 
the densely Kurdish-populated Eastern and Southeastern regions of Turkey 
throughout the second half of the 1980s and the 1990s: hundreds of people were 
detained on charges of aiding the PKK and approximately 3200 villages were 
evacuated, forcing their inhabitants to migrate to cities elsewhere in Turkey (Sarıgil 
and Fazlıoğlu 2014).  
 Kurdish music was intermittently banned throughout the 20th Century. Yet, a 
tradition of oral performance (including traveling folk singers called dengbêj), 
recordings - both locally and internationally produced - and radio broadcasts from 
Yerevan and Baghdad (both cities with Kurdish-speaking populations) were involved 
in the transmission of music. There were periods with loosened restrictions, but in 
the 1980s, the ban on performance, broadcast, and sales was rigorously enforced, 
particularly in the Kurdish-inhabited regions. In 1991 this ban was partially lifted, 
allowing performance and sales, but not broadcast, of music. Importantly, unofficial 
restrictions on Kurdish music remained well into the 2000s. Albums thought to 
contain separatist lyrics or imagery were subject to confiscation and individuals who 
produced, owned, or sold them could be charged, fined, or even imprisoned. A 
prevalent “terrorism” narrative framed many cultural products and performances as 
such. Under these conditions, Kurdish music was unsanctioned and linked, in 
Turkish state and public discourse, to terrorism.  
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 In this context, the illegal circulation of cassettes stands out amongst the 
resistive and community-building practices available to the Kurds of Turkey during 
the 1980s and 1990s. In the relative absence of written traditions – Kurdish language 
and writing was not standardized until the 1980s and 90s (Uçarlar 2009) - musical 
traditions constituted a central place in the lives of many Kurds, in their homelands 
or in diasporas (Blum and Hassanpour 1996; Scalbert-Yücel 2009). Music, in its 
immediacy, emotiveness, and symbolism, holds great potential for resistance 
(Hennion 2003). Through creating affect (Born 2011, Hirschkind 2006) and 
articulating emotions (Feld 1990), sound and music facilitate the formation of 
networks (Tacchi 1998) and communities. Collective musical practices including 
composing, singing, listening, and dancing have played a particularly potent role in 
social movements (Adams 2002; Jasper 2011).  While the connecting and resistive 
role of music is well-established, I focus on its material circulation. We find that 
circulation fueled a grass-roots imagination of communal bonds and provided 
support for pro-Kurdish political purposes, often simultaneously. I acknowledge the 
presence of the latter, but my primary concern in chapter 2 is the former. Thus, illegal 
circulation situated within this context forms the focus of Chapter 2. 
 Whereas tribalism and sectarianism have been prevalent among the Kurds 
(Romano 2006), during the 1980s and 1990s the Kurds of Turkey became unified “on 
a much more ethnic nationalist basis than on a tribal or religious one” (İçduygu, 
Romano, and Sirkeci 1999, 994). Analyses of the Kurdish movement (e.g., Romano 
2006; Güneş 2012) emphasize the grand narratives that constituted this period: how 
political structures, resources, and ideologies came together in mobilizing masses 
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and challenging the dominant orders. Yet, the role of the everyday material practices 
and the accompanying emotionality have often been overlooked. I discovered and 
explicated how the circulation of cassettes in daily life served “tactical” (De Certeau 
1988) or “infrapolitical” (Scott 1990) resistance, and simultaneously generated 
feelings and imaginings of a unified community based on ethnicity rather than 
fragmented tribal identities.  
 I was struck by the fact that when I uttered the phrase “Kurdish music,” 
informants immediately and passionately volunteered their historical experiences of 
cassettes and provided detailed accounts of their involvement in the illegal 
circulation of cassettes throughout the 1970s, 80s, and 90s. What I found particularly 
noteworthy was how a commonality in practices of circulation was accompanied by 
a shared emotional and experiential repertoire (despite the diversity of informants) 
regarding these cassettes. Informants saw these cassettes as an inextricable 
component of coming of age as a Kurd in Turkey, and sometimes also explicitly 
termed practices related to cassettes as acts of rebellion or resistance. More subtle, 
however, was the way that emotions surfaced during early stages of fieldwork: not 
only were emotions commonly recounted as having been felt during the years in 
which this illegal circulation took place, but they also seeped into the act of speech in 
the present. Informants were often visibly and audibly moved by their retelling of 
experiences of the past – and terms they used to articulate these emotions were also 
strikingly similar. Cassettes, I found, were embedded in informants’ emotional life 
stories. While the particularities of life stories could be different, the emotionality 
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generated through and associated with the cassettes served as a unifying theme. Thus 
was born the focus of the second chapter. 
 The period of illegal circulation had a structuring influence on the formal 
market, as well. Market actors who were active throughout the 1990s were “raised” 
within and habituated into the emotional dynamics and the accompanying resistive-
communality that were generated by illegal circulation, and they also perceived of 
themselves as taking an active part in continuing the circulation and, accordingly, 
serving the unification of and resistance enacted by, the Kurds. In the third chapter, I 
start to engage more explicitly with the PKK-line Kurdish movement as partaking in 
circulation, and also as an ideological resource - in motivating activism, establishing 
a collective identity, and instilling a sense of “national” unity - for the market. As 
noted, The PKK, at the same time, was engaged in increasingly violent conflicts with 
the military, and sometimes also directed violence towards civilians. It thus started to 
become more salient in media.  
  Starting with the late 1980s, the “Kurdish problem”, or as it was more 
commonly referred, the “Eastern problem” and the “terror problem”, became a 
household issue, finding a place in politician’s speeches, newspaper pages, and in 
public discourse. The president at the time, Turgut Özal, declaring that he would like 
to bring an end to the conflict, started implementing a series of protocols, including a 
number of legal amendments in the early 1990s. One of these concerned the 
publication and dissemination of Kurdish language cultural products, including 
music. With this amendment, Kurdish music was constituted as legal for sale, for 
playing and performing live, but remained illegal to broadcast on radio or television. 
Products to be sold on the legal market were (as were all such materials produced in 
$14
Turkey) subject to preliminary review by the Ministry of Culture. Thus commenced 
the formal market. 
 What followed legalization was an initial surge of Kurdish language music 
production – greeted very enthusiastically by the audience - but a subsequent drop in 
the number of companies producing this music shortly thereafter. Despite 
legalization, the terrorism counter-frame continued to inform dominant discourse on 
Kurds throughout the 1990s, and well into the 2000s. Throughout the 1990s, a large 
volume of albums were produced by a very limited number of production companies, 
and with the involvement of a small group of people. The field of Kurdish music 
production was insufficiently recognized by and represented in mainstream sales and 
broadcasting channels, and with a very limited audience amongst the non-Kurdish 
(that is, predominantly Turkish) public. What struck me during my fieldwork in the 
field is how these early years of cultural production are described by its actors as 
having been plagued with legal difficulties, but also as being a time of hope, 
excitement, and being guided by political ideals. These political ideals themselves 
were quite dynamic, and were shaped by the events, tensions, and discourses of the 
day – discourses produced and disseminated by, among other actors, the Turkish 
state, the Kurdish movement (and its intellectual leaders), the media (both Turkish 
and Kurdish) and the actors in various fields of production, including the music 
market. I found that this idealism and these dynamics sets of political, social, and 
cultural ideals pointed towards a dominant political-normative order. I thus decided 
to try to unpack this entwinement of the political-normative and the business as well 
as artistic activities in the context of the (legal) market for Kurdish music.  
!
$15
1.2 Methodology 
My aim, in writing this dissertation, was to gain an in-depth and detailed (Patton 
1990) understanding of the circulation of and the market for Kurdish music from the 
point of view of Kurdish “actors” who participated in both “making” and “hearing” 
the music. Moreover, I wanted to gain a processual understanding (Maxwell 1996) of 
how a market was collaboratively formed and how it evolved over time, as situated 
within a specific social, historical and political context. Thus, fieldwork comprising 
qualitative methods was most appropriate.  
 The fieldwork spanned two years (between April 2011 - June 2013), two 
cities (predominantly Istanbul, but also Diyarbakır, which I visited in May 2013), 
and involved in-depth interviews, observations at concerts and other social events, 
unstructured conversations with Kurdish individuals at these events and also during 
and after Kurdish language classes taken with Kurds who are not fluent in the 
language. I carried out the majority of the fieldwork in Istanbul, but also conducted 
interviews and made observations in Diyarbakır. These primary sources of data 
provided an emic oral-history account of illegal and legal music circulation and 
productions, starting in the 1970s, and continuing up until today. Archived print and 
online newspapers, magazines, as well as social media accounts of Kurdish music 
enthusiasts and activists also served as a valuable repository of data. These multiple 
sources of data were useful in ensuring the trustworthiness of the findings (Berg 
1998; Lincoln and Guba 1985).  Additionally, readings on both academic and 
journalistic analyses of the history of the “Kurdish Question” in Turkey were helpful 
in contextualizing the data, and understanding the institutional environment that gave 
rise to illegal circulation and the formal market for Kurdish music.  
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My very first informant, “Nizam,” was introduced by a mutual acquaintance, during 
a trip to Unkapanı, the headquarters of music production, located in the Fatih district 
in Istanbul. At the time, I had not yet decided to write a dissertation on the market for 
Kurdish music, but was intrigued by the hundreds of albums featuring music sung 
with Kurdish lyrics. Our informal conversation with the shop owner that day further 
piqued my curiosity: he spoke of Şivan Perwer, one of the most famed Kurdish 
singers, who had left the country in the 1970s and, at the time of our conversation, 
was yet to return. Perwer had declared, according to Nizam, that he would return 
only after there was “peace” in the country. (It should be noted that Perwer would 
return in the course of my writing this dissertation, although whether “peace” had 
arrived at the time of his return is highly debatable.) I left the office that day with an 
album - a recording of a female dengbêj - gifted to me by my acquaintance, and with 
seeds planted in my mind. Months later, when I decided tentatively to write my 
dissertation on Kurdish music, I started by interviewing Nizam. I contacted further 
informants through a variety of methods - in some cases, I asked a former informant 
to introduce or refer me to someone (which they sometimes did without even 
asking), whereas in other cases, I called, sent messages through facebook, or visited 
offices. Personal introductions, “greetings,” and name-dropping from previous 
informants were helpful in establishing rapport. As I prolonged my engagement, I 
came to learn and employ certain practices and emic terms, which ranged from 
drinking countless glasses of Ceylon tea (kaçak çay), to referring to the PKK as the 
“Kurdish movement.” 
 Throughout the fieldwork, I conducted a total of 27 loosely structured and 
recorded interviews with individuals who self-identified as ethnically Kurdish. Two 
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additional interviews (which exceeded “informal conversations”) took place without 
being recorded. All informants had come of age during or before the 1980s, they all 
witnessed the restrictions on Kurdish music, and were involved in circulating 
cassettes.  23 interviews were conducted in Istanbul, and 4 interviews were 
conducted in Diyarbakır, a major city in Southeastern Turkey with a predominantly 
Kurdish population. Business offices, cafes, cultural centers, and in one case, the 
home of the informant constituted the sites for interviews. In all cases, the interview 
sites were places where the informant and I could converse about politically sensitive 
topics: the three cafes where I conducted some interviews, for instance, were owned/
managed and frequented by Kurds, and the other sites were private spaces.   
 With the exception of three individuals who came of age in cities in the West 
of Turkey, all of the other informants grew up in cities, towns, or villages in the 
Southeastern/Eastern region (which I shall simply refer to as the “region” - an emic 
term - from this point on) of Turkey that are and historically have been densely 
populated with Kurds. Informal conversations also involved individuals who came of 
age in Western Europe. The accounts of the informants who did not grow up in the 
“region” provided insights on how the circulation of music also reached and 
influenced the lives of Kurds living in the Western parts of Turkey and abroad.  
 The sampling for finding and interviewing informants was purposive (Patton 
1990; Maxwell 1996): Once I started to get a “feel” of the field, I identified and 
interviewed a variety of producer-actors; who deployed political-normative frames, 
artistic logics, and commercial logics to different extents and in different 
combinations. Owners of music companies (referred to as “producers” (yapımcı) in 
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the music market); employees of a recording studio specializing in Kurdish music; 
performers (both singers and musicians); and retailers selling Kurdish music, were 
among the music market professionals interviewed.  I took care to interview some 
individuals who were identified, by other informants, as pioneers or key actors in the 
field. Several of these producer-actors were, before 1991 (the legalization of the 
market) actively involved in other circulation in the informal market, such as 
performing music, duplicating cassettes, and transporting them to different cities and 
towns in Turkey. Some of these individuals - such as the sound engineers at the 
recording studio, as well as the people working in the cultural centers, also had had 
careers as singers or musicians. Additionally, the directors of four cultural centers 
(two in Istanbul and two in Diyarbakır), one “songwriter” (i.e., composer and 
lyricist); two people involved with NGOs in Diyarbakır (with some involvement in 
concert organizations), and the co-owners of a Kurdish publishing house were 
interviewed to gain a better understanding of the overarching field of cultural 
production. The owners of the publishing house, who I interviewed early on, were 
particularly helpful in addressing some questions that I had, until then, found 
difficult to ask music producers - with their “outsider” (but still, to some extent, 
insider) position to the music market, they were able to provide valuable insights to 
topics that generated a “defensive” stance in music producers and performers. 
Finally, to enrich and diversify the data for the chapter on illegal circulation, four 
Kurdish individuals without any professional involvement with the formal music 
market were also interviewed.  
 I conducted all interviews in Turkish (the language in which all informants 
received formal education). I do not have sufficient knowledge of Kurdish to conduct 
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an interview, though my limited knowledge was somewhat helpful in establishing 
rapport, or at the very least, in setting a convivial tone with new acquaintances. (It 
should be noted, moreover, that not all of my informants are proficient at speaking 
Kurdish.) I transcribed most recorded interviews in their completion - although with 
a few, I transcribed only the most relevant portions. Before each interview, I prepared 
a list of “topics to be covered” with that particular interviewee, depending on his role 
in the market, but did not rely on an interview guide after seeing the futility of trying 
to do so during my first few interviews.  
 I told informants that my research was on the Kurdish music market (“Kürtçe 
müzik sektörü” which is an emic term). After deciding to write a chapter on illegal 
circulation, I told informants, if needed, that I was interested not only in the formal 
market (resmi sektor) but also in the “cassettes” before 1991. (Often illegal 
circulation came up without my prompting.) I assured informants that their real 
names or identifying characteristics would not be used - although many noted that 
they did not mind if I used their real names. I asked for permission and recorded the 
formal interviews. The interviews lasted from one hour to four hours, and some 
informants were interviewed up to three times. I tried to transcribe interviews almost 
immediately after I conducted them, so I could think about the analysis and also 
determine if I needed a follow-up. In order to protect the privacy of all those who 
have been consulted, I use pseudonyms (with few exceptions, which I indicate in the 
text) and exclude most personal details.   
 For the chapter on illegal circulation, interviews focused on informants’ 
memories of cassette circulation from their childhood or youth in the 1970s, 80s and 
90s: cassette-related experiences, encounters, and stories, intertwined with life 
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stories, were relayed. For the chapter on the formal market, I usually started by 
asking about how the informant became involved with the Kurdish music scene, and 
responses would often begin with (illegal) circulation of cassettes and continue onto 
the informants’ tenure at Unkapanı. Informants placed a great deal of emphasis on 
restrictions - some of this emphasis was based on actual encounters with law 
enforcement, but in a more general sense, the state, I came to realize, was a specter, 
providing a constant counterpoint to the market’s operations. All market activity was 
framed despite and against this (both real and imagined) opponent. This informed 
my focus in the second chapter, as the encounters with and the imagination of the 
state, co-producing the normative-political frames that infused the market culture.  
I maintained social relations with some of the informants, and our informal 
conversations – which sometimes included informants’ Kurdish friends, relatives, or 
spouses who were not formally interviewed - turned into impromptu focus groups 
about music, as well as on growing up and coming of age as a Kurd in Turkey. These 
conversations contributed significantly to my comprehension of the significance of 
the circulation of cassettes, both legally and illegally. 
 I observed behaviors, emotions, and conversations at public events - 
including concerts, talks, and political gatherings that involved musical performance. 
Concerts were particularly important in understanding the segmentation of the 
market after the 2000s: performers from different segments, and with different 
political orientations also drew visibly different audiences, who behaved in different 
ways. While some of the concerts (particularly of performers who I identify as 
belonging to the “world music segment”) also attracted Turkish audience, at other 
concerts, performers were predominantly Kurdish. I also observed interactions at 
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music production companies in Unkapanı and at a recording studio- although 
admittedly, I was not privy to the actual processes of recording, signing contracts, or 
other aspects of production. However, these observations still gave me some idea of 
relationships amongst Kurdish producers in Unkapanı, as well as their relationship to 
other production companies. Moreover, many informal conversations, at concerts, 
political activities, and through other social encounters, were also recorded as 
fieldnotes.  
 I also collected data from two different types of print media. Newspapers and 
magazines that were published by Kurds (often featuring both Kurdish and Turkish 
materials) - such as Özgür Gündem (newspaper), Tiroj, Nubihar, Dojin (magazines), 
as well as websites which compile newspaper articles, including published interviews 
and opinion pieces about music and performers (such as navkurd.eu; 
kurdishmagazine.com) were helpful in supporting my primary data. While I read 
through the physical archives of Kurdish-published specialty magazines (the Ismail 
Beşikçi Vakfı Library in Istanbul hosts an impressive archive of magazines, some of 
which published only a few issues), I conducted online searches to access newspaper 
articles and interviews. The online archives of mainstream Turkish newspapers, such 
as Radikal, Hürriyet, Milliyet and Cumhuriyet, on the other hand, were helpful in 
tracing when Kurdish music started to enter the mainstream, and which performers / 
companies were able to do so. Published interviews and opinion pieces, particularly 
after 2000, were especially informative.  
 Thus, approximately 250 pages of single-spaced interview transcripts, 300 
pages of notes on journal and newspaper archives, and over 300 pages of handwritten 
fieldnotes informed the emergent account presented here. 
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Analysis and fieldwork overlapped considerably. From early on, informants were 
interested in providing long answers, at times interweaving their responses with 
episodes from their life histories, as well as their personal analyses of political and 
historical events. I made a conscious decision to “follow participants down their 
diverse trails” (Riessman 2003). This intertwinement with life histories turned out to 
be quite influential in my understanding of how cassettes shaped the informants’ 
lives and their emotional understandings of themselves as “Kurds.” This 
understanding, moreover, helped me make sense of the way in which illegal 
circulation was a means through which several market actors were “produced” as 
producers (Weber et al. 2008) with a particular political orientation. It helped me 
understand how informants’ experiences growing up led them to perceive the state as 
oppressive, and themselves, as producers and/or audience members, as contributing - 
in one way or another - to a collective pro-Kurdish cause.  
 In moving from the emic to the etic, I followed a hermeneutic approach 
(Thompson 1997) to analysis, particularly as field data included detailed accounts of 
personal histories intertwined with emotional narratives on music, cassettes, 
circulation, and the formal market. Moving back and forth between inter- and intra-
textual approaches, I conducted several reiterations (Miles and Huberman 1994) of 
reading the data, coding, and engaging with theory. As a first step, I transcribed and 
coded each interview shortly after conducting it. Open coding - “the process of 
breaking down examining, comparing, conceptualizing, and categorizing 
data” (Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 61) - was following by generating higher-order 
categories and frames through axial coding (Strauss and Corbin 1990).  I similarly 
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coded other textual (archives of published materials, fieldnotes) data. In analyzing 
data for the chapter on illegal circulation, I identified common themes of resistance 
facilitated by the materiality of cassettes as well as the emotionally charged nature of 
these accounts, and thus engaged with theoretical literature on emotions, community, 
and resistance. The following iterations concerned moving back to individual 
accounts, working with parts of each text, in order to understand which emotions 
were generated through the circulation of cassettes, and how emotional 
understandings of belonging to community as well as emotional orientations towards 
resistance developed within accounts. This was followed by a re-engagement with 
the theoretical foundations, and refining the theoretical contributions.  
 The data on the legal market was more voluminous and more fragmented. 
The analysis underwent several re-iterations. At the outset, I engaged with a 
theoretical perspective that viewed market creation as a process of legitimation 
(Humphreys 2010b), but saw that the limitations of this view: not only did the market 
for Kurdish music not conform to a straightforward process of attaining legitimacy 
within mainstream culture; the theoretical story of legitimation also did not address 
the multiplicities and tensions in the social-political context. Yet, institutional theory 
provided further tools to address this issue: drawing on Bourdieu, I was able to better 
analyze the market as a field that is shaped by both “internal” and “external” 
processes. Thus, I tried to reflect this in the analysis by, on one hand, by 
understanding the “external” social and political contradictions and processes/
transformations, and also through analyzing the ways in which market actors framed 
(Benford and Snow 1988; Goffman 1976; Humphreys 2010a; Lounsbury et al. 2003) 
their practices as well as their perceptions of the market and the context.  Again, 
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reading iteratively, across and within interviews, I grouped together the frames that 
actors used to diagnose their grievances and prognose actions, and constructed a 
narrative of how a particular “alternative” market culture (Spillman 1999) emerged. I 
finally presented the final portion of my findings to portray the market as divided 
into multiple segments following the early 2000s, accompanied by changes in the 
social, political, and technological environment.  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CHAPTER 2: 
!
AN EMOTIONAL ECONOMY OF MUNDANE OBJECTS‑  1
!
!
2.1 Introduction 
Performing, broadcasting, and selling music with Kurdish-language lyrics was 
restricted in Turkey through most of the 20th Century. Yet, cassette technology, 
starting from the mid-1970s, and overlapping with the escalation of ethnic strife and 
violence, brought vitality to an underground music scene. Anyone in possession of a 
tape recorder was able to become a brave producer as well as a consumer of dissident 
music. Cassettes were copiously recorded at homes or smuggled across the borders; 
duplicated, exchanged among friends and relatives; hidden in dowry chests or buried 
underground; sold in streetcars, or from the under the counter, shrouded by covers of 
Turkish pop. Music was played behind closed doors, with children standing guard in 
hallways and door-fronts, and an exit plan in place for what to do with the cassettes if 
authorities dropped in. Cartoonists portrayed cassettes as hand grenades, ready to 
blow up in the face of law enforcement.  There was fear, among the Kurds, of getting 
$26
 This chapter has been derived from a portion of an eponymously titled article published in 1
Consumption Markets and Culture. When citing from this chapter, please refer accordingly:  
Kuruoğlu, Alev P., and Güliz Ger. 2014. "An emotional economy of mundane objects." Consumption 
Markets & Culture DOI: 10.1080/10253866.2014.976074: 1-30. 
caught, and anger at the state and its instruments. There was also love for the music, 
the singers, and the landscapes immortalized in song, and also for the people with 
whom the music was shared. There was sorrow, for people lost and hometowns left 
behind, but also hope for better times. While music, in its evocative glory, may seem 
to be the glue that sticks these people, places, and experiences together, the unsung 
hero of this story is a thing that transcends its mundaneness. 
 In this chapter, I examine how a commodity, such as a cassette, plays a vital 
part, through its circulation, in generating community and resistance. The cassette, as 
an artefact, is easy to hide, transport, distribute, and record upon, and it easily evades 
attempts to restrict its circulation. Cassettes have been credited with facilitating 
monumental transformations such as overthrowing regimes (Sreberny-Mohammadi 
and Mohammadi 1994), instigating religious revivals (Hirschkind 2006), as well as 
re-aligning interpersonal dynamics, such as family relationships (Abu-Lughod 1989). 
They have been discussed as taking part in these transformations mainly by virtue of 
the textual content (be it song, poetry, or speech) they mediate. Studies on 
consumption and markets have shown, however, that objects, in their materiality, 
take part in the social construction of identities, relationships and collectivities.  
 Things do not just “represent” and “communicate,” but “objectify” identities, 
relationships, symbols, values, meanings, power, and tensions (Borgerson 2005, 
2009; Chitakunye and Maclaran 2014; Craig 2011; Douny 2011; Holttinen 2014; 
Kravets and Örge 2010; Madianou and Miller 2011; Miller 1987, 1998, 2005). The 
circulation of objects across space and time, moreover, has a performative and 
materializing character (Aronczyk and Craig 2012; Lee and LiPuma 2002) that 
serves to constitute the objects themselves as well as the imagined communities 
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(Anderson 1983) within which they circulate. Thus, I approach cassettes, in their 
materiality, as “more than transmitters of content” (Larkin 2008, 2). Even though 
emotionality is implicit in the relationships that are objectified, such as love among 
members of a family (Miller 1998), or the “feeling” of belonging to a community 
(Anderson 1983), we discern that the affective potentialities that materialization 
entails have not been explicated. I thus inquire: How does a nexus of emotionality 
and materiality emerge and serve to generate community and resistance? 
 My focus on the nexus of emotionality and materiality moves from the 
premise that emotions are evoked by encounters with other bodies and objects: 
emotions “stick” and circulate with these objects (Ahmed 2004). Emotions are 
conceptualized as active, energy-laden (Illouz 2007), and generative: they create 
affective fields (Harris and Sørensen 2010), and move individuals and collectivities 
into shared ways of feeling, thinking, and acting (Ahmed 2004, 2010; Calhoun 2001; 
Illouz 2007; Gould 2009; Kane 2001). Thus, as an effect of their circulation, 
emotions generate common orientations and dispositions – hence, an emotional 
habitus accompanies the emergence of a sense of “us” as well as the delineation of 
the “other.” The role of emotions in shaping communal imaginaries (Chronis, 
Arnould, and Hampton 2012) and structuring consumption practices (Gopaldas 2014; 
Thompson 2005) has been noted, but how objects and consumption experiences play 
a part in the emergence of  “structured and structuring” (Swartz 1997) emotional 
structures is less clear. I thus study how an emotional habitus emerges, and how it 
shapes practices and collective imaginaries. 
 The circulation of the emotionally potent yet legally inadmissible cassette 
also draws our attention to the performance of resistance through objects and their 
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uses (Smith 2009). I propose, moreover, that the emotionality that shapes and is also 
generated by resistance, in conjunction with materiality, deserves closer scrutiny. 
Thus, I study how the materiality-emotionality nexus serves in resisting dominant 
orders. In so doing, I also contribute to consumption studies scholarship on resistance 
(Izberk-Bilgin 2010 for a review). I elucidate how an emergent community engages 
with consumption in the making of a collective ethnic identity and in resisting a 
hegemonic order other than the market. Accordingly, I also extend discussions on the 
role played by emotions in oppositional communities (Jasper 2011; Sandlin and 
Callahan 2009) by providing an account of the interplay of materiality, emotions, and 
consumption in everyday resistance. 
 Hence, I focus on the practices that propel cassettes into circulation; the 
emotions these cassettes elicit during their encounters with subjects; the 
relationships, socialities and communality they objectify, and the boundaries they 
solidify, as they traverse their paths of circulation. 
!
2.2 Theoretical Foundations 
!
2.2.2 Emotional Materiality 
Objects, in their capacity to symbolize and represent meanings, values, mythologies, 
relationships, and identities have drawn considerable scholarly interest (e.g., Belk 
1988; Bonsu and Belk 2003; Grayson and Shulman 2000; Holt 2004; Levy 1959; 
McCracken 1986; Mick 1986; Moisio, Arnould, and Price 2004; Solomon 1983; 
Wallendorf and Arnould 1988; Weiner 1994). On the other hand, material culture 
studies have drawn our attention to the entwinement of meanings, symbols, 
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subjectivities, and relationships with the artefactual quality of objects (e.g., Aronczyk 
and Craig 2012; Beckstead et al. 2001; Borgerson 2005, 2009; Craig 2011; Douny 
2011; Kravets and Örge 2010; Miller 1987, 1998, 2005; Smith 2009) and to the 
constitutive and co-emergent, rather than merely representative, nature of this 
entwinement. Familial socialization and interaction (e.g., Chitakunye and Maclaran 
2014; Holttinen 2014; Madianou and Miller 2011; Miller 1998), as well as belonging 
to religious (D’Alisera 2001; Tarlo 2007), ethnic (Avieli 2009), or literary (Craig 
2011) communities are thus seen to be objectified and mediated by objects that are 
enmeshed in peoples’ everyday lives – such as clothes, accessories, chapbooks, food, 
letters, cassettes, and television. This objectification of identities, relationships, and 
collectivities may take place in ways that conform to (Douny 2011; Naji 2009) or 
resist and challenge (Smith 2009) dominant moral or political orders and hierarchies. 
Such processes involve the entwinement of materiality and symbolism (e.g., 
Bartmanski and Woodward 2013; Craig 2011; Curasi, Price, and Arnould 2004; 
D’Alisera 2001; Douny 2011; Epp and Price 2010; Holttinen 2014; Kravets and Örge 
2010; Sandıkcı and Ger 2010) - and thus the symbolic densification of objects 
(Weiner 1994).  
Yet, one detects that the relationships and ideals that are materialized, 
transformed, and negotiated through objects and related practices – such as 
provisioning (Miller 1998), preparing food (Holttinen 2014), watching television 
(Chitakunye and Maclaran 2014), exchanging written letters and audio recordings 
(Madianou and Miller 2011) in the context of the “loving family,” or making clothes 
that materialize mother-daughter and kinship bonds (Margiotti 2013) – are also 
inherently emotional. I wonder if the objectification of emotional relationships is 
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accompanied by the saturation of these objects with affect. Thus, relevant to my 
focus in this chapter is understanding (1) how objects become laden with 
emotionality and (2) how this emotional potency serves community and resistance.  
Consumer research literature has explored the evocative and experiential 
aspect of consumption objects and practices; as well as the influence of emotions in 
motivating consumption practices, bonding individuals, and building communities of 
varying degrees of permanence. Emotions are viewed as influencing consumption 
choice and decision making processes (e.g., Mogilner, Aaker, and Kamvar 2012; 
Shiv and Fedorikhin 1999). Transient emotional states - excitement, pleasure, anger, 
and others - are seen as evoked by consumption experiences (Arnould and Price 
1993; Belk and Costa 1998; Belk, Wallendorf, and Sherry 1989; Bonsu and Belk 
2003; Bonsu, Darmody and Parmentier 2010; Celsi, Rose, and Leigh 1993; Goulding 
et al. 2009; Henry and Caldwell 2007; Holbrook and Hirschman 1982; Holt 1995; 
Martin 2004; Mick and Fournier 1998; Wallendorf and Arnould 1991). These 
activities, when performed in the company of others, may lead to shared heightened 
emotional states - what Durkheim (2001 [1912]) refers to as “collective 
effervescence,” and a sense of togetherness - Turner’s (1969) communitas.  
Research on brand and consumption communities, as well as consumer 
resistance movements (e.g., Belk and Costa 1998; Cova and Cova 2002; Cronin, 
McCarthy, and Collins 2014; Kozinets 2001, 2002; Muniz and O’Guinn 2001; 
Portwood-Stacer 2012; Sandlin and Callahan 2009; Schouten and McAlexander 
1995; Thompson 2005; Thompson and Arsel 2004; Thompson and Coskuner-Balli 
2007) also refer to a sense of communality amongst participants. Such communities 
– akin to postmodern “tribes” (Maffesoli 1996) – are characterized by voluntary 
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participation. While some communities are more transient, participation to others are 
more enduring. Thompson (2005), drawing on Williams (1977, 1979) has noted that 
commitment to such communities are structured by shared ideological beliefs which 
are experienced by participants as “feelings.”  
 Furthermore, collective consumption practices and experiences have also 
been demonstrated to mediate more permanent bonds among subjects and 
collectivities. Gift-giving, for instance, expresses and (re-)aligns relatively non-
transient emotional relationships (Belk and Coon 1993; Joy 2001; Ruth, Otnes and 
Brunel 1999; Sherry 1983) between individuals and within a community (Weinberger 
and Wallendorf 2012), as do various consumption activities that take place in the 
context of romantic relationship (Illouz 2007, 2009). Touristic consumption 
experiences of visiting historical sites and exhibitions have been argued to generate 
emotional responses that serve collective imaginaries and communal bonding 
(Chronis 2006; Chronis et al. 2012) at the national level. Emotional object-subject 
bonds (e.g., Ahuvia 2005; Belk 1988; Fournier 1998; Lastovicka and Sirianni 2011; 
Roster 2014) often relate to self-identity, but may also serve interpersonal and 
communal ends.  
Thus, even though few studies explicitly deal with emotions as an analytical 
category (see Gopaldas 2014 and Illouz 2009 for critiques), several have worked on 
emotion-laden topics and point us in the direction of emotions structuring practices, 
generating shared dispositions, and binding collectivities. I have discerned, however, 
that we know less about the co-constitutive linkages amongst the elicitation of 
emotions - particularly as mediated by objects, the generation of structures, and the 
materialization of communal relationships. I thus trace the emergence of an 
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emotional structure which, in turn, animates consumption practices, and structures 
relationships and communities.  
To this end, I turn to the literature that explores the generative capacity of 
emotions. Emotions have been conceptualized as evaluative (Nussbaum 2003), 
energy-laden (Illouz 2007). Arising through humans’ interactions with other bodies - 
imagined or real, human or non-human, individual or collective - emotions can also 
move and orient people towards and apart from other bodies, and into shared ways of 
being and acting (Ahmed 2004; Burkitt 1997, 2002; Calhoun 2001; Harris and 
Sørensen 2010; Kane 2001). In other words, emotions can generate dispositions, a la 
Bourdieu. In understanding how emotions generate structures and dispositions, I find 
inspiration in Ahmed’s (2004) arguments that emotions are “sticky” and that they 
circulate.  
In what Ahmed terms an “affective economy,” emotions stick to and circulate 
with bodies and objects, and in effect, also stick subjects together. To illustrate, 
“hate” is evoked by and sticks onto the bodies of such figures as the “immigrant” and 
circulates with these bodies, as well as through hate speeches and texts. Ahmed 
suggests that hate “intensifies” on these bodies - in other words, these bodies become 
saturated with hate. This intensification “sticks” the bodies of the immigrants 
together as a “common threat,” while at the same time binding the “white nation” as 
a unified community. Thus, intensification has a twofold effect: it not only shapes an 
understanding of which bodies constitute “us,” but also constitutes and delineates 
certain bodies as the “other” and draws boundaries between the two. This can work 
through objects saturated with negative emotions, such as hate and fear as in the 
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immigrant and the terrorist, but also through objects of positive emotions, such as 
love and happiness (Ahmed 2010) as in the “objects” of the family and the nation.  
Harris and Sørensen (2010), drawing on Ahmed (2004) suggest that material 
objects generate and are inherent to “affective fields:” webs of emotionally evocative 
relationships amongst objects, things, and places. I discern that this notion of 
affective fields provides a linkage between Ahmed’s affective economy and 
objectification: Practices and processes that materialize relationships also draw 
individuals into the affective fields generated by the object. I suggest that individuals 
who are drawn into an object’s affective field become linked to others who have been 
similarly affected by the object: they come to have a common repertoire of 
experiences, emotions, and relationships related to that object, and they take a certain 
position with respect to this object. In other words, they are oriented. This 
orientation, in turn, can be broadened to encompass a more general way of relating to 
the world: taking inspiration from Bourdieu, an emotional habitus. This term has 
been used by several scholars (e.g., Calhoun 2001; Gould 2009; Illouz 2007; Kane 
2001) to describe the deeply internalized, unreflexive, and partially conscious 
“structure” that shapes relations and (re)actions to objects or situations. The 
emotional saturation and circulation of objects thus generate affective fields, and 
attune people into common orientations and dispositions. Thus, one can extrapolate: 
Objects, by generating, embodying, and circulating emotions across space and time, 
also play a part in shaping an emotional habitus. Through their encounters with these 
objects, individuals and collectivities become habituated. 
Bridging Ahmed’s perspective on the circulation of emotions with literature 
on materiality, I propose that the objects can become “sticky” and “intense,” with a 
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multitude of emotions, and this “stickiness” is integral to the materializing nature 
(Aronczyk and Craig 2012) of object circulation. The process of intensification, we 
note, also suggests temporality: the circulation of an object, as it continues through 
time and space, leads to more intense emotionality. This, in turn, can be said to 
thicken the threads that weave together a collectivity: solidifying the sense of “us,” 
while concomitantly rigidifying the boundaries against the “other.” Thus, a shared 
emotional disposition is generated by the circulation of a class of objects, and in turn 
this disposition is what binds and delineates the communal body.   
I inquire how mundane objects of everyday life can become “sticky” with 
multiple emotions, and set an affective economy into motion. In a context laden with 
ethnic strife, and where the circulation of certain objects is restricted, I note that this 
circulation takes on a resistive character, and the emotional economy takes on a 
particularly political significance. I am compelled to ask, then, how emotions and 
materiality work together in producing and solidifying imaginaries of communities 
and boundaries, and in this process, also constitute resistance. Hence, I seek to 
elucidate how the affective potentiality of an object animates emotional structures 
that shape community and resistance. 
!
2.2.3 Movement and Resistance  
The way that community is materialized through objects and practices not only 
reproduces collective imaginaries and reinforces relationships, but also by doing so 
may position the collectivity in opposition to its other(s). Opposition is often 
articulated in terms of “grievances” (Snow and Benford 1988) – perceived injustice, 
inequality, and wrongdoings, which, as the term itself implies, are “felt.”  Grievances 
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and opposition thus also correspond to a shared emotional orientation – one most 
commonly of anger and indignation - with respect to certain orders and institutions. 
Thus, opposition also entails an emotional habitus.   
 Opposition can take one of two forms. It can develop into political activism 
and social movements (Tarrow 2012), in which collective grievances are framed and, 
in concert with resources and opportunities, fuel collective action. Movement 
activists often engage in “emotion work” (Hochschild 1979; Sandlin and Callahan 
2009) – managing emotions through various tools (including music, imagery, and 
speech acts) to strengthen the sense of shared identity and purpose within the 
movement, and to mobilize people into action (Jasper 2011). Visible and large-scale 
organized action, however, is not the only way in which opposition is enacted. The 
domain of mundane everyday practices (De Certeau 1988) and more evasive and 
small-scale acts of disobedience (Abu-Lughod 1990; Scott 1990) also constitute 
forms of resistance. Unlike the “strategies” (De Certeau 1988) that dominant 
institutional actors employ, the subordinate engage in less organized material and 
discursive practices, such as poaching, pilfering, tax evasion, rumor, and gossip 
(Scott 1990). Rather than geared towards being noticed, these practices are 
performed with the hopes that they will remain undetected – yet they also function in 
ways to shake the authority of dominant orders. Scott (1990, 184) terms such 
practices as constituting “infrapolitics,” noting that they often co-exist with and 
“[provide] much of the cultural and structural underpinning of the more visible 
political action on which our attention has been generally focused.” Materiality, as 
emergent within specific social and historical contexts, is particularly pertinent to 
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such types of resistance (Smith 2009). Yet, the nexus of emotionality and materiality 
that is generated by, and which in turn (re)produces such infrapolitical or tactical 
resistance remains to be explicated. I shall thus inquire how tactical or infrapolitical 
practices weave the emotional underpinning of  a collective resistance. 
 The potentialities of emotional-material dynamics for generating tactical 
resistance remains to be explicated not only in the social sciences but also in 
consumer research literature. Consumer researchers have focused on the market and 
consumerism as the hegemonic order to be resisted (Izberk-Bilgin 2010; see also 
Cronin, McCarthy and Collins 2014; Gopaldas 2014; Izberk-Bilgin 2012; Karababa 
and Ger 2011; Mikkonen and Bajde 2013; Portwood-Stacer 2012; Sandlin and 
Callahan 2011; Ulver-Sneistrup, Askegaard and Christensen 2011). Moreover, 
cassette technology has allowed amateur producers to engage with the production, 
circulation, and distribution of music, and thus to subvert hegemonic market orders 
(Manuel 1993). However, market actors can also collaborate and challenge other 
dominant orders, including the state (Goulding et al. 2009; Humphreys 2010; 
Karababa and Ger 2011; Sandıkcı and Ger 2010).  I thus supplement this emergent 
research on how communities engage with markets in opposing dominant structures 
other than the market.  In doing so, I also respond to Izberk-Bilgin’s (2010, 319) call 
for investigations of oppositional communities “where social solidarity is longer-
lasting and not based on brand loyalty, and to which membership cannot be 
purchased.” Accordingly, I examine grassroots practices of cassette circulation as 
sites of emotional and communal resistance that target the state.  I thus explore the 
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emotionality of these resistive material practices, and explicate how such practices 
simultaneously facilitate unity around a shared ethnic identity.  
!
2.3 Findings: The Circulation of Cassettes 
The mid-1970s saw the widespread availability of cassette technology throughout 
Turkey – and hence, the practices of circulating cassettes commenced and continued 
until the late 1990s. While a portion of Kurdish cassettes in circulation were 
recordings made by pro-Kurdish organizations, local performances of oral 
performers – foremostly the dengbêj – as well as other artists were also recorded. 
After the 1980 military coup d’état, many performers fled the country, while others 
were jailed or forced to stop performing. The dengbêj were left unable to travel as 
they used to, and the live music scene became more or less silent. Yet, beneath this 
silence, behind hidden doors, a thriving cassette culture emerged along with a 
resistive community.  
Studio recordings of artists who sought asylum in Europe in 1980s made their 
way into Turkey hidden in the suitcases of Kurds making a living as “guestworkers” 
in various European countries, and were also smuggled across the borders by 
professional smugglers. Dengbêj music that had been recorded during live 
performances in the 70s, on the other hand, was continually circulated, through 
copies of amateur home recordings. The 1980s thus saw no shortage of music 
circulation, despite various risks associated with recording, owning, playing, and 
exchanging cassettes.  Cassettes, being small, cheap, durable, and easy to record on, 
transport, and hide, seem ideal for carrying music. But, as we shall see, these 
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material properties also made cassettes open for becoming saturated with affect and, 
in the process, made them matter.  
Set in that stage, I identified four entangled practices, which (non-linearly) 
comprise circulation: recording, hiding, listening, and exchanging.  I now 
demonstrate how these practices set into motion an embedded emotional economy, 
an illegal market, and a resistive community. 
!
2.3.1 Recording Music: Capturing Emotions on Tape 
My findings reveal that the recording of music onto cassettes was often an emotional 
affair. I shall illustrate how social and political circumstances engendered the 
recording process as an evocative occasion, and, in turn, how the cassettes became 
“sticky” with the emotions that were evoked during the process. Two practices are 
poignant in this regard: home recordings of dengbêj sessions in Turkey and a studio 
recording made in Europe.   
Until the 1980s, a typical dengbêj would travel through the countryside in the 
“region,” stopping for visits in towns and villages where families could host him. He 
would perform his songs, which could be based on a range of topics, including 
historical events, folk legends, and love stories. The townsfolk would gather at the 
host’s home and listen to these performances, which sometimes went on for nights on 
end. In the 1970s, with the availability of cassette technology, hosts started to record 
these sessions. In return for the performance, the host would present the dengbêj with 
gifts of grains or livestock. After the 1970s, owning a cassette recorder also became a 
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requisite to host a dengbêj. Cem, a restaurant manager in his mid-30s, had an uncle 
who performed this role in their village in the city of Muş. Cem recalls, 
“[My uncle] was not a rich man, but he found the resources, not only to 
provide the dengbêj  with gifts, but also to [buy] new recording devices. 
He always ordered new cassette recorders from relatives who came to 
visit from Germany, and he recorded all of the dengbêj sessions that took 
place in his home.”  
Cem noted that his uncle performed a “sacrifice” by allocating what limited 
resources he had to acting as a patron of dengbêjs. Dengbêjs and their hosts were 
discussed by Cem, as well as by other informants, as preserving what has now come 
to be consciously termed as “heritage,” thus performing community service, and 
doing so as acts of love and sacrifice. The host’s generosity would, in turn, be 
recognized by the dengbêj, who would acknowledge the host’s names when 
recording began. Thus, the host’s name would also be heard during replays of copies, 
sometimes hundreds or thousands of miles away and by people who had no 
connection to the original “producer” of the cassette. This love towards the dengbêj, 
and the respectful recognition of sacrifice performed by the host, would thus become 
part of a constellation, along with the music and narratives, that would find body in 
and circulate with the “object” of the cassette. 
Recordings were often made using a cheap and simple tape recorder, in the 
presence of adults seated around the dengbêj, children running around, and audience 
shouting terms of encouragement and adulation to the performer. These atmospheric 
sounds, the substandard audio quality due to poor recording equipment, the crackles 
arising from the material wear and tear of the cassettes after they were played and 
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duplicated too many times, are not seen as distractions. Rather, as Dicle and Melda, 
co-owners of a publishing house, fondly reminisce, “you could not think of [dengbêj] 
music in any other way.” These sounds, music, narratives and the cassette have been 
discussed by informants as an integral part of growing up “in a Kurdish household.” 
The physical and experiential particularities of the recording process weave into the 
cassette, saturating it with the excitement, joy, and everydayness of the recording 
process. These emotions seep into future experiences of listening, intensifying and 
becoming more tangible as the cassette continues to circulate.  
The material properties of the cassette recorder and the cassette itself meant 
that amateur recordings as well as duplicates could be easily made and easily 
circulated (as opposed to vinyl, which had to be recorded professionally, and was 
quite fragile). The cassettes, by circulating, enabled audiences to hear similar sounds 
and experience similar emotions - generating a shared repertoire. Dicle and Melda, 
despite having grown up in Zazaki and Kurmanji speaking homes, respectively, in 
different parts of the “region,” recount these cassettes in very similar, lovingly 
familiar terms, as does Cem, whose childhood was divided between the “region” and 
a city in Western Turkey. Individuals who grew up in times or regions where 
dengbêjs did not perform also became privy to the dengbêj experience through these 
crackly, noisy cassettes – thus a union in experience and emotional orientations 
regarding the dengbêjs, the music, the hosts, and the cassettes took place; uniting 
people across geographies, differences in practices of oral traditions, or tribal origins. 
The connections among those in the audience at the time of the recording, those in 
different villages and cities who received and further exchanged this recording, and 
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those hearing it, perhaps ten years in the future in another city are materialized 
through these cassettes, which carry different songs but have been recorded through 
similar practices and give way to similar emotional experiences – which, in turn, are 
articulated in very similar ways. The cassette, then, is an “object” uniting these 
audiences: its materiality is entwined with the emotionality generated during its 
recording and through other practices that follow. 
Studio albums produced professionally in Europe and brought into Turkey by 
guest workers – on their own accord or upon insistent demands - comprised another 
class of recordings in circulation, particularly in the 1980s, and generated similar 
emotional dynamics. The narrative of the recording of Helebçe, a song written and 
performed by Şivan Perwer, stands out as a collective reminiscence. Perwer, 
arguably the most famed, beloved, but also polarizing among Kurdish artists, has 
lived in Europe after fleeing Turkey in 1976 (Kevirbiri 2004). His albums have, 
nonetheless, circulated extensively, with some reportedly reaching a circulation of 
hundreds of thousands in illegal copies. The extent of his influence is best expressed 
by Utku, a music producer: “No single book, no single word has been as influential 
as [his] music, as unifying as his music,” particularly in “connecting people to their 
Kurdishness” and mobilizing them politically - an influence made possible through 
illegal circulation. Helebçe, the song in question, was recorded on Perwer’s 
eponymous album, in 1988, shortly after Saddam Hussein’s administration 
committed a chemical attack on the Kurdish-populated town of Halabja in Northern 
Iraq, leaving an estimated 5,000 people dead. Perwer, deeply moved by photos of the 
tragedy – of children lying dead, of an old man crying – composed a song and 
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recorded it in one take. The story of how he wrote and recorded the song has become 
a matter of circulation in itself, with Perwer recounting the story in interviews (e.g., 
Matur 2009; Perwer 2013), emphasizing that he was crying in pain while recording 
and that he wanted his cries to be heard on the record. Word of the song reached 
Turkey before the album itself, and once the cassette came, it was greeted with a 
mixture of joy and sorrow. Murat, a university student at the time, recalled receiving 
the Helebçe cassette, in Diyarbakır: “I’ve seen people cry when they received that 
album,” he said, “not just because of the song, but also because we were able to 
procure such a beautifully recorded album.”  
The sorrow that Perwer recorded as a reaction to the Halabja massacre, while 
he was in exile from his own homeland, is bridged to the audience’s sorrows 
regarding their own strife and struggles- particularly those related to being a Kurd, 
and the collective sorrows were intensified with the circulation of the cassette. The 
cassette, when it is delivered into the hands of a Kurd in Diyarbakır, is already 
loaded. Many Kurds have already been touched by the emotions and atmospheres 
that Perwer sings about, and they already have an emotional repertory (Nussbaum 
2003) related to music cassettes. Even before they receive the physical artifact, or 
before they hear the songs on the album, they are ready to be attuned to the affective 
field (Harris and Sørensen 2010) generated by the cassette, and are thus the cassette’s 
primary addressees (Warner 2002).  The sorrowful emotional orientation with respect 
to Halabja (the city), as mediated by Helebçe (the cassette) eventually comes to be 
shared by many a Kurd: thus the cassette plays a part in shaping an emotional 
habitus, and elevates a collectivity formed around the cassette into a broader 
$43
“Kurdish” community. In Ahmed’s (2004) terms, the cassette becomes sticky with 
emotion, and by virtue of this stickiness, plays a part in bonding the community. 
These two examples illustrate how recording music onto cassettes sets the 
stage for the emotions, experiences, and narratives that would come to circulate 
throughout the cassette’s trajectory. The social, historical, and material properties 
regarding the manner in which the music is performed, recorded, played, and 
exchanged, along with musical content and stories that circulate, potentiates the 
cassettes with emotional density. Affective fields that are comprised of joy, sorrow, 
anger, or pain felt by those involved in recording, continued to circulate as the 
cassettes were received, played, exchanged: intensifying even when cassettes 
remained hidden in chests, buried underground, or were burned in fires. The 
circulation of cassettes, starting with recording the music, thus provided the means 
for socialization (Thompson 2005) into an emergent “structure of feelings” (Williams 
1977, 1979). This structure, as I will continue to explore, became stronger through 
time, as emotions intensified (Ahmed 2004); and came to encompass a broader 
constituency: the community was imagined as larger but also as more solid, and the 
boundaries against the “other” became more defined.   
!
2.3.2 Hiding, Storing and Destroying Cassettes: Emotions Buried 
and Afloat 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, households in the “region” were frequently 
searched by police, military, or special operative forces. Materials that were seen as 
evidence linking inhabitants to illegal activities and organizations (particularly the 
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PKK) included Kurdish music cassettes, even after the production and sales of 
Kurdish music became legal. Individuals arrested and taken under custody were 
reportedly subject to severe physical violence, and often received terrorism charges 
and a prison sentence. Tahir, a musician and sound engineer says, “Some people 
never survived these arrests... some people’s fingers and arms were broken.” News of 
such ordeals would travel, accompanied by waves of fear and anticipation of 
violence. Thus, cassettes were often kept hidden in hopes of escaping detection 
during a possible search: the bottoms of women’s dowry chests, beneath the 
haystacks in the barn, and sometimes, buried deep underground. 
Sami, a social worker in his 30s, grew up in a small Kurdish-inhabited town 
in the Northern part of the “region,” in the same household as his uncle. His narrative 
illustrates the secrecy and care his family paid in hiding their cassettes: 
My uncle owned a large collection of cassettes, which he kept hidden 
somewhere in the house, in a briefcase, next to his guns. Every once in a 
while, he would ceremoniously take the briefcase out of its hiding place, 
which no one else in the household knew. Everyone would gather around 
the cassette player, observe, and listen. No one else was allowed to 
handle the cassettes.  !
Sami’s uncle had accumulated this collection arduously throughout the years, 
through gifts and by requesting cassettes from personal contacts. However, in 1990, 
the town became rife with tension due to armed conflict between the PKK and the 
military. Police raided households suspected of aiding the PKK, and took several 
people under custody, which started, in Sami’s words, “an endless cycle of violence 
and torture.” Sami’s narrative highlights intensification of fear during that period: 
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It was terrible, everyone was really frightened. It was a huge crime to be 
caught owning guns, because there were armed conflicts all around. In 
that period, all the cassettes were also destroyed. But before they were 
destroyed, I remember that the cassettes and the guns were thrown into a 
hole that was dug in the barn and then buried. They were buried as a 
precaution, [the cassettes] were that dangerous, that’s how [we] perceived 
the situation. 
I note that the cassette comes to be perceived, by Kurds and Turkish 
authorities alike, as a “weapon” (as dangerous as guns) against the state. Hiding, 
burying, or otherwise destroying cassettes are ways of tricking the authorities - what 
De Certeau (1988) refers to as diversionary tactics of “perruque” - to the objects, and 
thus constitute infrapolitics or tactical resistance (Scott 1990). Fear was a prominent 
response to being sealed (Ahmed 2003, 2004) as “terrorists” by the law, the 
authorities, and to some extent the general public, and this fear “stuck” onto the 
cassettes, through their possession being associated with “terrorist activities.” Fear 
intensifies with the burial and destruction of the cassette, and a fearful relationship 
between the people and the state is materialized through this practice. As such, the 
very presence of the state as “the other” is felt through these emotionally charged 
experiences, and the emotional saturation of the cassettes become denser.  
Throughout fieldwork, I witnessed that informants were most moved - with 
anger as well as sorrow - while they were relating stories about hiding or destroying 
their cassettes. It was not unusual for a Kurdish informant or acquaintance to offer a 
story about their buried cassettes, almost immediately after we met. Elif, a Kurdish 
student raised in German, is one such example She spoke of visiting her family’s 
village during the summers in the 1990s, and noted how surprised she was when one 
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summer, her cousins took her to the barns and retrieved some cassettes that were 
hidden underneath the haystacks. This occasion was her initiation into understanding 
the fears, secrecy, and frustration associated with being a Kurd in Turkey - this took 
place through her initiation into the affective field generated by the cassettes. Ersin, a 
librarian in his 30s, talked about the cassettes his father had felt obligated to bury in 
their backyard, not five minutes after we met. He was visibly saddened when he 
recounted how, twenty years after burying these cassettes, his father had asked to 
find them. He and his brothers managed to locate and unearth these cassettes - 
unforgotten for twenty years - but they were consumed by mould and had to be 
thrown away. Despite being disposed of, the cassettes continued to have an 
emotional hold on the family to this day - an indication that the affective field does 
not necessarily diminish once the object is destroyed. Similarly, a number of other 
informants have commented that there are “graveyards” of cassettes (kaset 
mezarlıkları) throughout the “region.” The repetition of this emotionally loaded 
metaphor is indicative of a shared emotional vocabulary (Burkitt 2002) developed to 
express similar feelings generated by the practice of burying, and which might not be 
initially comprehendible to outsiders. This, in turn, is indicative of a “structure” of 
emotions, or a habitus: one that is reinforced through practices of hiding and burying, 
as well as the narratives that continued to circulate.  
Hiding or burying create an even stronger affective field around the cassettes, 
and these fields also served to compound and intensify fear, anger, and resentment; 
thus reinforcing a resistive stance against the state. This relationship amongst the 
state and the Kurds, as objectified through the cassettes, was also narrated through 
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the notion of being “marked:” a more literal usage of the term relates to the arrests 
(i.e., “marks”) that many Kurds had on their legal records. In a more figurative sense, 
it relates to a “feeling” of being marked as an illegitimate member of society. It is so 
common to be “marked” in both manners that when the state established a Kurdish-
language television channel in 2009, their attempts to find Kurdish employees with 
“clean records” became a source of ridicule among Kurds, because, in Dicle’s words, 
“there are no unmarked Kurds.” Being “marked” due to owning, hiding, or burying 
cassettes, and the narratives that accompanied these “marks” intensified the affective 
field generated by the cassettes. The notion of “sacrifice” also deeply colors these 
“marking” experiences and narratives related to cassettes. Informants emphasized, 
“despite all the risks,” people continued to procure and hide music cassettes, some 
forsaking their safety and freedom in the process - a notion that is emically referred 
to as “bedel,” a Turkish word that roughly translates as “sacrificial price.” Again, this 
emotionally loaded term is part of a shared vocabulary and expresses the resentful, 
fearful, but also proud emotional orientation that accompanies a resistive stance 
against the state.    
Thus a generative structure emerges: the emotional habitus, shaped by 
experiences and narratives, in turn disposes its constituents towards certain ways of 
being, acting, and feeling. An emotional habitus shaped by fear, anger/resentment, 
sacrifice, and sorrow in turn shaped practices that were sacrificial and resistive - and 
such practices further reinforced the emotional structure. Rather than serving identity 
projects that are limited to the individual (Ahuvia 2005; Belk 1988; Roster 2014) or 
the nuclear family (Curasi, Price, and Arnould 2004; Epp and Price 2008, 2010) the 
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possession, use and dispossession of objects generated emotional experiences and 
orientations which led to (real or imagined) alignments with a collective body.  In-
group and out-group dynamics also simultaneously took shape through this process. 
The very idea of an “other” takes shape as a coherent entity - in this case, the state 
and its apparatuses - through encounters and experiences that also generate an 
emotional structure. Such coherence and boundary shaping dynamics also 
characterized experiences of playing the cassettes. 
!
2.3.3 Playing Cassettes: Building the Audience-Public 
The practice of listening to cassettes often assembled family and friends together 
and, at times, served to establish new friendships and social networks. But, 
importantly, it connected individuals and collectivities on an imagined level, among 
past, present, and future audiences, by virtue of listening to the same recordings, 
learning the same stories, and constructing a common repertoire of experiences. 
Shared emotional orientations that emerged through these practices served to connect 
Kurds across national, lingual, and tribal borders.  
In Kurdish homes, noted Mehmet, an academic, “whenever there were guests 
one of those poorly recorded dengbêj cassettes would be played,” if only in the 
background while the adults were conversing. “The music had to play there,” he says, 
even if no one actively listened to it, and notes this obligation was in place especially 
because these cassettes were illegal, interpreting it as a form of resistance. There 
were also times, Mehmet recalls, when a cassette would be the reason for getting 
together and all the conversations that night would concern that cassette. Such 
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gatherings were common in the “region,” but also took place and were even more 
emotionally charged in other parts of Turkey (which were “diaspora” for the Kurds).  
Cem and his family migrated to a city in the Northwest of Turkey when Cem 
was five years old. Cem recalls that in their new hometown, they initially avoided 
acknowledging to neighbors that they were Kurds, and they no longer spoke Kurdish 
in public. “When people learned we were Kurds, they treated us as if we were aliens,” 
he says. Cem’s family brought along all their existing cassettes to this new dwelling 
and continued to enlist friends and relatives to bring back new recordings back from 
the “region.” Upon the arrival of new cassettes, Cem’s parents would host “cassette 
sessions:” liminal (Turner 1969) spaces and times during which emotions and 
Kurdish language flowed freely: 
About 90 percent of the time, [we would gather] because someone came 
to visit from our hometown, so [all the Kurds living in the area] would 
get together in someone’s home. And then after each song, [the grown-
ups] would refer to the story in the song. It would be a love story told by 
Dengbêj Şakiro, for example, so thousands of time, they would make the 
same comments about that song. This and that happened… like there was 
a story where a young woman falls in love with a madrasa [religious 
school] student, that story was told to us [children] perhaps a thousand 
times. … there were other things, like escapades. They would tell us 
about things they remembered from their own lifetimes, such as the 
cruelties of Feshi Ağa [a feudal lord], they would recall the bandits who 
were famous back then, how brave they were … In those cassettes, you 
would always hear the voices in the background, people calling out 
[words of encouragement], and other laudatory words, like her biji [long 
live]. If someone in the room had actually been there the night that 
cassette was recorded, they would commemorate that. People would get 
extremely emotional, which was also because we were [far from home]. 
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At least one or two people would most definitely say “I would like a copy 
of this cassette,” so the host would be assigned this duty as well. 
The emotional economy of the cassette – set into motion during recording, as 
evidenced once again in Cem’s narrative – is compounded by the emotions displayed 
and the storytelling that takes place during group-listening practices. The young 
children are initiated into “being Kurdish” through these sessions. They learn about 
the stories told in and around the cassette. They observe and experience the emotions 
and the communitas generated through the cassettes during these sessions, and thus 
enter into the affective field created by the cassettes, and become habituated. 
Strangers were also sometimes invited and became attuned into this field – 
thus new relationships materialized through practices of listening together. Cem 
recalls that some Kurdish residents of their new town heard about “the new Kurdish 
family” in possession of a large cassette collection. These people initiated contact, 
and started attending cassette sessions at Cem’s home. They would bring gifts, such 
as homemade yogurt and fresh produce in gratitude for being hosted. The cassettes 
were responsible for bringing the music, stories, and conversation into the family 
home, and objectified these friendly relationships. Memories would be rehashed, 
with Kurds from different regions and perhaps with different affiliations sharing their 
similar yet different stories. New collective experiences became part of shared 
repertoires. Sorrow accompanied listening to the music of the hometown left behind 
and colored the experience even if the music itself was happy or upbeat. This love 
and sorrow for the hometown found body in the crackling cassette that played, and 
these emotions were experienced, by the children who perhaps never even saw the 
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hometown. The experientiality (Holbrook and Hirschman 1982) of the session thus 
has broader consequences that transcend temporal and geographic locales. The 
emotionality generated during the session draws the participants into partaking in a 
broader and markedly “Kurdish” experiential repertoire. Making a copy, as requested 
from the host, not only enabled the music to change hands, but also extends this 
constellation of music, experience, and emotions – tears, crackles and all - into the 
lifeworlds of others.  
Listening to cassettes also objectified intimate and familial relationships 
(Miller 1998), and moreover, our findings suggest that these experiences are part of a 
common repertoire of “being Kurdish.” Even the materialization of intimate 
relationships has communal repercussions, as illustrated by the narratives of 
informants who had difficulties in communicating with their parents. Children 
received mandatory formal education in Turkish, thus for those who came of age in 
larger cities after the 1980s, Kurdish was not the primary language of communication 
and socialization. On the other hand, parents, especially those who didn’t receive 
much formal education, were often not as fluent in Turkish as their children. This 
sometimes created chasms in relationships. Cem was worried, as an adult, that he 
was never able to properly express his love for his mother. He and his mother 
frequently listened to cassettes of the dengbêj Şakiro together. It was through 
listening to these cassettes that Cem came to learn most of his Kurdish, and he also 
came to realize, that even without words spoken between them, “we were able to 
express ourselves to each other by listening to cassettes together.” Nurten, the 
director of an NGO, went to school in Diyarbakır in the 1980s. As a child, she prided 
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herself in her fluent and accent-free Turkish, and struggled with her feelings about 
her mother, whose Turkish, she felt, was embarrassingly flawed. Nurten herself 
refused to learn or speak Kurdish. Nonetheless, she says she knew many songs by 
heart, as they always played cassettes at home. Cassettes objectified, mediated and 
also mended the relationships at times when words were not available. Interpersonal 
and familial bonds, including emotional frustrations, as materialized or resolved 
through cassettes, were articulated as part as growing up as an ethnic Kurd. The 
affective field generated by cassettes thus also included these shared familial love 
and frustrations – which in turn indicate a pointedly Kurdish emotional habitus. 
Thus, the object and practice not only “crafted” love (Madianou and Miller 2011) and 
negotiated family identity (Holttinen 2014) but also contributed to the emotional 
structuring of Kurdish community.  
Listening, particularly in groups, could also bring the emotions and sufferings 
of other Kurds, even across state borders, into the circle, effectively situating them as 
part of a Kurdish “us” that transcended national borders. The experience of listening 
to Perwer’s Helebçe, the lamentation sung in memory of the deaths of Iraqi Kurds in 
the hands of Saddam Hussein, is an instance in which sorrow finds body through and 
circulates with the cassette, entering the field of emotions and experiences of the 
participants of other social circles. Murat recalls the times he and his friends got 
together and listened to the song, over and over again, always crying while doing so. 
The emotional density of the cassette intensified each time it was played, and later 
copied and given away. The cassette, already “sticky” (Ahmed 2004) with emotions – 
recall, if you will, that Perwer cried while recording it, and the students cried with 
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joy and sorrow when they received it – thus kept thickening with sorrow for the 
Kurds of Halabja, and also bridged to the audience’s own experiences, emotions, and 
dispositions related to being a Kurd in Turkey, giving this sorrow a different flavor 
than what would be experienced, say, by someone who is not a Kurd. It is this 
particular flavor that indicates an emotional habitus, and that allows the cassettes to 
“address” (Warner 2002) a Kurdish public. 
While intimate and imagined relationships constituting “us” were objectified, 
the resistive relationship with “them” simultaneously emerged and took shape 
through listening practices. As with hiding and destroying the cassettes, fear colored 
many experiences of listening. Cem recalls that whenever his parents listened to 
cassettes in the 1980s (by themselves or during the cassette sessions), they would 
assign a few children to play outside the door, so that they could have ample warning 
if someone – say, an intolerant Turkish neighbor, or the police – came by. In the 
“region,” fear was even more intense and was also commonly exercised by law 
enforcement as a means of upholding order. Mehmet recalls, as a young boy, that a 
wedding he attended was raided by “special ops carrying very large guns.” Children 
would hang around the street give news of approaching law enforcement. Adults 
would then try to switch the cassettes, hiding them in Turkish covers, and playing 
Turkish pop before the enforcement arrived – as with burying, a case of employing a 
perruque (De Certeau 1988) appropriate for that moment. 
An evocative case of such diversion, shaped by and generating the dual 
emotions of fear and bravery, took place in minibuses, which to this day provide 
transportation between cities, towns, and villages in the “region.” In the 1980s and 
$54
90s, the minibuses would be stacked with Kurdish music cassettes, which would be 
played throughout the journeys, during which solidarity amongst the driver and the 
passengers prevailed. There were multiple military checkpoints, and upon 
approaching them, the driver would hide the cassettes with a sleight of hand. 
According to Sami, who grew up speaking Kurmanji Kurdish, military forces 
conducting searches knew that cassettes were hidden somewhere on the minibus, and 
the driver and passengers knew that the soldiers knew. Yet, the passengers would 
never speak out. On some days, the soldiers would perform thorough searches, 
forcing the driver to turn the cassettes in, and would consequently destroy the 
cassettes. On other days, they would let this offense slide. Such games characterized 
many exchanges between Kurds and law enforcers – the Kurds affirming their own 
communality, banding against the authorities (even in their silence) and forcing the 
boundaries to the limit. In Zazaki speaker Dicle’s reminiscence of similar incidences 
in a different city in the “region,” the driver would turn the volume on full blast after 
passing the checkpoint. The passengers, in turn, might applaud the driver. I have 
witnessed that checkpoints, as well as the habit of turning the music off at the 
checkpoint and turning the volume all the way up after passing inspection remain 
today. And, despite the legality of the Kurdish music the conflicted relationship 
between “us” and “them” continues to play out in the collective imaginary. Similar 
stories articulated in very similar ways, and practices that even to this day remain 
embedded in daily life, are indicative of an emotional habitus shaped by emotions 
and the fields generated by these encounters.  
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Stories of “in-your-face” acts of disobedience were also found alongside 
narratives of evasive and manipulative practices. Mehmet recounted a confrontation 
that took place when he was a teenager working a summer job at a shoe store. He 
frequently hung out with other teens who worked at surrounding shops. One of these 
shops was a music store, and the boy who worked there, a few years older than 
Mehmet, was “a very rebellious boy” they were all envious of. One day, this boy 
played Şivan Perwer at full blast while armored military vehicles were passing by. 
“Suddenly,” Mehmet says, “one of the [vehicles] stopped, turned around, and the 
[special ops] guys got off, these huge men, carrying automatic rifles. They came into 
the shop, shook [the boy], stomped onto some cassettes, and told him to never play 
this music again.” Children also often witnessed scenes when the music was shut 
down, cassettes broken, their homes searched, family members threatened and 
sometimes even taken away. Through such experiences, the relationship between the 
armed forces (and thus the Turkish state) and the Kurds was objectified in a manner 
that is fraught with fear, anger, and rebellion, and the materiality of the cassette is 
entwined with these emotions. Such encounters engender a shared emotional 
disposition, which in turn drives various tactics and rebellions towards the state. A 
structure of feelings thus develops and solidifies through practices, experiences and 
encounters related to playing cassettes.  
Another site in which these emotional dispositions towards the “other” found 
body was the wedding party. Utku, a music producer, notes that the bride and groom 
were sometimes “figurines,” and the wedding was more of an opportunity to get 
together, engage in political discourse, distribute political pamphlets, and feel 
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incensed. Talat, an employee at an NGO remembers people dancing, at weddings, 
while “songs about martyrs played on the cassettes.” Semih, the owner of a 
bookstore, noted that guests would become angry if songs with agitative lyrics were 
not played. A popular song of the 1980s was Şivan Perwer’s Serhildan Jiyane, whose 
title translates to “resisting is living.” This phrase aptly serves as a trope for the 
emotional habitus that is constitutive of living life as a Kurd, and in explaining such 
resistive acts and attitudes even at celebratory events. The risky acts of listening to 
illegal cassettes at homes, weddings, and minibuses, not only shaped young peoples’ 
understandings of being Kurdish, but simultaneously shaped their understanding of 
the state as oppressive and hostile, thus moving them into banding together, engaging 
with politics, resisting authorities in evasive as well as confrontational manners.  
Informants often emphasized the emotions and contextual particularities as 
shaping their listening experiences - sometimes above and beyond the lyrics or 
compositions. For example, when Cem was asked to talk about memories of listening 
to his favorite songs, he referred to “[my parents’] fear, their longing for our 
hometown, how we kids used to go to wait at the doorway while they listened.” He 
moreover emphasized the music of dengbêj Şakiro as occupying a special place 
among his favorites, as this was the music that he listened to with his mother. Thus, it 
was also the secrecy, the fear, and the longing that mattered.  These emotions, in 
turn, shaped Cem’s relationship with his parents, especially his mother, his own 
identity as part of the Kurdish community, and also shaped how he learned to regard 
the state as posing a looming threat. Such experiences were common in other 
interviews – more than one informant referred to music as teaching her/him “what it 
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means to be a Kurd,” and when asked to elaborate, informants often focused on 
practices related to the cassettes. This indicates that the emotionality of the content 
also intensified upon the object of the cassette. Thus, the elements of the music, 
lyrics, and narratives are part of a constellation that finds body in the cassette, which, 
through the practice of listening, generates affective fields that touch all those who 
come into contact.  
Through listening, then, joy, bravery, sacrifice, love, anger, fear, and 
repulsion were evoked, intensified, and continued to circulate. Cassettes as objects 
provided ways to emotionally address (Warner 2002) Kurds as a public, by drawing 
them into an emotional habitus. The “feeling” of belonging that is noted by Anderson 
(1983) can be explained as stimulated by being habituated into such this shared 
structure. Emotionally charged experiences related to listening to the music and 
playing the cassettes thus materialized interpersonal as well as communal 
relationships (imagined and real), influenced people’s understandings of their selves 
as Kurds, and also shaped resistance against those who were perceived as the 
oppressors - in other words, collective alignments and boundaries emerged. Practices 
of exchange, as we shall see, enabled cassettes to move amongst people, and thus to 
touch and move new people into this emergent resistive community. 
!
2.3.4 Sharing, Gifting and Selling: The Exchange of Cassettes 
In the absence of a legal network of distributors and retailers for Kurdish music, 
dispersed efforts to duplicate and exchange cassettes allowed the music to travel 
throughout places with Kurdish inhabitants. It was very common for individuals to 
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make copies of cassettes and gift them within friendship and kinship networks. More 
concerted efforts to duplicate and sell the cassettes on the black market were also in 
existence: studio recordings that were smuggled across the borders, as well as 
recordings of famous dengbêj were duplicated by makeshift equipment, and sold by 
unregistered vendors and also by regular retailers “under the table.” These “off the 
books” sales remained in place well after legalization in 1991 - partly due to the 
cheapness of reproducing cassettes in this manner, and partly due to remaining legal 
and normative restrictions. 
Street vendors called tablacıs sold cassettes in the “region” as well as other 
cities with Kurdish populations, including Istanbul. The tablacıs’ merchandise was 
not limited to Kurdish music, but they would often also hide the Kurdish recordings 
under cassette covers of Turkish pop. How to locate these vendors was part of a 
repertoire of local knowledge; new customers – especially during times of 
heightened surveillance – would have to use chains of reference. Formal retailers, 
after legalization, were still under close scrutiny and surveillance by Turkish 
authorities. Cassettes often travelled perilous roads, crossing borders and 
checkpoints, often evading  inspections. Stories of how far a cassette travelled until it 
reached a particular home or vendor could intensify the affective field a particular 
cassette generated, and thus thicken its emotional saturation, and also increasing its 
emotional impact on the buyer or receiver. Encounters with law enforcement created 
an economy of fear, which was countered by tactics (De Certeau 1988) and the 
formation of a repertoire of insider knowledge. Cassettes were duplicated and 
circulated in masses, vendors and retailers alike made mix tapes from popular songs 
$59
found on both legal and illegal recordings, and sold them off the books for cheaper 
prices. There was, thus, a wide array of cassettes on the market.  
The exchange of cassettes was often described as being primarily non-
commercial in intent, even in cases where the cassettes were sold for money. 
Informants framed their own acts of sharing and gifting not only within the realm of 
friendly or kinship relationships, but also as a means of helping other people learn 
about and embrace Kurdish identity – thus including others in what they perceived as 
their community. Trying to make money out of this almost-sacred process was, 
according to Cem, embarrassing. He noted, “It was only [after the 1990s] that 
Kurdish cassettes were sold for money. Previously they were only duplicated, and 
given away as part of a gift-giving culture … a person might bring his or her own 
blank cassette and ask, could you record [that album] onto this cassette?” Murat 
similarly framed selling music as more of a service to the people rather than a profit-
making practice, indicating that sellers would often provide discounts, or even give 
cassettes away for free, as their primary purpose was to circulate the music. The 
exchange of cassettes materialized relationships that were beyond transactional and 
embedded in the sacred realm of communality. It has been argued that anonymously 
bequeathed intracommunal gifts - as opposed to dyadic gifting - generate solidarity 
and communality (Weinberger and Wallendorf 2012). Yet, we find that dyadic gifting 
practices, as well as other forms of exchange, by contributing to shared experiential 
and emotional repertoires, and by drawing individuals into affective fields, serve 
communal bonds in addition to interpersonal relationships.  
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One of Murat’s memories regarding exchange further illustrates the lack of 
financial concerns and the role of gifting in establishing communality. While still a 
teenager in the early 1980s, living in a province of Diyarbakır, he had a cousin who 
made frequent visits to the city center and brought back cassettes each time. There 
was a minibus service between the city and the provincial towns, and it was almost 
always the same driver who served that route. One memorable encounter with this 
driver is as follows: 
On one journey, this driver saw that a cassette that had fallen out of my 
cousin’s bag. He asked for the cassette, and said, “if you don’t give it to 
me, I will report you to the gendarmerie or the police. My cousin 
somehow told the driver that if he was serious in his threat, he wouldn’t 
give the cassette, [the driver] should go ahead and call the police or 
gendarmeries. However, if the driver wanted to listen to the cassette, [my 
cousin] would give it to him as a gift. The driver apologized, said he had 
been joking and took the cassette, saying he would like to listen to it. My 
cousin said he gave the cassette … thinking maybe the driver really 
wanted to listen to this music. When he told me about this, we thought 
why don’t we make copies of other cassettes and give it to the driver. We 
presented them to the driver the next time he passed through their town. 
The driver was really delighted. He didn’t charge us on one of our 
following journeys to the city center.  
An interesting juxtaposition took place here: rather than being afraid of or 
angry at the bus driver, Murat’s cousin tactically invited him into forming a 
relationship based on camaraderie and compatriotism, at which he succeeded. Gifting 
the cassettes thus helped someone establish or strengthen the bond with his own 
“Kurdishness” and it also created rapport among three members of a community. 
While gifting cassettes to friends and relatives was common, the type of gift-giving 
between Murat, his cousin, and the driver, points towards a relationship established 
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among strangers who only have an ethnic background in common. This common 
background, through the practice of gifting, becomes elevated into “community.” 
Engendering a loving disposition towards members of one’s ethnic community - 
despite possibly being of different tribal, regional, lingual, or religious backgrounds - 
is established, in part, through these gifting practices. In some cases, a person might 
not be aware of what being part of this community entails – in such cases, gifting the 
cassette may teach a lesson of camaraderie.  
Various forms of exchange, then, extended the affective fields of cassettes to 
a variety of places and spaces. Cassettes crossed borders between regions, dialects, 
tribal and religious backgrounds, established bridges and helped shape a 
constituency. Violent or non-submissive encounters with authorities and law 
enforcement – the oppressive other – shaped these fields, and also were an 
inextricable part of the process of understanding and experiencing this resistive 
communal ethnic identity. The constant danger of violence created fear, anger, and 
frustration; but also bravery and camaraderie, which saturated the cassettes. 
Resistance, as well as communality, was materialized through these practices, in 
these objects and bodies.  Through the practice of exchange, particularly through 
gifting, loving relationships were created and maintained. While the recipients of 
cassettes could already exist as part of an individual’s network of friends and 
families, the selling and gifting of cassettes could also act as a means of initiating 
people into one’s broader network of fellow Kurds – that is, exchange could act as a 
means of inviting people to become Kurdish, and attuning them into the affective 
field of the cassette: moving them from strangers into parts of “us” who share 
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emotional orientations. As the cassette was shared, exchanged, and consequently 
encountered new individuals, the stories and emotions circulated as well. Emotions 
intensified, weaving thicker threads through the community and fortifying the 
boundaries against its “other”s, throughout the cassette’s travels. 
!
2.4 Discussion 
In this chapter, I traced the circulation of cassettes through a number of practices - 
recording, owning, hiding, destroying, playing, and exchanging. Through informants’ 
narratives, I examined the various experiences and encounters, the elicitation of 
emotions, and the materialization of relationships that the circulation of cassettes 
animates. My findings allow me to explain the entwinement of emotions with 
materiality, as well as the generative and structuring potentialities that this 
entwinement entails.  
My first argument concerns the entwinement of materiality and emotionality. 
I observe in the findings that cassettes are inextricably entwined in the interpersonal 
relationships with family members, friends, local community members, as well as 
imagined relationships with a broader Kurdish community, and a resistive 
relationship with the state. Cassettes objectify these unifying as well as oppositional 
relationships through various practices, experiences and encounters, such as 
collective listening experiences with family and local community members, gifting to 
strangers - and resistive encounters with the state, in manners that are overt (such as 
playing loud music towards law enforcement) and evasive (as with hiding the 
cassettes, or enlisting the children to stand guard). Inspired by Ahmed (2004), I use 
the metaphor of “stickiness” to explain the association of the emotions that are 
$63
elicited during these materializing experience and encounters. This emotional 
“stickiness” of cassettes is evidenced by informants’ emotionally charged narratives 
in relating their experiences with cassettes. Cassettes remain “sticky” to this day, 
through narratives that continue to circulate, as evidenced by emotions that continue 
to surface today while talking about these past events - even years after many 
cassettes have been thrown out, legal restrictions have been relaxed, and other 
technologies have replaced tape players. 
My second major argument is that the emotional stickiness of materiality 
works to “stick” individuals, binding them together and also orienting them against 
others. The circulation of objects materializes communal bonds (Aronczyk and Craig 
2012) and resistance by also enabling the circulation of emotions (Ahmed 2004) and 
generating an emotional structure that is both “structured” and “structuring” (Swartz 
1997). The structured-ness is derived from and reinforced by repeated evocative 
experiences, encounters, and relationships that are common to people across 
regional, lingual, religious affiliations:  emotions that are elicited while listening to 
music together, dealing with law enforcement (in actuality or the threat thereof), 
hearing stories, and through other experiences, become part of a shared repertoire - 
one that is evidenced by the similarity of stories told, as well as the commonality of 
vocabulary (Burkitt 2002) and metaphors (Kane 2001) that are used - such as 
graveyards, markings, and sacrifice - in describing experiences and encounters. The 
cassette is the object that brings these experiences to life and makes these shared 
repertoires of emotions possible - and thus it plays a vital role in socializing 
individuals into the “structure.” 
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The “structuring” aspect of emotions, on the other hand, works both to align 
individuals into a collective body, and orients them against the state. This structuring-
ness moreover entails a disposition towards performing certain practices - 
particularly resistive and rebellious ones - that ensure the continuation of circulation. 
People buying cassette recorders and making copies for friends and family even 
though they have limited resources, gifting cassettes - sometimes to strangers, selling 
without intending to make profits, hiding cassettes from law enforcement and 
disposing only as a last resort, and presenting a united front towards the law 
enforcement are some of the practices that are shaped by the emergent emotional 
habitus. In turn, these practices reinforce and strengthen this structure. These 
practices also allow new people to be socialized, and thus maintain the structure: 
children are introduced by participation in cassette-related experiences, gifts are 
given to those who had not been initiated before - thus the structure also disposes its 
constituents to habituate others.  
 Thus, the cassette transcends its mundanity, and emerges as an “object” that 
stimulates an emotional economy. While the entwinement of iconization and 
signification with materialization (Bartmanski and Woodward  2013; Beckstead et 
al.; Craig 2011; Douny 2011; Kravets and Örge 2011) has been documented, I 
provide an additional dimension to materiality.  Examining the entwinement of 
materiality with emotions, and exploring the structuring potentiality of the 
materiality-emotionality nexus also allows us to see how seemingly individual or 
interpersonal experiences - such as listening to music, owning cassettes, gifting, 
selling, or dispossession may serve communal bonds by generating shared 
experiences and emotional orientations.  
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 As I summarize in figure 1, a “feeling” of “being Kurdish” and of being 
resistive against the state, then, are experienced as emotional dispositions. In other 
words, the imagining of a community (Anderson 1983) comes from being habituated 
into and constituted by an emotional habitus. The emotional habitus is “sticky” and, 
as such, “sticks” the community: with the circulation of objects across time and 
space, and the intensification of objects’ emotional saturation, the habitus also 
becomes stronger. The communal alignments that it structures become more solid, 
and the boundaries against the other more rigid.  
 
Previous research has acknowledged that “structures of feeling” (Williams 
1977, 1979) and collective emotional dispositions (Gopaldas 2014) shape 
$66
Figure 1 - The Emotional Habitus
consumption decisions and practices, and form the basis of consumption 
communities (Thompson 2005). In these studies, how such structures emerge and 
how individuals are socialized into shared dispositions is not explicit. I contribute by 
elucidating the linkages between evocative experiences - which involve the 
consumption, disposal, and various forms of exchange (including gifting and selling) 
of a material object - and the habituation of individuals into an emotional habitus. 
Whereas Thompson (2005) notes that ideology and politics are personally 
experienced as feelings, I show how the opposite also holds – that emotions orient 
individuals towards holding political and ideological stances, such as identifying as a 
member of an ethnic minority community and taking part in resistance. Hence, the 
structures generated by an emotional-material nexus can engender processes and 
movements of political import. By underscoring the entwinement of emotions and 
materiality in generating structures, I also extend Chronis et al. (2012) who note that 
emotions elicited during consumption experiences play a part in (re)producing 
collective imaginaries. The imagining of community, I show, entails the habituation 
into an emotional habitus, or structure. While consecrated landscapes (Chronis et al. 
2012) and heritage exhibitions (Chronis 2006) may provide an avenue to become 
habituated, we show that a mundane object can also elicit emotionality and habituate. 
Moreover, I contribute to our understanding of collective tactical resistance 
(De Certeau 1988; Scott 1990; see also Izberk-Bilgin 2010) by revealing its material-
emotional underpinnings.  We show how the hegemonic “other” that is resisted is also 
emotionally delineated, and that the nature of the relationship with this “other” also 
shapes an understanding of “us.” In-group and out-group dynamics and relationships 
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are thus mutually and simultaneously objectified through an object category and 
related practices of circulation. The tense and violent relationship between the state 
and the Kurds shaped a Kurdish community that is resistive. The role of consumption 
in interpersonal, familial, and communal relationships is often depicted as bonding, 
and these relationships are often described as “loving” (e.g., Holttinen 2014; Miller 
1998; Moisio et al. 2004). Yet, we see that oppositional, violent, and separatist 
relationships can simultaneously be materialized through the very same objects, and 
that these relationships can be fraught with fear, indignation, hatred, and other 
“negative” emotions. The cassette, while materializing “positive” bonds of love and 
kinship amongst members of the ethnic community, simultaneously materializes a 
resistive relationship based on anger, fear, and violence with the Turkish state. Thus, 
I note that consumption, markets, and material objects have the power to not only 
enliven bonds and objectify inclusive relationships, but also to materialize 
relationships that are divisive, exclusionary, oppositional, and conflicting.  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!!
CHAPTER 3:  
!
THE EMERGENCE OF THE LEGAL MARKET 
!
!
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I move from the illegal circulation of cassettes to the emergence of a 
legal and formal market for Kurdish music. In chapter 2, I detailed how illegal 
circulation was influential in delineating a resistive  “Kurdish” community (see also 
Kuruoğlu and Ger 2014). This delineation, I argued, worked not only to engender a 
sense of belonging and unity amongst individuals identifying as ethnic Kurds, but 
also to build resistive boundaries against the “Other:” the State, which is markedly 
Turkish. Thus, these practices of circulation were influential in cultivating a 
“collective identity” (Hunt and Benford 2004; Jenkins 2008; Melucci 1995; Polletta 
and Jasper 2001; Simon and Klandermans 2001) that is grounded not only in shared 
ethnic background, but also shaped by a emotional structure (Calhoun 2001; Kane 
2001; Kuruoğlu and Ger 2014). This emotional structure and accompanying 
collective identity, in turn, were influential in the continuation of practices of 
circulation. 	

	
 The practices of circulation that I detailed in chapter 2 took place in an 
illegal, informal, and grassroots manner, rather than organized by a social movement, 
a political organization, or a formal market.  This circulation was effective, but also 
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dispersed and non-centralized. I acknowledged, but did not detail, that activists of the 
emergent Kurdish movement also took part in the circulation of cassettes, and saw 
music as a powerful way to ideologically educate, politicize, and mobilize the 
people. Concomitantly, I noted that illegal circulation also played a part in Kurds 
perceiving themselves as “marked” — in other words, stigmatized (Link and Phelan 
2001) and dominated (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) — by the forceful policies and 
agencies of the state. The emotional structure thus not only “structured” the 
imagination of community; it also served to politicize this community, and shaped a 
resistive collective identity. In this chapter, I show that the processes which generated 
a politicized collective identity and an emotional structure also had a “structuring” 
influence on formal market activities, following the legalization of the production 
and sale of Kurdish music. 	

	
 The research questions for this chapter are thus as follows: How does a 
market, whose producer and consumer constituency is subject to sociocultural 
and political dynamics of domination and stigmatization, emerge and evolve? 
How do market actors (in particular, producers) navigate this process? In trying 
to respond to this inquiry, I re-visit the pre-legal circulation, but this time explicitly 
deal with how this circulation was fueled and appropriated by the Kurdish political 
movement, and how illegal circulation served as the backdrop for the formal market. 
I follow with the legalization of music production in 1991, which was a game-
changer in many ways. While “off the books” circulation continued, a great deal of 
new music was recorded in studios; produced and distributed through music 
production companies in Unkapanı, Istanbul — the headquarters of music production 
in Turkey. The production of Kurdish music thus became centralized and formalized. 
As such, the emotional economy of music circulation encountered the dynamics of 
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the formal market. In this chapter, I seek out to understand how music production 
proceeded at the nexus of generative and resistive practices of music circulation; the 
logics and dynamics of a formal market; and the interceptions of the state.	
 	

	
 The sticky and intense communal alignments, the imagining of a unified 
Kurdish community, and an accompanying resistive stance is one possible response 
to perceptions of being stigmatized and dominated. While the previous chapter was 
concerned with the grassroots processes of aligning with and identifying as part of an 
ethnic community, in this chapter, I also take into account how the Kurdish political 
movement interacts with music production and performance in cultivating a 
politicized collective identity (Simon and Klandermans 2001). Rather than an object 
and emotion-centered view, however, I shift the focus to the rhetorical devices - 
frames - that operate at a more cognitive level: how experiences are processed and 
turned into motivation for market activities; participation in a political collective 
identity is elicited; and “consciousness” of being part of a political community is 
awakened, and how codes and frames from a social movement are appropriated.  I 
detail how, accordingly, a politicized “market culture” (Abolafia 1998; Ho 2009; 
Penaloza 2000; Spillman 1999; Zelizer 2010) emerged and is framed by actors. 	

	
 Market culture, as conceptualized by Spillman (1999), comprises three 
intertwined yet also distinct elements: the object of market exchange; a social 
imaginary of producers and consumers - i.e., the collectivity comprised by the parties 
to exchange; and the norms of exchange. In this chapter, by tracing the generation of 
normative structures through the frames (Goffman 1976) employed by market actors, 
I detail how a new market culture emerged. I find that this market culture was 
influenced by the neighboring Kurdish political movement, as well as shaped by 
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actors’ “local” experiences (J.C. Scott 1998) in the marketplace, particularly in their 
dealings with the state.	

	
 A recent view in marketing literature has been to treat the emergence of a new 
market as a process of legitimation — wherein social entities (such as a market, its 
products, producers, and organizations) gain acceptance in accordance with 
entrenched normative, cultural, and legislative structures - that is, institutions (W.R. 
Scott 1995) - that preside in a society (Humphreys 2010a,b; Press and Arnould 
2011). This view acknowledges that market actors - business owners, managers, and 
other stakeholders - navigate their social-political context, negotiate barriers, draw 
from supportive ideologies, and pave the way to legitimation (Humphreys 2010b; 
Karababa and Ger 2011). However, this relatively straightforward process of market 
formation does not take into account that different groups/ factions within a society 
may have different demands (Kraatz and Block 2008), identify with contrasting 
norms, values, and beliefs (Webb et al. 2009), and/or occupy a subordinate and 
disadvantaged, rather than mainstream, position (Coskuner-Balli and Thompson 
2013; Scaraboto and Fischer 2013) - and thus does not address how markets may 
exist and even thrive in contexts where they are not sanctified by the majority culture 
and/or regulative authorities.	

	
 Scholarship that links social movements to the process of market formation, 
on the other hand, suggests that actors who are positioned in less advantageous, or 
dominated positions may engage in  collaborative (e.g., Lawrence et al. 2002; 
Lounsbury et al. 2003; Weber et al. 2008) or entrepreneurial (e.g., Maguire et al. 
2004; Scaraboto and Fischer 2013) action that uncovers and exploits contrasts and 
tensions. Tensions and conflicts in a society may serve as stepping stones (Seo and 
Creed 2002) to mobilize action geared towards challenging the dominant order(s), 
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and creating space for new ventures. Actors (consumers as well as marketers) 
systematically and collectively negotiate with ideologies and institutions in 
generating seeking inclusion in - or forming alternative paths to - mainstream culture. 
“Framing” (Goffman 1976) constitutes an important discursive and practical move in 
social movements: actors diagnose and detect ways to respond to the tensions, 
contradictions, and restrictions in their environments (Benford and Snow 2000; 
Lounsbury et al. 2003). In markets that emerge through collective action / social 
movements, actors deploy framing to diagnose, prognose, and to enact business 
practices (Lounsbury et al. 2003). I also note that these frames, by becoming 
entrenched in a field of production, may evolve into proto-institutional logics 
(Lawrence et al. 2002) that shape practice and legitimate the activities of the market 
in the eyes of the audience. 	

	
 Consumer research literature has also inquired into how consumers draw 
from and adapt oppositional political-normative (Crockett and Wallendorf 2004) or 
religious (Izberk-Bilgin 2012; Sandıkcı and Ger 2010) ideologies in reacting to their 
dominated status and resisting the institutional orders that marginalize them. This 
stream also helps us understand that multiple actors partake in creating and shaping 
resistive and moral subjectivities (Karababa and Ger 2011),  parallel taste structures 
(Sandıkcı and Ger 2010), and countervailing markets (Thompson and Coskuner-Balli 
2007). Importantly, producers and consumers are aligned - both amongst themselves, 
and with each other. Consumer research on stigmatized, parallel, or counter-cultural 
communities places emphasis on community-building and meaning-making 
processes amongst consumers, while to some extent neglecting the role of producer-
actors in collaboratively shaping market culture, and partaking in shared collective 
identity and shared (political) ideals.  	
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 I thus seek to understand how market actors - producers, in particular - shape 
an emergent market. I trace how actors generate, adapt, and articulate political-
normative frames that become entrenched as “proto-institutional” logics (Lawrence 
et al. 2002) that shape the “norms” of production and exchange in a marketplace, 
influence the meanings and roles attributed to the object(s) of exchange; and 
construct a collective identity of producers. As such, I complement two streams of 
research: (1) The institutional/legitimation perspectives on market formation, which 
focus on the institutional (i.e., external) structures and thus inadequately address the 
(internal) issues of collective identity and culture in the marketplace; and which also 
do not account for stigma and domination as a source of institutional conflict. (2) 
Consumer research literature on oppositional/counter-cultural communities, which do 
not focus on the role of market producers in shaping collective identity, resistance, 
and normative-political activity.	

 Several other social movement researchers have commented on the place of 
music and other artistic production in social movements (e.g., Eyerman and Jamison 
1998; Futrell et al 2006; Jasper 2011; Roy 2010). Yet, while these accounts are 
focused on the music and the emotions it generates during its performance, we know 
less about the way that these political musics are circulated and marketed - 
particularly when their production and circulation are legally precarious. 
!
3.2 Theoretical Framework 
3.2.1 Stigma, Domination, and Consumer Markets 
!
Non-mainstream consumption practices, as well as communities that are formed 
around such practices have interested consumer researchers throughout the past two 
$74
decades. Some of these communities skirt the boundaries of what is accepted as 
“normal,” “moral,” or “legal” within the contexts their practitioners are embedded: 
biker communities that embrace an outlaw ethos (Schouten and McAlexander 1995), 
Star Trek fans who wear costumes (Kozinets 2001), rave-goers who also dabble in 
illegal drugs (Goulding et al. 2009); holistic-medicine (Thompson 2004; Thompson 
and Troester 2002) and natural-birthing adherents (Thompson 2005) are some 
examples. Research on consumer subcultures/ counter-cultures / microcultures / 
brand communities have drawn attention to the commercial/corporate co-optation 
and subsequent popularization of many such initially marginal, and sometimes 
deviant activities (see Thompson and Coskuner-Balli 2007 for a review). 
 However, as Sandikci and Ger (2010) as well as Thompson and Coskuner-
Balli (2007) point out, co-optation and insertion into mainstream culture is not the 
only way in which non-mainstream practices and identities become part of market 
dynamics. Market actors - both producers and consumers - may forge communal 
relationships and volitionally engage in creating “countervailing” market systems 
that continually resist co-optation (Thompson and Coskuner-Balli 2007). There are, 
moreover cases where a market and/or a consumption practice faces structural 
barriers towards becoming mainstream. When there is great ideological 
incompatibility between a minority/ oppositional community and mainstream culture, 
the inclusion or co-optation of this community into the mainstream culture might not 
be possible. With significant power difference, other dynamics - in particular, 
domination (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992; Ustuner and Holt 2007; Ustuner and 
Thompson 2012) and stigmatization (Sandikci and Ger 2010) - may be at play.  
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 Stigmatization, according to Link and Phelan (2001: 377), takes place “when 
elements of labeling, stereotyping, separation, status loss, and discrimination occur 
together in a power situation that allows them.” Volitional practices - such as 
“Trekkies” who are seen as immature or obsessive (Kozinets 2001), as well as 
organizations that are involved with deviant practices - such as mixed martial arts 
(mma) sports activities (Helms and Peterson 2014) may also be stigmatized. In 
several cases, however, where stigma accompanies a disadvantaged and “dominated” 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) socioeconomic position, and/or differences in ethnic 
background, religious beliefs, sexual orientation, and the such. Belonging to a 
stigmatized community, that is, may be “morally binding” (Coskuner-Balli and 
Thompson 2013) rather than a leisure activity. While stigma that is of the first type 
(i.e., through more volitional and temporally bounded affiliations) may even be 
utilized by organizations as a point of advantage by targeting an audience who is 
appreciative of these stigmatized practices (Helms and Patterson 2014); it may not be 
possible to similarly manage the second and more permanent type of stigma that is 
related to a relationship of domination. Longstanding exclusion from mainstream 
institutions and violence (symbolic as well as physical) may color the experience of 
belonging to dominated and stigmatized groups. 
 Sources of stigma that consumer research scholars have studied include the 
racial (Crockett et al. 2003; Crockett and Wallendorf 2004) and religious (Sandikci 
and Ger 2010) backgrounds of consumers, their non-conformity to heteronormativity 
(Kates 2004, 2006) or traditional gender roles (Coskuner-Balli and Thompson 2013), 
failure to meet hegemonic bodily ideals (Scaraboto and Fischer 2013),  and lack of 
access to cultural, social, and/or economic capital (Ustuner and Holt 2007; Ustuner 
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and Thompson 2012). In many of these cases, stigma and domination translate as 
barriers for these groups in their pursuits of individual or collective identity projects 
in mainstream markets.  
 There are a number of ways in which stigmatized consumers (and 
collectivities) have engaged with the market in responding and reacting to their 
conditions and in challenging structural barriers, and I situate this research amongst 
those studies, even though I focus on producers rather than consumers. One way has 
been to seek recognition by and inclusion into mainstream culture. However, there 
are certain conditions in which acculturation fails. The female lower-class, rural 
migrants in Ustuner and Holt’s (2007) study pursued a middle-class, Western-
oriented (Batici) lifestyle by adopting appropriate consumption practices. These 
women, for the most part, did not find success in their pursuit of middle-class urban 
identities - the ideological disjuncture between their rural origins and the hegemonic 
Batıcı ideology was too deep. Young men of similarly poor-rural backgrounds, by 
working in the service sector, attain only a limited degree of success and recognition, 
and they are able to do so by partaking in status games whose rules are set by the 
dominant factions of society (Ustuner and Thompson 2012). More sucessful attempts 
have also been represented in the literature: The Fatshionistas in Scaraboto and 
Fischer’s (2013) study seek inclusion into the field of fashion particularly through 
the efforts of “institutional entrepreneurs.” A collective identity formed around 
shared frustrations and goals, appeals to and collaborations with more powerful field 
actors, and the deployment of institutional logics that will legitimate their collective 
cause, are some of the ways through which this stigmatized group has attained (albeit 
limited) inclusion in mainstream fashion. 
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 Other stigmatized or marginal groups, on the other hand, have either chosen 
to or have been forced to take a more oppositional or reactionary stance against 
mainstream culture, and have cultivated parallel or alternative paths based on shared 
tastes and normative ideologies. The gay community, for instance, evaluates market 
offerings based on their fit with the community’s shared values, beliefs, and ideals 
(Kates 2002, 2004), accepting certain brands as “legitimate” while rejecting others. 
In other words, an alternative (and non-mainstream) cultural and normative order 
guides consumption choices in this community.   
 Oppositional ideologies play an important role in shaping the way that 
(consumer) collectivities diagnose and address their situation. Crockett and 
Wallendorf (2004) discuss two strands of oppositional normative-political ideology 
that shape consumption decisions in the Black community - and, note in turn that 
consumption experiences serve to shape  these ideologies - a similar argument is 
made by McAlexander et al (2014) in addressing the interplay between consumption 
and religious ideology.  Izberk-Bilgin (2012) as well as Sandikci and Ger (2010) 
draw attention to two different roles of religious ideology in structuring 
consumption. Izberk-Bilgin (2012) focuses on religious ideology serving as a basis 
for rejecting brands and aspects of (Western) consumer culture while concomitantly 
embracing the market logic. The shantytown (i.e., “dominated”) resident informants 
of Izberk-Bilgin’s research, moreover, draw from religious ideology and the Islamist 
movement as resources that provide empowering narrative. Sandikci and Ger (2010) 
on the other hand, focus on religion informing the construction of a new middle class 
that comprises a parallel “taste structure.” A range of consumption objects, spaces, 
and practices are influenced by this taste structure, which has gained more or less 
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equal footing with the (previously) hegemonic secular urban structure. This parallel 
structure, in time, becomes normalized and routinized to the extent that it starts to re-
converge with mainstream culture - in the case of Islamic attire, for instance, 
“regular” shops in addition to those catering to covered women, have started to sell 
more conservative (e.g., long-sleeved) clothes.  
 Significant, as noted, in many of these studies is the existence or emergence 
of normative structures - ideologies and logics - that the stigmatized, marginalized, 
and dominated groups draw from in cultivating and articulating their reaction to their 
position. While they may draw from existent ideological structures - such as religion 
(Izberk-Bilgin 2012; Sandikci and Ger 2010) - they importantly also adapt these 
structures to better serve their own oppositional or inclusion-seeking agendas. Black 
political ideologies (Crockett and Wallendorf 2004), human rights logics (Scaraboto 
and Fischer 2013), and the norms of the gay subculture arose as a response to the 
marginalizing, conflict-ridden, and exclusionary  institutional environment in which 
the community is embedded, and in turn become adapted into market cultures and 
relationships, shaping the way that these marginalized groups engaged with 
marketplace cultures. Relatedly, social movements - such as the Islamist movement 
(Izberk-Bilgin 2012; Sandikci and Ger 2010), the fat acceptance movement 
(Scaraboto and Fischer 2013), the abolitionist movement (Crockett and Wallendorf 
2004) address the disenfranchisement of, and serve as ideological resources for, these 
communities.  
 For instance, the “plus-sized” women in Scaraboto and Fischer’s study draw 
from their experiences of disenfranchisement in the marketplace, and the logic of 
human rights from the fat acceptance movement, in justifying their demands from the 
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fashion industry to accommodate them with more choice in larger sizes. The authors 
argue that politicizing their demands using the “human rights” logic allows their 
appeal to exert more pressure on mainstream marketers. Research also indicates that 
in addition to ideology shaping consumption; consumption experiences and practices 
also shape ideology (Crockett and Wallendorf 2004; McAlexander et al. 2014). 
Crockett and Wallendorf (2004) note, also, that black consumers draw from their 
experiences in the marketplace in generating “ideological narratives” about 
inequality and in (re)establishing their relationships with others. McAlexander et al. 
(2014) argue that consumption behaviors help shape new “moral cognitions” and 
“ideologies” in the aftermath of “breaking” with a previously held ideological, or 
religious, conviction. 
 With most emphasis on how consumers "co-create" meanings and value, the 
role of producer-actors in a market - as fellow community members of consumers 
and thus embroiled in similar identity politics, and in particular the dynamics of 
stigmatization - in shaping a field has been largely neglected. The literature does 
indicate (e.g., Karababa and Ger 2011; Kates 2002; Sandikci and Ger 2010) that 
producers or marketers also play an integral part in making and circulating the 
materialities, in constructing the spaces, and orchestrating the practices that delineate 
communities and co-create (consumer) subjectivities. However, the cultivation of 
collective identity, the appropriation of ideologies, and the shaping of business 
practices amongst producers has largely been overlooked within this literature. 
Penaloza and Gilly (1999) have notably investigated how marketers “acculturate” 
and learn to cater to their non-mainstream (specifically, a migrant minority 
community) clientele - but their focus is on markets that are already in existence, and 
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where producers are members of the dominant culture. Addressing this important 
gap, I would like to elaborate on how producer-actors collaborate in the cultivation of 
a market and in uniting and structuring communities, of which they are also 
members. Penaloza and Venkatesh (2006) have called for the study of a “larger 
configuration of the market,” as well as a conceptualization of consumers and 
marketers as “social beings inhabiting communities” (301). How, then, do producer-
actors reconcile extant market dynamics with the normative structures and conflicts 
that shape the larger community in which they are embedded? How does a collective 
response to stigma and marginalization translate into the “culture” of a market 
(Spillman 1999)? These are the questions I will be dealing with in this chapter. 
!
3.2.2 Market Culture and Collective Identity 
The notion of markets as “culture”s recognizes that the market is a locus of repeated 
interactions and transactions, contingent upon interpersonal relationships, which lead 
to configuration of shared understandings and systems of meaning (Abolafia 1998; 
Spillman 1999; Zelizer 2010). Market culture, as such, is not fixed but is dynamic 
and contingent upon interactions and transactions amongst producers and consumers. 
Spillman (1999) relatedly treats the market as a “social imaginary” comprising a 
community of (potential) partners in exchange. Market “culture” is comprised of this 
social imaginary; the “object” of exchange (i.e., the commodity) and the rules of 
exchange (i.e., normative structures), all of which are socially constructed and 
institutionalized over time. 
 How, then does the stigmatization, domination, and/or marginalization of a 
community influence market culture? One response, as mentioned earlier, is a 
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resistant and oppositional stance, with ideological and emotional underpinnings (e.g., 
Kuruoglu and Ger 2014; Thompson 2005), in which producers as well as consumers 
take part (Karababa and Ger 2010; Sandikci and Ger 2010). Of particular interest in 
this study is the perception of stigma and domination in response to the regulations 
of the state. While the literature presents the state as an agency that confers or 
withholds “legitimacy” (Humphreys 2010a,b; Karababa and Ger 2011), the role of 
the state in shaping market culture is less understood. Literature on resistance and 
social movements provide further inspiration in understanding how  actors generate 
“local,” that is, market-level, response to the restrictions that are imposed by the 
state. 
 The state has been conceptualized as a bundle of practices, processes, and 
discourses (see e.g., Aretxaga 2003; Mitchell 1991), as employing prescriptive 
“strategies” (DeCerteau 1988) and manifesting as a “social subject” in everyday 
encounters with its constituents through its various administrative and regulative 
organizations. The state, Aretxaga (2003: 395) notes, does not exist independent of 
this “subjective” component, which also involves the “discourses, narratives, and 
fantasies generated around the ideas of the state.” “Local” (i.e., civil) actors, in turn, 
are equipped with a different set of knowledge, skills, and tactics (see also J. Scott 
1990, 1995) – for which James Scott (1998) has invoked the ancient Greek term of 
“metis” referring to cunning and intelligence. Particularly in the face of restrictive 
policies, this local knowledge is of political and reactionary nature – James Scott 
(1998) refers to it as “partisan knowledge” in the sense that its holders and 
practitioners typically have “a passionate interest in a particular outcome” (318). 
$82
 As noted in chapter 2, tactical, everyday, and infrapolitical acts of resistance 
(De Certeau 1988; Scott 1990) often form the underpinning of larger-scale collective 
action - that is, social movements. Perceived stigma, injustices, and injuries are 
accordingly framed as “grievances” (Snow and Benford 1988, 2000) and, 
importantly, also form the basis for a politicized collective identity (Melucci 1995; 
Poletta and Jasper 2001; Simon and Klandermans 2001).  Collective identity has 
been defined as “the cognitive, normative, and emotional connection experienced by 
members of a social group because of their perceived common status with other 
members of the social group” (Thornton and Ocasio 2008: 111; see also Polletta and 
Jasper 2001). The generation of an emotional structure and communal imaginary 
through illegal circulation of cassettes, concomitantly served as infrastructure for an 
emergent political collective identity. I also inquire into how this type of knowledge 
influences the framings and practices of market actors.  I show how the repertoire of 
experiences and encounters in the market - particularly those that involve the state, 
its regulative agencies, and its counter-framings of the Kurdish actors as terrorists/
criminals - are framed by actors as grievances, contributes to actors’ understandings 
of themselves as stigmatized by and also positioned, collectively, against the state. 
Moreover, the PKK-line Kurdish movement, which itself engages in similar 
processes of framing and mobilization in response to the state, also serves as a 
“neighboring” ideological resource. As such, I show how presence of the restrictive 
state influences a politicized collective identity: market actors perceive of themselves 
as “activists” who need to stick together. 
 Understanding how market-level frames are generated, and how they shape a 
particular market culture requires a better understanding of how structural conditions 
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- particularly, tensions and conflicts - shape the emergence and establishment of 
markets. To this end, I will follow this section by linking stigma-domination and 
market formation through the perspective of institutional theory. Noting that 
institutional theory conceives of social movements and collective action as a way of 
addressing societal-level tensions, I will further explicate the employment of 
“framing,” performed by a collectivity of actors, as a means of addressing tensions 
and shaping market culture.  
!
3.2.3 Institutional Theory and Markets 
Institutional theory offers perspectives on how new social ventures and entities - such 
as markets and organizations - emerge and become taken-for-granted. Institutional 
theory is based on the premise that social order is constructed through the “reciprocal 
typification of habitualized action by types of actors” (Berger and Luckmann 1966: 
72) and the subsequent sharing and objectification of these typifications within a 
social group. W.R. Scott (1995: 33) provides the following definition for institution: 
“cognitive, normative, and regulative structures and activities that provide stability 
and meaning to social behavior.” Institutions are created historically, through shared 
experiences, but are reified and experienced as objective reality. Thus, institutions 
seem firmly entrenched Lawrence and Phillips 2004) and are consistently reproduced 
(Rao and Giorgi 2006). Institutions as such are “structures” with which social entities 
- such as markets - are evaluated. A number of conceptual tools employed by 
institutional theory scholars help to understand how the emergence of a market is 
shaped by institutional structures. I briefly review these concepts, and point out how 
y they have influenced literature on markets and market formation.  
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 Legitimacy. The concept of legitimacy is one that has found some popularity 
in marketing and consumer research, and is referred to as the adherence of any social 
entity to widely shared values, beliefs, and understandings in a community. An early 
usage of the “legitimacy” concept in marketing literature was related to the 
widespread acceptance / rejection of certain market offerings and business models 
within communities, based on the fit of those market offerings to the community’s 
shared values and beliefs. Kates (2004) studied the “legitimacy” of brands within the 
gay subculture-community, understanding how community members test and confer 
legitimate status to brands that they find fit with their shared values. 
 At the societal level, three types of legitimacy have been defined: Regulative 
legitimacy refers to whether an entity defers to authority of superior organizations, 
primarily governments, but also credentialing associations, professional bodies, or 
other, more powerful organizations. Normative legitimacy, on the other hand, is the 
type of legitimacy based on congruency with dominant norms and values of a group 
or society, rather than legality. Cultural-cognitive legitimacy is based on whether the 
entity (be it an institution, or a practice) can be understood, categorized, and framed 
by its relevant public (for a review of the types of legitimacy: W.R. Scott 1995; cf. 
Humphreys 2010a,b; Johnson et al 2006). 
 The creation of a market, or an industry has been described as “project” of 
attaining legitimacy and becoming “institutionalized,” in all three of the regulative, 
normative, and cultural-cognitive senses (Humphreys 2010a). Press and Arnould 
(2011) have studied the role of prominent ideological narratives that circulate in 
society, that have helped to legitimate Community Supported Agriculture practices as 
a market form. I note, however, that the “market formation as legitimation” 
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viewpoint is limited in its capacity to explicate the emergence of markets: it 
presupposes a singular institutional environment - that is, a dominant arrangement of 
normative, cultural, and legislative structures - to which a market, as a social entity, 
needs to adhere. Many contexts, however, are characterized by multiple and 
conflicting institutions and institutional arrangements, as well as hierarchical 
relationships amongst different institutional arrangements. As in Kates (2002, 2004), 
non-mainstream communities may establish their own institutional arrangements. 
Moreover, the legitimation view presupposes that a market cannot exist without 
having attained at least a degree of acceptance in terms of all three types of 
legitimacy - but many informal (e.g., Lindeman 2012; Round et al. 2008; Webb et al. 
2009) markets operate and thrive, throughout the world. Industries and organizations 
that do not conform to widely held normative structures nonetheless may appeal to 
audience constituencies (Helms and Patterson 2014). 
 Indeed, Kurdish music was widely circulated amongst a Kurdish constituency 
in Turkey, even before it was legal to do so. After legalization, the conflict and 
tensions amongst the Kurdish constituency and the state - particularly as enacted 
through conflict amongst the PKK and the military - did not subside, and also had an 
influence in how Kurdish music was perceived and framed in the “mainstream.” 
Thus, to better understand how social entities, such as markets, emerge in conflicted 
environments, I continue by reviewing the notion of institutional complexity. 
 Institutional Complexity. Institutional theorists have drawn attention to the 
co-existence and interplay(s) of multiple institutions that govern and shape social 
entities (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). This multiplicity, however, also generates 
tensions and conflicts: different groups in a society may prescribe to different values, 
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beliefs, and understandings (see e.g., Kraatz and Block 2008) - and thus, the tensions 
and contradictions that exist amongst different constituencies may also be 
conceptualized as tensions amongst institutions and institutional arrangements. 
Entities - individuals, communities, but also organizations and industries - may thus 
face contradictory prescriptions from different institutional structures (Greenwood et 
al. 2011; Pache and Santos 2010). Different organizations may respond to complexity 
in different ways - adhering to some institutions’ prescriptions or combinations 
thereof, while ignoring others. This, in turn, accounts for diversity (Greenwood et al. 
2011). Moreover, contradictions and tensions amongst competing institutions may 
also be exploited by actors and motivate collective or entrepreneurial action 
(Goodrick and Reay 2010). To better understand how institutions, in their 
multiplicity and tensions, operate within a market, it is useful to introduce the 
concepts of field and logic. 
 Organizational Field. Markets have been conceptualized as “organizational 
field”s (e.g., Fligstein 1996; Maguire et al. 2004; Scaraboto and Fischer 2013) that 
comprise multiple actors, organizations, and institutions. The notion of the “field,” as 
it is used in institutional theory, draws from the work of Pierre Bourdieu. Bourdieu 
defines a field as “a network, or configuration, of objective relations between 
positions” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 97) in which actors compete to accumulate 
and monopolize capital (Swartz 1997). Ferguson (1998: 598) notes that a field “ a 
field constructs a social universe in which all participants are at once producers and 
consumers caught in a complex web of social, political, economic, and cultural 
relations that they themselves have in part woven and continue to weave.” Bourdieu 
and Wacquant note, “[t]hose who dominate in a given field are in a position to make 
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it function according to their advantage but they must always contend with the 
resistance, the claims, the contention, the “political” or otherwise, of the 
dominated” (102). Thus, the Bourdieusian field is a highly contentious one.  
 The field, from an institutional perspective, is a “local social order” (Fligstein 
2001) where “organized groups of actors gather and frame their actions vis-a-vis one 
another” (Fligstein 2001: 108). Of interest to institutional scholars is how “particular 
features of the market and organizations come to acquire an ‘objective,’ natural and 
taken-for-granted character” (Fourcade 2007: 102), as well as how contradictions, 
tensions, and incompatibilities that affect the market may create opportunities 
towards transformation. Fields are structured by multiple, and potentially competing 
“institutional logics,” which I define next. 
 Institutional Logics. Friedland and Alford (1991) have defined institutional 
logics as “supraorganizational patterns of human activity by which individuals and 
organizations produce and reproduce their material subsistence and organize time 
and space” (243). Society is conceived as an “interinstitutional system,” and each 
institution that constitutes society has a central logic (Friedland and Alford 1991; 
Thornton and Ocasio 2008). This central “logic” is what gives substance and 
meaning to the institution (Scaraboto and Fischer 2013). Logics thus shape the 
actions of and relations among actors in accordance with purpose, values, beliefs 
(Friedland and Alford 1991; Glynn and Lounsbury 2005; Thornton and Ocasio 
2008). 
 Logics that operate at a field, such as a market or an industry, are embedded 
in higher-order societal logics, such as professional and market logics (Thornton and 
Ocasio 1999; 2008). Logics not only shape action, but they also provide legitimacy 
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and order to the field (Thornton and Ocasio 2008) - thus organizations often try to 
comply with dominant logic(s) in a field in order to attain legitimacy in the eyes of 
relevant audiences (Greenwood et al. 2011). The notion of logic thus provides a 
linkage between macro-structural processes and field-level processes.  
 From the institutional perspective, fields comprise multiple institutions and 
thus are governed by multiple institutional logics (Friedland and Alford 1991). The 
logics that operate at any given context may complement or contradict each other 
(Greenwood et al 2011). Institutional logics may compete for dominance and also 
account for segmentation and heterogeneity (Goodrick and Reay 2011; Kraatz and 
Block 2008; Marquis and Lounsbury 2007;  Thornton, Jones, and Kury 2005) within 
a field. It has been argued that artistic fields - including fields of musical production - 
are structured by two competing logics: the logic of art and the logic of commerce 
(Bourdieu 1996; Caves 2000; Glynn and Lounsbury 2005). As this line of thinking 
goes, the logic of art may be dominant for a particular sub-field or genre of music, 
whereas the logic of commerce may be dominant for another. The evolution of a field 
may involve a shift from one dominant logic to another (e.g., Glynn and Lounsbury 
2005 for the shift from artistic toward commercial logics in the field of symphony 
orchestra performance), another possibility is the emergence and institutionalization 
of a new normative order. As noted by Thornton and Ocasio (2008: 111), “as 
collective identities become institutionalized, they develop their own distinct 
institutional logic, and these logics prevail within the social group.” Then, the 
collaborative acts and formation of collective identity involved in the emergence of a 
new market may also involve the shaping of a new and distinct logic. 
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 Thornton and Ocasio (2008) warn against incorrect usages of the term 
“institutional logic,” emphasizing that logics do not emerge from within fields, but 
are localized and instantiated in markets and organizations. Lounsbury et al. (2003), 
also cognizant that logics are “exogenous,” have developed the intermediary notion 
of “field frames” to account for the ordering devices that emerge from within a field 
and challenge the dominant institutional logics that govern that field. Yet, whether 
frames may evolve into logics  - that is, become entrenched and in a way 
externalized - is unclear. The oppositional meanings that inform field-level frames, I 
argue, can become institutionalized to the extent that they are “proto-
institutional" (Lawrence et al. 2002) logics. To better understand how institutional - 
particularly state - hegemonies are challenged, and proto-institutional logics emerge, 
I turn to literature that investigates how social movements employ frames (of 
grievance and action) to instigate change in markets and other organizational fields.  
!
3.2.4 Social Movements, Market Formation, and Field-Level Frames 
Contention, as King and Pearce (2009: 251) note, “is a source of market dynamism, 
both by encouraging innovation and by transforming what is seen as acceptable 
market practice.” Market actors, by diagnosing, exploiting, and acting upon sources 
of contention in the institutional environment, may create projects that transform or 
replace institutions, or create new institutions altogether (see also Bartley 2007). The 
social movement perspective has been useful in explicating the collaborative acts 
within a field that instigate various types of market change (e.g., Weber et al. 2008), 
and also, in explaining how movements that arose outside of the market have given 
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rise to new markets, industries, or sectors (e.g., Sine and Lee 2009; Weber et al. 
2008). 
 Theorists studying the emergence of new markets refer to the challenge of 
mobilizing the requisite economic, cultural, and socio-political resources - needed, in 
particular, to carve out space for new ventures “at best in an institutional vacuum of 
institutional munificence and, at worst, in a hostile environment impervious to 
individual action” (Aldrich and Fiol 1994: 645). Collective efforts, which resemble 
or constitute social movements may be necessary to generate the necessary action 
and mobilize resources (Fligstein 1996). Collective action, as noted earlier, may 
address dissatisfaction that arises through tensions in the institutional environment. 
Scholars have drawn attention to movements and collective action that arise “within” 
the market: Such collective action has been documented to transform institutions, 
giving way to creating new markets and organizational forms (e.g., Lounsbury et al. 
2003). Collective action may also address unsatisfied demands and generate new 
“logics” and markets that  are structured by alternative beliefs and practices, without 
necessarily challenging the workings of the mainstream market - as with the 
emergence of a movement for grass-fed meat in the USA and the market segment 
that has emerged concomitantly with this movement. It has also been documented 
that movements external to the market (i.e., movements that did not “originate” from 
the market/ amongst market actors) may also generate their own organizational 
fields. Social movements, by constructing new cognitive, legislative, and normative 
structures, prepare a structural framework for market actors to engage in the creation 
of a market sector, as with the relationship between the environmental movement and 
the wind energy sector (Sine and Lee 2009). Movements mobilize resources 
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(including people) and ideologies in order to receive the support that is necessary to 
legitimate an emerging market (King and Pearce 2010; Swaminathan and Wade 
2001; Weber et al. 2008). In turn, companies enact the role of  “social movement 
organizations,” working to create opportunities and facilitate cultural transformations 
in addition to economic outcomes (Earl 2004). 
 The literature, while exemplifying different cases in which one type of 
collective action takes place, does not explore the dynamics in which both types of 
collective action take place simultaneously. As with the simultaneity of infrapolitics 
and organized resistance (Scott 1990), market-based movements may also have a co-
constitutive relationship with social movements that originated outside of the market. 
Research linking market formation and collective action, moreover, does not engage 
with linkages amongst markets and social movements that contest the state and 
government policies. Weber and colleagues (2008: 562) suggest that “challenges for 
movements and the tactics through which they effect change in markets are different 
than those that influence government policies.” Yet, action and activism with and 
through the market is one way to demand change in policies and to enact resistance. I 
thus try to contribute to literature on social movements and resistance by depicting 
the market actors generating collective action through (a) framing their own 
experiences and thus enacting a market-level movement and (b) borrowing and 
adapting codes, frames, as well as resources from the neighboring political 
movement, in order to attain common goals.  
 Two aspects of social movements that are of particular importance for this 
study are collective identity and frames. Movements not only draw from, but also 
cultivate, collective identity (Polletta and Jasper 2001). At the level of the market, the 
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collective identity forged amongst producers (Weber 2008), amongst consumers 
(Scaraboto and Fischer 2013), as well as the sense of communality amongst the two 
groups (Karababa and Ger 2011; Penaloza and Venkatesh 2006) are of interest. 
Importantly, cultivating a collective identity involves not only an internal 
cohesiveness, but, as mentioned earlier, also entails the generation of boundaries 
contra the “other”s. Weber et al. (2008) also draw attention to the role of collective 
identity in creating a “common language” and knowledge within an industry. The 
emergence of a collective identity, grounded, in part, in shared experiences of 
cassette circulation and the emotional structure that this circulation generated, was 
the topic of chapter 2. I explicate the role of the Kurdish political movement in 
(re)producing a collective identity in this chapter: yet, I note, the collective producer 
identity within the music market is shaped by not only the Kurdish movement, but 
also by producer-actors’ own experiences in cassette circulation and later by their 
involvement in the formal market.  
 Scholars of social movements have also drawn from Goffman’s notion of 
“frames” - schemata that identify, interpret, and label occurrences, rendering 
experiences meaningful, and guiding action (Benford and Snow 2000). Movement 
actors engage in framing in order to diagnose grievances, propose paths to solution, 
and mobilize collective action (Benford and Snow 2000). Lounsbury et al. (2003) 
discuss how “field-level frames” are employed by organizational actors in processes 
that involve political struggles for institutional transformation. They define field 
frames as “political constructions that provide order and meaning to fields of activity 
by creating a status ordering for practices that deem some practices as more 
appropriate than others” (Lounsbury et al. 2003: 76). While “institutional logics,” 
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they argue, are external to a field, and embedded in societal-level institutions; frames 
are co-created by the various actors that comprise the field. Field frames are sticky 
and durable - in this sense, akin to logics - but also malleable and subject to change 
through direct or indirect political action. Weber et al. (2008) also refer to “codes” of 
movements, which serve a similar purpose to field-frames: central ideals, values, and 
action frames that constitute the social movement are translated into business 
practices and market relationships. A market-based movement’s codes shape 
processes of production and innovation, and also serve to both unify the “collective” 
of producers, and delineate the boundaries of the field/sector. Social movements thus 
have an impact on organizational fields by challenging and de-institutionalizing 
previously dominant frames or logics, and thereby influencing which field-level 
practices are deemed more appropriate and others by market actors (Lounsbury et al. 
2003). 
 I suggest that field-level frames, in their durability, may become entrenched, 
and thus come to establish a normative order within the field. Another useful 
intermediary concept to explain the entrenchment of field-level frames is the “proto-
institution.” Coined by Lawrence et al. (2002), this term refers to new practices, 
technologies, and rules that are produced and diffused through collaborations, and 
which have the potential to become institutionalized. Bridging this notion with 
literature on social-movements geared towards institutional change, I suggest that the 
field-frames, by being persistently applied (and also re-arranged throughout time) 
become entrenched as proto-institutions that govern the field. They thus form the 
basis for an emergent institutional logic. Thus, in a sense, these frames constitute the 
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central logic of this proto-institution. I will refer to this logic throughout the 
dissertation as a “proto-institutional logic”.  
 In this chapter, I show how the repertoire of experiences and encounters in 
the market - particularly those that involve the state, its regulative agencies, and its 
counter-framings of the Kurdish actors as terrorists/criminals - are framed by actors 
as grievances, contributes to actors’ understandings of themselves as stigmatized by 
and also positioned against the state. As such, the activities of the restrictive state 
influences a collective identity: market actors perceive of themselves as “activists” 
who need to stick together. 
!
3.3 Findings: The Emergence of the (Legal) Market 
In the findings I present in this chapter, I start by filling in some of the details that I 
consciously left out in the previous chapter: how illegal circulation was utilized by 
the pro-Kurdish (mostly PKK-line) movement, leading up to production of music 
within the legal music market. The frames that emerged during this period were also 
adapted during the post-legal period: it is thus possible to talk about the beginning of 
an emergence of a proto-institutional logic (Lawrence et al. 2002) before the market 
became legalized and formalized. Thus, I note that the illegal circulation practices 
and experiences that shaped an emotional structure, detailed in the first section of the 
dissertation, contributed to the forming of a shared repertoire of political-normative 
frames.  	

	
 In this chapter, I try to illustrate how a political-normative proto-institutional 
logic emerged, in concert with a politicized collective (producer and consumer) 
identity. Relatedly, this proto-institutional logic also influenced the ways both 
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business decisions were made and artistic choices were performed. This emergent 
logic served as both a unifying and a stratifying device in the Kurdish music market 
in the 1990s and 2000s. This logic comprised meanings, values and orientations that 
started to take place in the pre-legal era, and evolved with the market actors’ 
experiences, through framings of their grievous experiences with the state. Frames 
were also drawn and adapted from the “neighboring”  grievance and action frames 
that were espoused by the pro-Kurdish (post-1980 PKK-led) political movement. As 
they were employed throughout the decade, these frames became entrenched and 
thus evolved into a political-normative proto-institutional logic. This proto-
institutional logic also provided ways to negotiate the tension of commerce and 
artistry/aesthetics that typically characterizes a music market. An “alternative” 
normative market order thus emerged.	

 To illustrate the emergence and evolution of field-level frames, I have 
organized my analysis into three periods. In this chapter, I will present findings from 
the first two periods: the pre-market (illegal) exchange (which addresses some issues 
that were not addressed in chapter 2, on the illegal circulation of cassettes) and the 
initial period following legalization (1991-early 2000s). The period after the early 
2000s until today will be covered in chapter 4. 
 A roadmap of this chapter is as follows: In first section of this chapter, I 
detect the three frames that emerged during the period of illegal circulation: “Raising 
consciousness through music and circulation;” “Grievances through encounters with 
the state;” “Illegal circulation as a lineage for the formal market.” A transitory frame 
is the “market actors as activists” frame, in which certain producers and performers 
are framed as having pushed for legalization - thereby legalization is cast as a right 
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that is won by the Kurds rather than granted by the state in the collective memory. 
The “consciousness” and “grievances” and “activist” frames are re-visited and re-
articulated in narratives on the the formal period, where legal production is possible 
but still restricted, and a “war” is taking place amongst the PKK and the Turkish 
military. A fifth frame concerns the collective identity of producers as 
“yurtsever” (Kurdish-patriot) and “örgütlü,” (member of a political movement/
organization). This is related to the “activist” frame, but is also relevant to generating 
and maintaining moral boundaries (Lamont 1992) against actors that are perceived as 
“outside” this collective identity. With these first five frames, I detail the way in 
which market actors diagnosed, addressed, and negotiated with societal-level 
tensions: the social-political dynamics which marginalize and stigmatize the Kurdish 
constituency, and relatedly, which do not grant the Kurdish music scene equal 
recognition and representation by legal, cultural, and normative orders. In the final 
section, in which “making good music” and “sales success” are also framed as 
service to the Kurdish people, I discuss how the proto-institutional logic is employed 
in negotiating the tension between the logics of arts and commerce: neither logic is 
foregone, completely, but are negotiated, re-interpreted and re-framed in a way that 
commercial and artistic concerns become entwined with political norms.  
!!
3.3.1 The Pre-Legal Era (1970s until 1991) 
3.3.1.1 Frame 1: Raising “Consciousness” through Music and 
Circulation 
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The illegal circulation of cassettes involved some transactions in which money 
changed hands, but relied heavily on practices of gifting. As detailed in chapter 2, 
circulation was embedded in and also helped generate an emotional habitus, which 
served the imagination of a unified and resistive Kurdish community. These 
grassroots efforts were relatively de-centralized, but also formed the precursor and 
motivation for more organized and politically-motivated circulation. The Kurdish 
movement - - which was more fragmented in the 1970s, and more or less unified 
around the PKK after the 1980 coup - was also involved in the circulation of music, 
as a means for attracting and mobilizing individuals, for “teaching” ideology, and for 
generating emotionally charged political alliances. 
 Many of my informants were aware of, and drew attention to, the strong 
association between music acting as a vessel – and thus, its being instrumentalized 
by the Kurdish movement, in order to generate a feeling of belonging to the Kurdish 
community. Several informants referred to music serving as a conduit towards 
attaining a “national consciousness” (ulus bilinci). They were aware, moreover, that 
this linkage between nationalistic sentiments and music was by no means discovered 
by the Kurdish movement – noting that other communities and nations around the 
world also utilized music and other performance arts, to engender communal 
togetherness and to relay nationalistic propaganda. Many informants nonetheless 
believed that the Kurdish case was somewhat exceptional, arguing that Kurds had 
long relied on musical oral traditions to articulate and transmit language, history and 
cultural repertoires. An exemplary quote from my interview with Dicle and Melda, 
illustrates this understanding: 
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D: … more than anything, any book or any printed product, music has a very 
important place in terms of nationalism, in terms of being the language of a 
political movement. … practically every important event has its song in this 
modern era, for example Mazlum Doğan , or others who have become heroes 2
in the Kurdish movement, the revolutionary martyrs and so on. If it were the 
Basques, maybe they would have written poetry, or the Russians would have 
written a novel. Our people make songs. … so music became the most 
important vehicle in the process of becoming a nation. It is very important in 
creating a shared culture, a shared feeling, a shared perspective.  !
 Even before cassette circulation, and during a period in which Kurdish music 
was absent from the Turkish radio-waves, a “resource” for Kurdish language and 
music - and thus for “awakening” the national consciousness, was Radio Yerevan 
(Erivan Radyosu, as it is referred to in Turkish). Broadcasting daily Kurdish music 
programs since the mid-1950s (Scalbert-Yucel 2012), their programs could be 
followed by employing various trickeries with radio antennae. There is a mythic 
quality that seeps into informants’ accounts on Radio Yerevan. Many people use 
laudatory terms in discussing the broadcasts – how it provided one of the vital means 
of “preserving” and playing “authentic” Kurdish music. Several informants have 
noted that these radio broadcasts influenced performers of Kurdish music in Turkey. 
During this time when there were few other sources through which they could listen 
to music, people would await the Kurdish music programs on Radio Yerevan with 
great excitement. They would meticulously arrange their radio antennae to be able to 
receive the signal, sometimes going up the roof to find the best spot. While 
conducting interviews, it struck me that some of my informants had never actually 
listened to these broadcasts as they were aired on radio - some where too young to 
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 Founding member of the PKK who died as a result of self-immolation while a prisoner at Diyarbakır 2
Prison following the 1980 military coup.
have done so, and some lived in regions where the broadcast could not be heard. But 
regardless, they were transmitting stories they had been told by their parents, friends, 
and relatives. These “shared memories” (whether actually experienced or not) had an 
immense emotional influence on many Kurds’ understandings of their “musical 
heritage.” (Less discussed, though still noted, are broadcasts on Radio Baghdad.) 
Thus, the Kurdish movement, in trying to shape a politicized collective identity, used 
references to singers and songs heard through these informal channels.  
 After the 1960 military coup, a new constitution was drawn up, and, 
according to informants, this constitution left some gray areas with respect to the 
production, the import, and exchange of Kurdish music. Taking advantage of these 
gray areas, Kurdish 45 and 78 RPMs were recorded and sold in the legal marketplace 
(Yektan Turkyilmaz, personal communication), and continued to be sold in the 
1970s, despite a constitutional ban (instated in 1967) that was, in all possibility, only 
selectively enforced. In the narratives that describe the decades leading up to the 
1980 coup, despite periods of relative “relaxation,” the state lurks in informants’ 
accounts as a restrictive and oppressive shadow. Even if it was not strictly illegal, 
listening to the Yerevan Radio is still framed as a resistive act - the use of Kurdish 
language was, if not constitutionally banned, still frowned upon and various policies 
were implemented to homogenize and “Turkish-ify” the young Republic (see e.g., 
Yıldız 2001). The State radio was involved in curating and modernizing (i.e., 
polyphonizing and transposing) music from different locales. Several songs that were 
originally sung in non-Turkish languages (such as Kurdish, Lazuri, Homshetsi, 
Georgian, etc.) were re-arranged with Turkish lyrics (see e.g., Hasgül 1996). While 
some Kurdish performers found fame through performing music with Turkish lyrics, 
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others did not become part of the “Turkish folk music” scene, or performed in both 
Turkish and Kurdish. Some performers travelled to Yerevan or Baghdad due to the 
lack of performance opportunities within Turkey. The artists who performed in 
Kurdish often did not gain broad public popularity in the Turkish market – moreover, 
a few artists who sung in both languages, and who had some visibility in the Turkish 
public, are often framed as having been wrongfully persecuted and stigmatized due 
to their singing in Kurdish. One such example is Ayşe (sometimes referred to as 
Eyşe) Şan, who, it is emphasized, lived a life of poverty and difficulty, at times 
leaving Turkey to live in other countries (including Germany and Iraq) as a 
consequence of performing Kurdish music (and recording albums) throughout the 
1960s and 70s . 3
 Nonetheless, the influence of these early broadcasts and recordings is framed 
as forming an “initiation” into a “Kurdish consciousness.” Music thus serves to 
initiate and habitutate individuals into the shared emotional structure/ habitus (Kane 
2001; Kuruoğlu and Ger 2014) that is constitutive of collective identity, as is 
evidenced through accounts of several actors in the music market. This quote from a 
published interview with Hozan Kawa is exemplary:  
In the area I was born and raised, all young people wanted to sing arabesk 
and they wanted to sing in Turkish. I was one of those. (...) My mother had 
great influence in my shift to Kurdish music. My mother practically forbade 
Turkish music to me, and was piling Kurdish cassettes in front of me, 
wanting me to listen to them. This is how I started to listen to the dengbej, 
such as Meryem Xan, Ayşe Şan, and Şakiro. Moreover, the dengbej tradition 
was very common and influential in our region. And it had its effect on 
Kurdish youth. Even though arabesk was a serious center of attraction, on the 
other hand, the dengbej were like the protective shield. Apart from this, my 
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mother would also systematically make me listen to Radio Yerevan which 
had a daily broadcast [of Kurdish music] for an hour or two. Listening to 
Kurdish music on Yerevan Radio really deeply affected me. We were born 
into a world in which the concepts of Kurdishness and Kurdistan were 
denied. These affected me deeply. … I wish my mother were alive today and 
could see that I made it here, that I am able to serve our people with my 
music, my art. (Online interview, no author ) 4!
 In Hozan Kawa’s narrative, particularly noteworthy is his drawing attention 
to the absence of the possibility to explicitly verbalize the “concept of Kurdishness 
and Kurdistan.” In this absence, the music serves as the unifying link. The music 
emotionally and symbolically connotes “Kurdishness” and “Kurdistan” by virtue of 
its being sung in Kurdish and its connecting the audiences to the oral heritage. Many 
market actors - performers, producers, sound engineers alike - see themselves as 
following in the footsteps of these performers and broadcasters and as thus taking a 
more pro-active role in circulating the music - a theme that also relates to the frames 
of “market actors as activists” and “illegal circulation as lineage for the legal 
market.” As such, the market actors see themselves as playing a part in unifying the 
Kurds around a “national consciousness.” 
 Starting in the 1970s, with the heating political atmosphere, cassette vendors 
circulated recordings of music as well as political speeches. The numerous Kurdish 
political organizations housed their own music groups as well. Zeynel, a specialist in 
Kurdish linguistics, director of a cultural center, and also a former musician, notes 
that several music groups and artists were part of illegal Kurdish political 
organizations in the 1970s – moreover, their music was immensely popular, played 
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on celebratory occasions such as weddings, in addition to being circulated covertly. 
Zeynel recounts; 
After the 70s, more or less all of the Kurdish illegal political parties featured 
[their own] illegal music groups, and these music groups conveyed the 
ideologies, strategies, style of struggle, worldview etcetera [of those 
organizations] through songs. Music was used as a means of propaganda. (…) 
until 1980, all the weddings would feature those groups affiliated with the 
political organizations, they all played political songs, revolutionary songs, 
propagandistic songs. And we grew up with those songs. !
The recordings of these groups were circulated, and live performances took place, 
behind closed doors. The singer Ali Baran, during a concert in March 2012, 
recounted giving concerts in the 1970s in tiny rooms. Despite the risk of police raids, 
these concerts were very well-attended - Ali Baran jokingly lamented that he was no 
longer able to gather such large audiences for his concerts.  Another informant, Sırrı, 
the owner of a shop selling Kurdish books and music, who was involved with the 
Kurdish political movements in the 1970s, recalled how he and his friends would 
gather at homes, often waiting until dark and not going in all at once but parsing their 
entries so as not to draw attention  – and listen to music and sing together during this 
period. A cassette made of their singing one evening – one that was not made for 
circulation but rather for the benefit of the recorder’s memory – recently made its 
way back into Sırrı’s hands at the time of our interview. Sırrı was extremely moved 
when he received this cassette, and he recounted it to me with a smile on his face. 
These “revolutionary musics” of the 70s was directly associated with the burgeoning 
(yet still fragmented) Kurdish movement, and memories of political gatherings from 
that period - such as the ones recalled by singer Ali Baran and bookshop owner Sırrı, 
are colored with the threat of police intervention.  
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 This covert music scene, as well as the circulation of records on the formal 
market came to an abrupt halt with the 1980 coup. Zeynel noted that in the period 
following the coup, even instrumental music with Kurdish overtones was prohibited. 
The Kurdish intellectual Musa Anter, according to his own account that was 
recounted to me by numerous informants, was once taken under custody for 
whistling a Kurdish tune. I lost count of the times I heard the catchphrase “It was 
forbidden to even whistle in Kurdish” (Kürtçe ıslık çalmak bile yasaktı). The dengbej 
were unable to travel, many musician/activists were jailed, several others fled the 
country before or during the period of military rule. Thus, a moratorium was 
effectively placed on all Kurdish cultural production and performance. 
 Despite the visible silence following the coup, many accounts - as explained 
in the chapter 2 - indicate that the recordings made and reproduced during the 1970s 
continued to be circulated widely in the 1980s. Moreover, artists who were in exile 
continued to record  professionally and prolifically abroad. Şivan Perwer, based in 
Germany at the time, produced a number of albums, which would find their way into 
Turkey. The way that most people describe their attaining these cassettes connotes a 
claim to agency: these cassettes were not merely “brought” to them by smugglers, 
friends, or family members. They were “asked” to be brought to the Kurds in Turkey. 
Fehim, an academic in his early 30s, described his father as always “ordering” these 
cassettes from relatives who worked abroad – the verb he uses, “getirtmek,” places 
the agency on the one who does asks for the cassettes: the father was responsible for 
the bringing of the cassettes. Mehmet, the producer introduced in the previous 
chapter, who listened to Perwer’s Halepçe album with his friends, talks about how 
they procured and “got their hands on” the cassettes (the verbs he used were 
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edinmek, elimize geçirmek). The sense I often got – supported by the selection of 
words, demeanor, facial expression – during interviews was that many Kurds, while 
they immensely enjoyed listening to this music, they additionally received pleasure 
and satisfaction of opposing the law and also of fulfilling patriotic duty by listening 
to these cassettes. In other words, “ordering,” listening to, and enjoying these 
cassettes was a way of embodying and enacting a moral and political stance.  
 A significant development in the mid-1980s was the re-surfacing of the 
Kurdish movement – this time, subsumed more or less under one organization, the 
PKK. The PKK, active since the late 1970s, covertly organized and gained broader 
support during the military coup. The first attack on a military outpost took place in 
1984 (Icduygu et al. 1999), and the organization became more visible throughout the 
1980s.  The PKK and its leaders were well aware of the important role of music in 
fostering belonging to an ethnic community/ “nation”, and mobilizing supporters to 
the movement. Abdullah Öcalan, the now imprisoned leader of PKK, is reported to 
have said “We have built our revolution upon the [music] of Aram Tigran” (Xelil 
2012 ) – referring to the Armenian singer and songwriter whose family had migrated 5
from Diyarbakır (a city that was once home to a large Armenian population), who 
performed Kurdish folk songs as well as his own compositions of Kurdish poetry, 
notably of Cegerxwin, a Kurdish nationalist poet who lived between 1903-1984. 
 While Tigran’s music, or the music of many other folk singers / dengbej were 
generally not overtly political, or propagandistic, there were other groups whose 
music was precisely that: A new music group, Koma Berxwedan, was established in 
Europe in the mid-1980s. This group was formed by an artist’s collective 
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(Hunerkom) based in Germany, in the tradition of the 1970s’ political, revolutionary 
music groups, as part of an effort to mobilize Kurds into supporting the movement, 
and to convey the movement’s ideologies in an accessible manner. Koma Berxwedan 
came to be associated with a distinctive musical genre, referred to by my informants 
as well as in print articles by [former] members of the group as “agitative:” a term 
used by left-wing activists with respect to protest songs that were specifically 
designed to elicit feelings of anger, and hope for the future – a rosy future that was 
pictured as occurring following “the uprising” (in Kurdish, serhildan). One of its 
founders, Xemgin Birhat, described the group and it purpose in a published interview 
as follows: 
When the fight for freedom started emerging in the 1980s, the [technologies] 
for mass communication were not yet very advanced. The publications 
prepared by the movement for freedom [PKK] also could not be distributed to 
the public in a speedy manner. When you also consider the problem of 
[il]literacy with our people, I think you can better understand Koma 
Berxwedan’s role in this struggle for freedom. The music of Koma 
Berxwedan has been a most efficient tool in spreading the newly developing 
ideology of freedom to the people. For instance, in that period, the standard 
style [of music] of agitation and propaganda were practically conceived by 
Koma Berxwedan. This triggered, among the people, the feelings of owning 
up to one’s language, culture, and identity. In short, Koma Berxwedan played 
a large role in both conveying the politics of the freedom struggle to the 
people, and also to transfer the values that this struggle created, in an artistic 
language, back to the people. In this sense, it has been a source of morale 
support for the struggle and for the Kurdish people. (Interview published in 
the newspaper Yeni Özgür Politika, 2008 ) 6
 The Turkish word Birhat uses – “moral,” does not translate to morality in 
English, but rather refers to an uplifted emotional state that involve hopes and beliefs 
that the movement will be victorious. With such phrasing, and with the rest of this 
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quote, it is possible to see how emotionality forms a foundation for involvement with 
the movement and the embodiment of a political-normative orientation: the anger 
against the state (agitation) and the feelings of owning up to one’s language, culture, 
and identity. In the previous chapter, I discussed how this “feeling” was cultivated 
and shared, as an emotional disposition, that was shaped in part through the 
circulation of cassettes. The Kurdish movement organizations - especially the PKK - 
also employed music in a more instrumental manner to trigger and accelerate the 
cultivation of such feelings - and, importantly, to “move” the feelings along the 
direction that aligns with the political agenda of the movement. Groups such as 
Koma Berxwedan, comprised of individuals who also self-identified as activists, 
were instrumental in these efforts.  
 The activism of these pro-movement groups and singers, in this period, 
served to unify people around a politicized collective identity: Kurdishness, in 
activists’ imagination, entailed not only a shared ethnicity, but also a subscription to a 
particular political ideology. The music and lyrics were thus a means to both shape 
and convey an emergent ideology to the people, and thus served to awaken 
nationalistic feelings/ cognitions of a particular kind, as is evidenced further in 
Birhat’s quote: 
Throughout history, the Kurds have become acquainted with a number of 
ideologies. The most important among these is the PKK ideology, which has 
promised freedom and liberation to the Kurds. In these recent years, this 
musical style … has taken on the duty of carrying the ideology and 
propaganda of a political party, an organization. These political and agitative 
songs have been received with [fondness] among the Kurds. Because the 
ideological statements that were articulated [in the songs] were not divorced 
from the societal [needs] of the Kurds. So in this way, it has been easy to 
influence people by these ideological statements, and to motivate them to 
$107
resist the existing system. The most important aspect of these songs is that 
they [contain] the “we” form. The [purpose] for this is to [make] the public 
identify with the contents of the song. The content of the songs, in general, is 
that the party [PKK] is, with no reservations, the guarantor of the struggle. 
[With these songs] a call is made to individuals, to unify around the party, to 
fight for the righteous cause. !
 As Birhat notes, the lyrics were written in a manner that they believed would 
reflect and serve a political cause: to transfer certain “values,” such as freedom, and 
nationalistic ideals, by encoding them in emotionally charged lyrics, to “the people,” 
some of whom are illiterate and thus can be reached only through song or speech, 
rather than through written text. Thus, the aim was to generate a “collective 
effervescence” (Durkheim 2001[1912]) around the “party”s ideologies and actions - 
in other words, by emotionally generating a collective subscription to the pro-PKK 
ideology. “The people,” as a community, is imagined and constructed in part through 
these musical efforts.  
 Listening to Koma Berxwedan and other Kurdish singers during the 1980s 
was thus a means to become educated about about an ideal of “Kurdishness” as 
inextricably related to resistance. One of my informants, Metin, a performer and 
sound engineer, talks about how he perceived of listening to Kurdish music under 
legal restrictions was influential in shaping understandings of Kurdish 
“consciousness”, and also convinced new generations of artists to become involved: 
People who were forbidden from speaking Kurdish with each other, people 
who were pressured, when the time came, they started to listen to Kurdish 
albums, they started hearing [music] from Europe, from Iraq, from Yerevan. 
Yes, they said, Kurdish music is made, and they liked it, and they started 
thinking, we can do this too. I mean, if you clog all vital arteries, but if there 
is flow through only one channel, then people want to pursue that. So the way 
to [get in touch with] Kurdish identity was through making Kurdish music. ... 
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Because the language was so quick to spread, and quick to reach the ear, this 
was one of the methods used, and people started gaining a consciousness in 
this matter. It wasn’t just about political messages, in the music of Hunerkom 
and Koma Berxwedan, the people who were making music in Europe at the 
time, they were also talking about the villages, the people’s lives, about love. 
But this gradually brought about such a consciousness, that if you talk about 
love in Kurdish, it gains a political meaning. (Metin, performer and sound 
engineer) !
 Articulations of the Kurdish movement’s (i.e., the PKK’s) normative and 
political ideology can be found in Koma Berxwedan’s music, as well as in the music 
of the groups that followed. While a thorough analysis of lyrics is beyond the scope 
of this dissertation, a few examples are useful: the more abstract concepts of 
“freedom” –Azadiya, “rebellion” – Berxwedan and Serhildan, - and “homeland” - 
Welat and Kurdistan; the notion of martyrdom (Şehid - invoking fallen rebels and 
guerilla); as well as more concrete descriptions of mountainous landscapes, and 
invocations of culturally / historically significant days and events, such as Newroz, 
are some of the emotionally and symbolically charged themes that circulated through 
the music.  
 While Birhat claims that these notions and ideas are “grounded” in the 
traditional values of Kurdish society, analyses of the (changing) ideological frames 
espoused by the Kurdish movement (e.g., Güneş 2012; Romano 2006) suggest that 
the PKK had a more transformative agenda, grounded in Marxist-Leninist ideology 
in the 1980s, with a shift of emphasis towards liberation and “radical democracy” in 
the 1990s, which problematized not only the repression of the Turkish state but also 
aimed at liberating the Kurds from feudal oppression. The Newroz myth, for 
instance, served as a symbolic resource for the movement and pro-movement 
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musical productions, in their collaborative efforts to construct a counter-hegemonic 
(with respect to both the Turkish state and the feudal relations) “national” identity 
(see also Aydın 2005). Importantly, this early era of agitative music would continue 
to influence the music produced in the legal market: performers and songwriters 
were encouraged, by audience and movement activists alike, to produce songs that 
invoked these themes of Kurdish resistance and patriotism in the 1990s. Many 
performers saw groups like Koma Berxwedan as their forebearers. They thus partook 
in a similar act of communal imagination and ideological outreach. This effort and 
political position, in turn, informed a collective identity amongst producers in the 
marketplace in the 1990s.  
 Around the same period that Koma Berxwedan was performing pro-
movement songs, Şivan Perwer was “raising consciousness” in a somewhat different 
manner. Perwer was not particularly pro-PKK. In various published interviews (e.g., 
Kevirbiri 2003), he argues that he is not affiliated with any Kurdish organization. 
Indeed, in his songs, he has been critical of the disagreement amongst pro-Kurdish 
actors. Most striking is the album “Me Çi Kir?” (“What Have We Done?”), recorded 
in 1982, in which he directly references and critiques the pre-1980 fragmentation 
among rival Kurdish factions, particularly with the song “Yar Merhaba” (“Hello, 
love”). The album also included the song Cane Cane (a song that, in its Turkish 
incarnation, came to be very popular amongst Turkish audience who were clueless of 
its origins) which was reportedly composed by Delil Doğan, one of the founders of 
the PKK (and brother of Mazlum Doğan, who died by self-immolation in the 
Diyarbakır Prison, becoming one of the first “martyrs” who would go on to become 
an emblem for the PKK). Perwer, despite his (uncertain or shifting) alliances, was 
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beloved by many Kurds – lauded both musically, and also because of his songs that 
often wove together themes of love and Kurdish identity. He differed from Koma 
Berxwedan in that his songs could be musically quite experimental (Koma 
Berxwedan’s songs were often repetitive and featured similar musical themes), and 
his lyrics could be more allusive than propagandistic. Even more overtly nationalistic 
songs, such as Kine Em? (Who are we?) were rich with poetic metaphors, and such 
songs, in my informant Utku’s words, influenced the Kurds and awakened feelings of 
“Kurdish consciousness” like no other. Thus, to a certain extent, pro-movement 
musicians and other actors also “adopted” Perwer’s music, taking inspiration from 
his ability to musically “affect” millions of people. Other musicians, such as Ciwan 
Haco, Nizamettin Ariç, Ayşe San were similarly seen as influential - but, in the words 
of Berdan, a performer, the pro-movement performers in the 1990s infused their 
music with a “more radical” political stance. These groups and performers - the 
explicitly pro-movement groups, as well as the “unaffiliated” performers - were seen, 
due to their role in generating consciousness and unity, as forming a “lineage” for the 
politically-motivated actors of the 1990s. 
!
3.3.1.2 Frame 2: Illegal Circulation as the Lineage of the Legal 
Market 
The illegal circulation of cassettes, along with other technologies and practices that 
enabled Kurds to listen to Kurdish music, were seen widely to have formed the 
backdrop for the current-day market exchange, and thus played a role in shaping the 
market culture. Many of my informants had been involved, in one way or another, 
with illegal circulation, and thus had been initiated into the emotional structures 
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detailed in chapter 2. This immersion forms a backbone for a shared identity and 
political orientation in the marketplace. While this a more or less unreflective 
process, at a more conscious level, many informants also explicitly linked their work 
as producers in the marketplace to their experiences with illegal circulation. As such, 
radio broadcasts from neighboring countries, the political music of the 1970s, and the 
cassette circulation of the 1970s were framed as forming the “lineage” of the legal 
music market of the 1990s. While this is easily seen in the accounts of performers, 
who refer to other groups/performers as “inspiring” the kind of music they make, this 
framing is also found in the accounts of company owners/producers, sound 
engineers, and other people who are involved with the music scene at a professional 
capacity. This was voiced explicitly by Utku, a producer at a prominent Kurdish 
music company, which I shall refer to as [A] Muzik. When I told him that I was 
interested not only in the legal market, but also in the illegal circulation that preceded 
it, he said, approvingly: 
It’s good that you are going back to the 1970s, I mean, in a period where 
[communications] technology wasn’t that developed, circulation took place 
through [informal] trade. Musicians were influenced by each other, by these 
flows. Of course even before [the 70s] there was Radio Yerevan, one of the 
factors that helped transmit Kurdish music. Now [A] Müzik is the next step in 
that process [of transmitting Kurdish music]. (Utku, producer) !
Emre, who would go on to become a prominent producer in Unkapanı, also referred 
to his experiences with illegal circulation when I asked him about how he became 
involved with the music business: 
E: In the 70s, around 77, I was in [Gazi]Antep. Because import and export 
were limited and prohibited in Turkey at the time, cassettes would enter from 
Iraq and Syria into Antep, so all the [recordings] could be found around that 
time, as cassettes... In Antep around that period, there was this [circulation], 
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with the new [cassette recording] technology arriving at the time, of things 
like the court defense of Deniz Gezmiş , and the [political speeches] that were 7
made at the beginning of the new Kurdish movement… it was very lively 
there, there was this important political triangle formed between Ankara, 
Diyarbakır and Antep. So we would record those speeches, those meetings 
which were a bit like conferences. And then we would put the cassettes in 
covers depicting photos of famous singers, such as Esengül, to avoid being 
caught. This is how the recording scene was established, until September 12 
[1980]. We also made recordings and distributed [cassettes] of Kurdish 
singers, such as Şakiro.  
A: You mean in studios? 
E: No, just by connecting tape recorders to each other... there were no studios 
or anything at the time. That’s how I got started [and kept going], until 
September 12. !
 In Zeynel’s words, “a period of silence” followed the 1980 coup. Many 
musicians and activists fled the country and sought asylum in Europe, continuing to 
perform there. Some were arrested in the period following the coup. Emre fled 
Antep, but was arrested on the road, when he was subject to a police search and 
found in possession of a banned album - a long play of Turkish folk singer and left-
wing activist Zülfü Livaneli called “Kardeşin Duymaz.” He says that he was tortured 
in custody for a duration of 45 days. After he was freed, he started looking for work 
in Istanbul, and ended up in Unkapanı - “I didn’t know how to do any other kind of 
work,” he says, of his continued involvement with music production and circulation. 
He moreover played a prominent role in pushing for the legalization of Kurdish 
music, as I will discuss further in this chapter.   
 Conceiving of actors of the legal market as constituting the “next step,” 
following illegal circulation, indicates the role that their shared history played in 
shaping the way they now conduct their roles in the marketplace: The similar ways in 
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which they were immersed in music while they were coming of age, such as shared 
experiences and narratives on Yerevan radio and cassettes, as well as the common 
emotional orientation that was generated through these experiences all were 
influential in motivating involvement with music as not only a cultural, but also a 
political activity. Thus, this shared orientation, rooted in the illegal era, played a part 
in generating a collective political identity amongst producers, and also shaped the 
content of music (i.e., the “object” of circulation) that was produced. 
!
3.3.1.3 Frame 3: Grievances Resulting from Encounters with the 
State 
The cassettes of Koma Berxwedan, Şivan Perwer, and other performers making 
music in Europe at the time were not sold legally in the Turkish market. However, 
they reached high figures – hundreds of thousands, allegedly - of circulation through 
illegal and informal exchange of cassettes. Being in possession of cassettes, listening 
to them in public, or selling them were offenses that could be met with harsh 
punishment: at times beatings from the police, and at extremes, several years of 
imprisonment. As detailed in chapter 2, these experiences led to a common feeling of 
being “marked” as an illegitimate - in other words, dominated (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant 1992) and stigmatized (Link and Phelan 2001) member of society. In 
addition to generating shared emotional orientations, as argued Chapter 2, being 
marked, and the accompanying narratives concerning arrests and state violence from 
the period of illegal circulation, have also been framed as grievances. Grievance or 
injustice frames (Romano 2006; Snow and Benford 2000), in turn, were frequently 
employed to mobilize and justify support for the movement. Stories such as Musa 
$114
Anter’s whistling were very commonly recounted to me - indicating that they were 
also in heavy circulation amongst the Kurds.  Many informants have claimed that 
people found in possession of cassettes in this pre-legal period were arrested and 
subsequently “lost” in custody. Personal experiences of circulating cassettes, stories 
about circulation, stories told within the music, and stories told about music all 
melded together. Thus, stigma and domination was influential in generating pro-
movement political orientations.  
 One such story was narrated by Metin, when we were first introduced by 
Utku at the offices of a music production company. Metin was visiting Utku for a 
business matter, but joined our conversation for a few minutes upon hearing that I 
was doing research on Kurdish music. That he told me this story almost immediately 
after we met is, I think, illustrative of the urgency with which he wanted to illustrate 
to an outsider the grievances that “his people” met, and how these grievances 
motivated the people to resist - rather than give in to - the policies of the state: 
There was a man who [sung] in Kurdish and played the bağlama [long-
necked lute]. They broke all ten of his fingers and left him incapacitated. But 
he got better and played again, so this time, they put one [bullet] in his head 
and killed him. But what is this, this is something with great meaning, if a 
prime minister were to go up and speak it could only have so much of an 
influence [on the people] because [those artists in the 1980s] would go up and 
sing in a forbidden language, with great self-confidence. Such was their 
contribution that, [taking them as an example] people contributed to the 
circulation of music, risking everything. There are many musicians who were 
killed … but despite that, despite all the pressure, Kurdish music has 
managed to survive. (Metin, performer and sound engineer) 
 I have not tried to verify through official sources whether such stories really 
took place, but  accounts on the martial rule following the 1980 coup in the Southeast 
– e.g., Cemal (2003), Tan (2009), suggest their likelihood. These music-centered 
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stories, real or not, were in wide circulation, serving as tropes for the grievances 
caused by the state, and thus were the means through which the state appeared as a 
“subject” (Aretxaga 2003) and circulated amongst the Kurds. Other stories, such as 
raids, narratives of hiding / burying cassettes, all feature the state and are likewise in 
heavy circulation. Such grievances were, then, symbolically framed and re-circulated 
through the songs and narratives of the period, as well as the ten-year period that 
followed legalization. These grievance frames served to motivate, justify and guide 
actors’ participation in the market, and are articulated, in the data, through the 
narratives of various producer-actors on how and why they participated in musical 
performance/production.   
 Emre’s narrative, for example, invoked his arrest and torture by authorities. 
Once he started working as a produced in Unkapanı  in the 1980s, he worked on 
Turkish music albums - yet he worked with many Kurdish artists (who performed in 
Turkish) and also kept looking for ways to challenge the authorities. The way he 
frames his eventual involvement with Kurdish music production is a case of 
“stubbornness” and his indignation towards the state that would not allow people to 
sing in their native language. He thus combines his personal grievances with the 
collective grievances of the Kurdish people in narrating how he eventually started to 
produce Kurdish music. As I shall further detail in the “market actors as activists” 
frame, several other producer-actors drew upon both their personal encounters with 
the state/authorities, and from narratives in circulation, in framing their own entry to 
the market. Thus, encounters with the state were significant in shaping a repertoire of 
action and a common moral orientation, one that is linked to the emotional habitus 
generated through illegal circulation, and is also fortified by specific experiences and 
$116
grievances. This orientation, as I shall further argue, were generative of particular 
types of artistic and business relationships and practices in the marketplace.  
!
3.3.1.4 Frame 4: Market Actors as Activists  
In the late 1980s, the PKK-led Kurdish movement started to gain visibility in Turkish 
media, and also intensified its recruitment amongst young Kurdish people. Music and 
other performance arts also started re-surfacing from the underground, despite the 
continuation of the legal ban. Koma Denge Azadi and Koma Rojhilat, for instance, 
were such groups, formed in Istanbul by young Kurdish men and women – many of 
them university students - around 1989-1990. Many young people were performing 
and recording music in an amateur manner at various community centers or “music 
schools” in the region as well as in Istanbul. Moreover, music producers at Unkapanı 
had started thinking about ways to bypass the legal restrictions. These schools and 
centers were often founded by activist-leaders, and followed political agendas - thus, 
at these schools, ideological training and discussions accompanied artistic education 
and performance. Yet, neither performance, nor formal production were legal: this 
led to a heightened awareness of the institutional incongruence (Webb et al. 2009) 
amongst the Turkish and Kurdish constituencies within the market, as well as at the 
broader societal level.  While the music was popular and revered (had cultural-
cognitive and normative legitimacy) amongst Kurdish audience, it was either 
unknown or was linked to “terrorism” by Turkish audience, press, and by authorities. 
At this juncture, a number of Kurdish producers and performers, who were already 
active in the Turkish music market, started to look into ways to exploit this 
incongruence.  
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 In the late 80s, a number of attempts to publish albums containing Kurdish-
language songs brought some mainstream awareness to the illegality of Kurdish 
music. All music albums issued had to (and to this day have to) pass inspection and 
receive a sticker indicating permit, called the bandrol, from the Ministry of Culture. 
Ministry officials were supposed to listen to the albums and read the lyrics, 
submitted by record companies, before issuing the bandrol, making sure there were 
no offensive lyrics or imageries – and, of course, no lyrics that were in a 
constitutionally inadmissible language. Thus, the ministry served not only to grant 
legal status to an album, but also was responsible for checking its compliance with 
what were deemed as “appropriate” societal norms and values. However, producers 
had come to believe that the officials were not always thorough. A prominent 
example is Ethem Güner , the co-owner of Ses Plak, who decided to test the waters 8
and push the limits. He had frequently worked with Kurdish artists, producing music 
sung with Turkish lyrics but with melodies or motifs from Kurdish songs. In the late 
80s, he finally decided to try something else: 
I first started with artists like Mahsun Kırmızıgül, Fırat Başkale, Nilüfer 
Akbal, who are of Kurdish origin, with albums named “The Eastern 
concerts.” I made a few albums by using songs that incorporated some “le le 
lo lo” lyrics in the beginnings and ends. Then I [produced an album] for a 
local artist named Beşir Kaya from Diyarbakır. It was 1989 or 1988, I had 
him sing an uzun hava called Xazal Xazal in Kurdish, from beginning to end, 
and I produced it. And it was illegal in those years … there was law number 
2932, and Kurdish could not be used in any way. But I handed [the album] 
over for inspection, saying that it was [completely] Turkish, and they didn’t 
realize that there was [a] Kurdish [song] in it. So I published it and it received 
a great deal of reaction from the press, and it was re-collected everywhere. 
(Ethem Güner, producer, interview with author) 
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 I refer to Ethem Güner by his full name here, as he has given a very similar account to other 8
publications, and it complements some other interviews that I refer to in this section. 
!
 Mr. Güner noted that in the prosecutor’s report, the song was identified as 
being sung in an “unknown language.” His interpretation is that, if the word 
“Kurdish” were to be used in some official records, this would be to acknowledge the 
name of the language, which in itself would constitute a crime – but it would also 
effectively acknowledge the presence of Kurdish ethnicity. He was cleared of charges 
related to his role as producers on this album 7 years after he first produced it. 
However, in the meantime, the cassette was no longer available in the legal market. 
In my interview with him, he noted that the album did circulate and sold many copies 
through illegal circulation – but Mr Güner did not incur any financial gain from this 
album. 
 In one sense, Mr Güner’s effort was not successful – he noted that his 
initiative did not receive positive support from Turkish press, media, or arts circles - 
nonetheless, it provoked discussion regarding Kurdish music and the ban on the 
language, which, until that point, had remained virtually absent from public 
discourse. Kurds were still at that point referred to as “Easterners” or 
“Southeasterners” in mainstream media (e.g., Aktan 2012), and when the word Kurd 
was used, it was often in association with the PKK and its increasingly violent 
clashes with the military. In Mr Güner’s words: “It was still a period in which 
[producing Kurdish music] was considered a big crime, still a period when [Kurds 
were not recognized] … Therefore it was impossible for there to have been any 
support, any intelligentsia or politician to come up and say something like, look this 
is possible, it is actually a good thing.” Thus, Mr Güner thinks even instigating 
discussion on music and language was a sign of progress. A few other producers and 
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artists tried somewhat similar tactics shortly thereafter. Singer Rahmi Saltuk recorded 
an album called Hoy Nare, which was also met with similar repercussions to those 
faced by Mr Güner .  Some of my informants mentioned that another production 9
company in Unkapanı issued an instrumental album of Kurdish songs, and with the 
depiction of an elderly man on the cover, with black tape covering his mouth. 
 These musical developments took place shortly before a turning point for the 
Kurdish movement. On March 15 1990, a funeral for thirteen PKK members took 
place in Nusaybin, a province of the Southeastern city of Mardin. This funeral was 
attended by thousands of Kurds, and is cited as the first funeral for PKK militants 
with mass-attendance (e.g. Çiçek, 2012 ). Importantly, it was the first time mass 10
support for PKK was demonstrated in a large-scale, overt, and public manner. 
Several demonstrations in various cities in the Southeastern region followed the 
funerals. Popularly referred to as “the first Serhildan (uprising)” among the Kurds, 
the demonstrations and public displays of support for the PKK following this event 
were coded, by the movement, as part of a mass uprising against the Turkish state. 
Read within this historical context, the attempts to produce Kurdish albums for the 
mass market, and the emergent political music scene coincided with the Serhildan. 
 Amidst this tense environment, during the late 1980s and early 1990s, a series 
of legislative reforms were implemented under the leadership of Turgut Özal (who 
was initially prime minister, and later president of Turkey). Some of these 
implementations were perceived as detrimental to the Kurdish cause: such as “state 
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 It should be noted that this album was finally re-issued in 2009, on the 20th anniversary of its ban. 9
(http://www.esenshop.com/detail.aspx?id=20478) 
  http://www.yeniozgurpolitika.org/index.php?rupel=nuce&id=1594110
of emergency” being declared in the region (OHAL) starting in 1987; or the Village 
Guard (köy korucusu in Turkish) system which involved the recruitment of Kurdish 
villages, arming and training them to protect their villages against the PKK – a 
practice which, as framed by many of my informants, turned Kurds against each 
other and escalated the tension and violence in the region. On the other hand, Turgut 
Özal was also a proponent of changes in the Constitution that entailed broader 
cultural liberties: In 1991 Article 2932 was amended, and this led to the legalization 
of the production and sale of Kurdish music. Journalist Hasan Cemal argues, based 
on his participation in several meetings held with politicians and military officials, as 
well as his interviews and conversations with a number of politicians (including 
several with Turgut Özal) that Özal was committed to laying groundwork for 
Kurdish TV and radio broadcast, and, moreover, was open to discussing the 
possibility of a federative Kurdish state in Turkey (Cemal 2001). However, Özal 
passed away in 1993, before these alleged initiatives could come to fruition.  
 The Özal era is reminisced by several informants as a period that, at the very 
least, afforded legal opportunities to initiate pro-Kurdish organizations and cultural 
endeavors. The  “Mesopotamia Cultural Center” (Mezopotamya Kültür Merkezi, 
MKM as commonly referred to in Turkish or Navenda Çanda Mezopotamya, NÇM 
in Kurdish), dedicated to the arts, and the Istanbul Kurdish Institute, dedicated to 
Kurdish language and literature, were formed in the early 1990s, following Ozal’s 
legal reforms.  Kurdish actors importantly see the changes in the constitution and the 
opportunity space for these organizations as fought for, and thus gained, by the 
movement.  Tahir, for example, said: 
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With the developing Kurdish movement for freedom (Kürt özgürlük 
hareketi), especially after the 1980s until the 1990s, Kurdish [music] was 
only able to express itself at … at [illegal] demonstrations and meetings, and 
had nothing to do with the [formal market] sector. But in the 1990s, as a 
result of the pressure exerted especially by the Kurdish movement for 
freedom, and also because we were living together with the whole 
community of Turkey, during the period of Özal, a [legal market] space was 
also created for Kurdish music, and thus [Kurdish music] gained a space in 
the market that we call Unkapanı. (Tahir, performer and sound engineer) 
 The endeavors and grievances that preceded the legalization of Kurdish 
music are seen, by actors of the market, as part of paying a “cost” or a “price” (bedel) 
in order to attain cultural rights. Thus, legalization was not framed as being 
bequeathed by the state, but as something that was earned (kazanım) by the 
endeavors (mücadele) of the Kurdish people in general, and the Kurdish movement 
in particular. The term bedel recurred throughout my interviews and throughout the 
published interviews and opinion pieces that I examined, and often characterized the 
way that the Kurds perceived the problematic and tension-leaden relationship 
between themselves and the state. Without paying a bedel it seemed to them, the 
Kurds would never attain anything. This “having paid the price” also served as an 
element of the collective identity for producers in the market. The prices that a 
particular producer-actor paid indicate her/his commitment to the shared political 
goals and collective identity. Those who “haven’t paid,” in one way or another, are 
effectively cast as outsiders.  
 A related term which has its roots in the pre-legal era is yurtsever (an emic 
term, literally meaning “one who loves one’s land” used frequently within the 
Kurdish as well as the radical left-wing movement). Yurtsever, in the context of the 
Kurdish movement, refers to devotion to the Kurdish cause, and patriotism that 
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pertains to Kurdish ethnic identity. In this sense, it is distinct from other terms 
referring to patriotism or nationalism, such as vatansever, milliyetçi, or ulusalcı, 
which refer to various brands of Turkish nationalism.. Individuals who aligned with 
the pro-Kurdish cause are often termed as such, and being a “patriot” both requires 
and generates a particular moral orientation. In the context of the market, it is thus 
conducive to a way of conducting business and performing music in the market. The 
history of “struggle” and the payment of high “bedel”s has paved the way for 
subjectivities in the market that are shaped by a particular pro-Kurdish political and 
moral frame. While other subjectivities and ways of doing business were seemingly 
available when the market was legalized, the continued tensions, and the 
stigmatization of the Kurds in both the public sphere as well as in the market, led to 
the pro-Kurdish moral-political frames to dominate the market through most of the 
1990s. 
!
3.3.1.5 Section Summary 
 While there was no formal market to speak of the period leading up to 1991, 
there were several different means through which music was played, heard, and 
circulated. This circulation fell into legal gray areas, at best, and was explicitly 
forbidden, at worst. Thus, practices related to music were often perceived as acts of 
dissidence, by the authorities as well as their practitioners. While the Chapter 2 of 
this dissertation detailed how these practices were instrumental in generating a sense 
of communality amongst the Kurds, this chapter showed how these (and other) 
musical practices constituted a lineage for the formal and legal production, exchange, 
and consumption of music following legalization in 1991, and formed the basis for a 
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collective identity of producers in the legal marketplace. The grievances and 
struggles incurred throughout the decades leading up to legalization, the ideological 
agenda of the movement, and the musical repertoires of various influential artists 
took part in shaping and drawing producers into a pro-Kurdish political disposition. 
This political-normative disposition, importantly, was constructed as contra the state 
policies and practices that were perceived as oppressive and in denial of Kurdish 
identity. Three frames are linked to the emergent pre-market culture, and thus also 
shaped the emergent proto-institutional (Lawrence et al. 2002) “logic” of performing 
and producing Kurdish music during the illegal period: awakening national 
consciousness, grievances with the state, and illegal circulation as lineage. The frame 
of “market actors as activists” on the other hand, frames the efforts of market actors 
in the transition from the illegal to the legal period - imbuing a sense of agency in the 
institutional changes that took place. In the next section, I discuss how these frames 
shaped the collective identity of producers in the Kurdish music market during the 
first ten years following legalization.  
!
3.3.2 The Contentious Marketplace (1991-2000) 
3.3.2.1 Grievance Frames Revisited 
Accounts suggest that following legalization in 1991, demand was very high, and 
Kurdish audience were buying practically every album that was released – therefore 
there was an initial flux of production in the market. Seeing the potential for profit, 
most companies in Unkapanı, including those owned and run by Turks (some with 
strong nationalistic sentiments, claim my informants), produced at least one or two 
albums in the Kurdish language. Current-day producers frame this initial flux of 
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production as consisting mainly of actors “who sought profit.” However, this trend 
did not last long: again, according to informants, these “commercially oriented” 
producers had not foreseen were the risks and punishments that often followed the 
production and circulation of Kurdish music. As soon as it became clear that there 
were (potential) repercussions, many producers retracted themselves from the 
Kurdish music scene. The producers who remained in the business of producing 
Kurdish music were people who were personally and politically motivated to serve 
the pro-Kurdish cause - in other words, people who identified as yurtsever and who 
were prepared to pay the necessary bedel. Thus, a collective identity that was 
grounded in shared ethnicity as well as a shared political-normative orientation 
became dominant in this market. 
 As mentioned earlier, an important this shared political-normative orientation 
and the “feeling” of community was greatly influenced by shared experiences - and 
in particular, by shared grievances and injustices. What the actors felt were 
stigmatizing and discriminating state policies were in turn framed as grievances. 
These frames served to mobilize, motivate, and unify individuals around the shared 
pro-Kurdish cause and politicized identity. The framing of legal-market experiences 
as grievances is evidenced by the commonality of grievance narratives related to me 
several times, using similar terms, by different actors (including producers, sound 
engineers, and singers/musicians) in the marketplace. To summarize: Kurdish 
language albums were inspected thoroughly (and with more scrutiny compared to 
their Turkish language counterparts) by Ministry of Culture officials, who often 
refused to issue the bandrol (the obligatory sticker that any legal musical and literary 
production has to receive) to an album, squashing its entry into the formal 
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marketplace at an early stage. Moreover, despite receiving the bandrol, many albums 
were later banned and recalled – particularly in the region, and their producers were 
subject to court proceedings. Several producers had ongoing trials at the DGM: the 
State Security Courts, which prosecuted cases based on charges of terrorism-related 
activities. This could be a long process that was both financially and emotionally 
draining, even if the person being tried was not found guilty.  Such encounters 
contributed to the affirmation of an angry and oppositional orientation with regards 
to the state. It also, as will be discussed further, led to a sense of kinship and unity 
within the market.  
 Moreover, producers felt that there was a lack of opportunities to sell their 
products and to represent themselves in mainstream media: in other words, a limited 
number of channels through which Kurdish music could be distributed, sold, and 
advertised. Kurdish music could not be played on mainstream television or radio; 
many music stores refused to sell the albums – some out of fear of being branded as 
“sympathizers of PKK”, some because the owners personally were opposed to 
Kurdish being sung or spoken. It was practically impossible to advertise the albums 
through any legally recognized channel within Turkey. Whereas Turkish language 
music could be advertised through a variety of channels, including, as Nizam pointed 
out, “giant billboards in city centers,” Kurdish producers sometimes hesitated to 
place a poster advertising a new album on their office windows.Venues for live music 
in Kurdish language were limited, especially compared to those that were available 
to those who performed in Turkish language. Large-scale concerts did not take place 
until the early 2000s, and most performance was limited to contained spaces and 
occasions - particularly, weddings and celebrations. Thus, playing by the rules of the 
$126
Turkish music market - i.e., the dominant faction (Ustuner and Thompson 2012) - 
was not a viable option for the Kurdish actors. Whereas in some cases, the 
containment of illicit activities in managed and regulated spaces is facilitated by the 
police and statue authorities giving a “knowing wink” - as with clubbing activities in 
the UK (Goulding et al. 2009), in other cases, this complicity, while in the realm of 
possibility, could not be taken-for-granted. The counter-framing “terrorism” 
narrative, and the entwinement of musical activities with the broader resistive stance 
- the enactment of a “living is resisting” attitude (as discussed in the previous 
chapter) - made it such that instances of complicity were framed by informants as 
few and tenuous. Many of them argued that playing live music even on private 
occasions, such as weddings or other celebrations, could be a risky activity, with the 
possibility of police or military officials conducting a raid hanging in the air, 
especially in the Kurdish-inhabited regions. 
 I have pieced together an exemplary account of the ordeals a Kurdish music 
producer could face, based on my interviews with producers, as well as through 
reading several published interviews. Ethem Güner, who was one of my informants, 
the owner of Ses Plak, has also spoken with several journalistic publications about 
the music market in the early 1990s at length. Mr Güner notes that in 1991, 
representatives from the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Justice were added 
to the seven-person inspection commission, to ensure a tighter inspection of the 
newly legalized Kurdish albums. Despite these tightened restrictions, albums that 
passed inspection could still be recalled at a future date, if suspected of including 
divisive or “terrorism”-related content. An exemplary case is that of Şivan Perwer’s 
album entitled “Hêviya Te”, recorded abroad in 1999 (shortly before the political 
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atmosphere in Turkey started to shift in a direction that was more favorable towards 
Kurdish music production) and distributed by Ses Plak in Turkey. The album passed 
inspection and received the requisite “operating certificate” (eser işletmesi) sticker 
(bandrol) from the Ministry of Culture. However, reportedly, upon complaint, the 
inspection board re-reviewed the album and repealed the certificate, contending that 
the album contained criminal elements that oppose public unity and interest (Radikal 
26 September 1999).  Hasan Güner, the brother and business partner of Mr Güner 
was taken under custody. The case was relayed to the State Security Court (DGM), 
which decided, on the basis of examining the Turkish translations of the lyrics, that 
two of the songs, Duhok and Lo Mamo contained divisive propaganda, and thus the 
album should be recalled from the market.  
 In an article published in the Turkish newspaper Radikal (26 September 
1999), Mr Güner notes that such bans and recalls often took place after the album 
had been distributed to storage companies and retailers, and after they had received 
the bandrol sticker from the ministry. Thus, many albums, of which they produced 
thousands of copies (in the case of Perwer’s album, the initial number of copies they 
produced was 100 thousand), were confiscated and placed into the storage facilities 
of the police. Legal proceedings could take around three to five years to resolve, and 
at the end, Mr Güner says that even if the album was re-permitted to go on the 
market, the copies held in custody might not be returned to the production company, 
or they might have already been destroyed. For the Perwer album, Mr Güner cites a 
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financial loss of “70-80 billion Turkish liras” which, at the time, corresponded to the 
vicinity of 150,000 to 170,000 USD .  11
 Such losses also meant that Mr Güner (and other companies) had difficulty 
paying off their debt accounts to various other companies that took part in 
manufacturing the finished product. In a published interview with the Kurdish-
operated Fırat News Agency, ANF, Mr Güner described the difficulties they faced in 
this regard (Gönençay 2012). In the music business, typically, a producer would hand 
a promissory check to the cassette manufacturing factory (which produces the 
physical objects of the cassette albums) as well as the printing house (which prepares 
the album covers), and would complete payment in installments, while the albums 
were being sold. It was, however, common knowledge that many Kurdish albums 
were recalled from the market, and that Kurdish production companies might also be 
burdened with expensive legal proceedings. Thus, it was suspected by lenders that 
they they would not be able to incur revenue from the sales of these albums. Thus, 
these other businesses would often ask for upfront cash payments from the Kurdish 
companies rather than accepting a promissory check. Mr Güner grants that these 
other businesses had to do so to protect their own interests. Thus, these legal 
difficulties had an impact on the way that business was conducted in the music 
market. Mr Güner says that his company was on the verge of bankruptcy several 
times, and had to rely on loans from acquaintances and friendly businesses.  
 Another story that articulates the difficulties faced by producers, and which 
demonstrates the influence of a “terrorism” counter-narrative employed by the state, 
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is one that took place in the mid-1990s. A music shop in Germany ordered a batch of 
cassettes, including an album of Kurdish songs called “Umut Türküleri,” a 
compilation album of songs that were previously issued on albums legally available 
in the Turkish market, and an album of Grup Kızılırmak, a left-wing protest music 
band which mostly performed in Turkish. The cover of this album depicted an 
elderly woman dressed in traditional garb. The cassettes were sent via a Czech 
transportation company. However, at the border, the driver was taken under custody. 
The search report noted that the truck was carrying 
“cassettes that contained Kurdish texts, and one that included a photograph 
that is thought to be PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan’s mother. Upon listening to 
samples from these cassettes, they were found to contain Kurdish 
propaganda, and divisive and regionalist elements …”  (Radikal Sep 26 1999) !
The TIR truck carrying the cassettes – along with other, unrelated merchandise to be 
delivered to a number of different places -  were also stored in custody. Other 
companies that had contracted this distribution company to deliver their goods 
threatened to sue Ses Plak. Eventually, the court decided that the photo on the album 
cover was not one of Öcalan’s mother, but decided, nonetheless, to sentence Mr 
Güner, based on the TMK (the “anti-terror law”) to a one year prison sentence for 
producing the “Umut Türküleri” album, even though it contained materials 
previously inspected by the Ministry. Mr Güner’s sentence was first delayed due to a 
change in legislation in 1997, and eventually overturned.  
 Producers have emphasized that albums which received fines and/or were 
recollected from the market, or that led to court proceedings, did not necessarily 
involve overtly political music. Murat has explained that even albums consisting 
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only of love songs have been recalled, and points out the arbitrariness of court 
decisions.  
… I once made an album for a group that sang in the Kurdish accent of the 
Malatya region, a group called Koma [name of group]. In that album there 
were songs about love, longing, about the land, it had no political content but 
it was banned. I was shocked, why would you ban this album? Another album 
I made, had a song [about] Doktor Zeki, about a doctor that was a victim of 
an unsolved murder  … an artist [whose album I produced] made a song 12
about the life of this doctor … with Kurdish lyrics, and that album was 
banned. Now that one I could understand, it was a politically tense period, 
with a lot of conflict going on. But with this Koma […] group, the album had 
absolutely no political content, but still it got banned. (Murat, producer) 
 A similar argument was made by Nizam, who noted that he took care not to 
produce albums with overtly political content - he made the point that he “speaks 
Kurdish very well” and thus was always conscientious about the lyrics - as I shall 
argue further, producers also tactically used allusions and metaphors, rather than 
overtly political content. Nonetheless, several albums that Nizam produced were 
recollected and banned, and he was subject to court proceedings several times. 
Nizam says that all charges were eventually dropped, but these dealings were, 
nonetheless, time, energy and money-consuming. Moreover, he noted that while 
some albums passed inspection, and were sold freely in the “West” of Turkey, they 
could be banned in the OHAL region by order from the governor’s office. 
 The financial costs associated with restrictions were also noted by several 
informants. For one, there was the issue of money spent on legal fees, and the loss of 
potential sales profits from recalled albums. Additionally, producers have also argued 
that they were in an economically disadvantaged position within the market because 
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 “faili meçhul,” referring to murders that were allegedly perpetrated while people were under 12
custody and whose victims were subsequently reported to their families as “lost.”  
they were unable to promote and sell through the channels that were available to 
Turkish music. In Murat’s words: 
… we haven’t really talked about the commercial losses. We would make 
music videos, for example, but they couldn’t be aired on Kral TV. An album 
that didn’t have videos on Kral TV would not be found on the shelves of 
[mainstream music stores], would not go to relevant sales points, it wouldn’t 
receive attention [from the Turkish consumers]. But if you were able to make 
Kurdish videos and if Kral TV would have played them, I mean, an album 
that normally sold a hundred thousand would maybe sell a million. There 
were these double standards. On any media channel, let alone playing music 
videos, you couldn’t even run advertisements. (Murat, producer) !
 Legal and financial issues could also be compounded by incidents involving 
physical violence. Singer Rojda (female), for instance, argues that she ran into legal 
and physical altercations with law enforcement, starting from a very young age. 
Rojda was, according to this quote in a newspaper article, taken into police custody 
on average once every two months until 2002– at which point such arrests stopped, 
almost abruptly. 
I started [performing] when I was 13. I would sing at weddings and 
gatherings. During those years, [performing in] Kurdish was illegal, but 
nonetheless we would sing. And then we would play “tag” with the police. I 
was 16 years old the first time I was taken into custody. In Edirne, there was a 
Newroz celebration at the university. After the concert, I was taken into 
custody. They beat me up, saying “why are you here, why did you come here, 
Kurdish is forbidden, why are you singing in Kurdish”? The district attorney 
let me go. But because of the beating I received, my spine and my back were 
injured. I had to receive medical treatment for five years. (Başlangıç 2006 ) 13!
 Retailers selling Kurdish music were also involved in a contentious 
relationship with the state and authorities. At a cassette shop in Diyarbakır, situated 
across the street from the police headquarters, I was told during an informal 
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conversation how, in the 1990s, scenes in which the officers exercised their authority 
towards the retailers were very common, and these helped established the way in 
which the state took part as a “subject” (Aretxaga 2003) in their day-to-day 
experiences. Apart from the overtly hostile acts, such as the times when officers 
would raid the shop to make sure that no “offensive” albums were sold, there were 
several instances during which the tension was played out in a more subtle manner. 
According to the owners, police officers would often drop by the shop. They would 
loudly place their guns on the counter next to them, sit down, and would expect the 
owners to order in some food and serve tea. The retailers, trying to remain on the 
good graces of the officers, would entertain the officers, even if they did not enjoy 
doing so. Thus, while outward appearances might suggest a friendly rapport between 
the officers and the retailers, the details – such as the gun on the counter, the unease 
felt and perhaps small gestures performed by the shopkeepers – indicated a 
contentious tableau that underscored the experience. Sometimes the officers would 
ask if the store had such and such cassette on stock – and, the owners note, they 
would ask for the albums of singers that have reputations as Turkish nationalists. The 
retailers saw this as a power play, and they also, to this day, retaliate with small-scale 
tactical measures. In 2013, for instance, during a period of (perhaps heretofore 
unseen) political calm, the cassette shop had decked its windows with posters and 
albums with Turkish language titles such as “We are still standing” (Ayaktayız), “We 
have not fallen” (Yıkılmadık), “We shall win” (Biz Kazanacağız). 
 Cases or threats of physical violence inflicted upon the actors subsided 
considerably after the late 1990s/early 2000s, some of the legal difficulties that actors 
encountered – or, as the actors perceive them, violations of their rights – have 
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repercussions that continue to this day. Tahir for instance, frames his involvement 
with the music scene (initially as a performer, and later as a sound engineer) as a 
natural result of his involvement with pro-Kurdish politics. He moreover sees a 
relationship between his involvement with a cultural center in the 1990s and legal 
difficulties he faces to this day: 
I mean, some artists who are [socially] aware and sensitive to their 
community’s [issues] formed an establishment called [The Center]. We 
needed to be involved with such an organization due to our sensitivity to our 
community’s problems, but we paid the price [for doing so]. I received a 9 
month sentence because I was [a member of the Center]. And it’s not just me, 
my wife has also seen the repercussions. My wife is a Kurd from Syria, she 
applied but was unable to gain [Turkish] citizenship… The state views us in a 
certain regard (devletin bize bir bakış açısı var), even though we only took 
part in legal activities. (Tahir, performer and sound engineer) !
 While the Turkish authorities saw the making of music as a punishable 
offence, the Kurdish actors saw making music as serving the movement (particularly 
in terms of framing and conveying ideology) and possible repercussions as “the 
price” (bedel) to be paid. Continuing with Tahir’s narrative: 
Many [firms] were charged [by the courts], many firms were shut down. Of 
course Kurdish music is not just about the le le lo los, there were many 
groups that conveyed [the movement’s] intellectual foundations to the people, 
as part of art, and of course the state had to do its own job, so there was this 
mechanism at play, court actions were filed, and of course a person who is a 
liberationist [özgürlükçü] is aware of the possible price [bedel] and has taken 
that into account. The fight still goes on, it hasn’t ended. !
 Tahir’s statement, “the state sees us in a certain regard” is particularly 
significant, and has been repeated in similar terms within several accounts. It refers 
to the Kurds’ perception of their being stigmatized by the dominant culture. This 
involves a constant awareness of being seen and marked as “terrorists” that are to be 
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excluded from the mainstream cultural and economic spheres. Thus, a market culture 
with a strong collective identity emerges as a response to this stigmatizing marking: 
the actors band together and construct alternative spaces for their own cultural and 
economic activities, as I shall further explore. 
 The framing of (past and some current) difficulties – including being the 
recipients of physical violence – on one hand contributes to the collective identity of 
musicians and other market actors as “warriors” in a cultural and political battle – on 
the other hand, it also acts as a discriminatory tool. Those who “have paid the price” 
are highly critical of those who did not/ do not. Those who associate with the 
yurtsever ethos, and are members of certain organizations, feel a kinship amongst 
each other but also against the “Other”s - in this case, both other Kurds and Turk(ish 
state). Performers of Kurdish background who did not sing in Kurdish in the 1990s, 
but who started to sing later on, for instance, are viewed in a negative light (Ahmet 
Kaya is a rare exception).  
 The state’s strategies of closely inspecting and frequently recalling albums, 
the charging of producers and performers with terrorism, the material losses as well 
as both physical and psychical injuries all were framed as grievances and were in 
circulation. In response to this array of strategies and counter-framings employed by 
the state, the market actors accumulated knowledge (J. Scott 1998) and a repertoire 
of experiences. Such repertoires, as discussed in the previous section of the 
dissertation, generate shared orientations which in turn have an impact on the 
constitution of understandings of surfaces and boundaries, of “us” and “them.” 
Moreover, these grievances pushed many actors in the market to ideologically side 
with the Kurdish movement: the force, as many saw, that could resist against the 
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powerful state. As I shall discuss in the next frame (actors as activists) this led to 
producers perceiving themselves as activists - albeit in a legal field (rather than 
through fighting alongside the guerilla) - and as serving the “Kurdish people” - their 
social imaginary of the market - through their activities.  
!
3.3.2.2 Frame 4 Revisited: Actors as Activists 
A common way in which informants referred to their participation in the market was 
as being part of a larger “struggle” (mücadele). This framing of themselves as 
“activists” for a larger cause - which some informants implicitly or explicitly referred 
to as the PKK-line Kurdish movement - is related to the frames of “raising 
consciousness” and “grievances,” but additionally refers more explicitly to the 
surmounting of difficulties related to participating in the market. 
 As such, the activist frame addresses a question that is essential to the 
formation of new markets: how producers are “convinced” to enter a new market, 
particularly one that is non-mainstream. Weber et al. (2008) note that a collective 
producer identity is important in convincing new producers to enter the market. Yet, 
previous research also suggests that “contending ideologies” may pose a normative 
barrier against the adoption of certain non-mainstream (business) practices even 
when the market and these practices are profitable (Press et al. 2014). Thus, while a 
collective identity - linked with a countervailing ideology - may provide incentive to 
enter the market, the (material or immaterial) risks of entering the market may work 
as an opposing force. Then, the question is, who enters the market despite the risks, 
and how does this shape the evolution of the market?  
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 Many of my informants argued that immediately after legalization, several (or 
even all) companies in Unkapanı produced at least one or two Kurdish albums. With 
high demand (practically everything was sold, informants claim) and low production 
costs at the time, profit margins were potentially high. Yet, many producers and 
companies gave up despite potential for profits. Other “prices” were high, in the 
words of my informants. Some music producers and artists who made Kurdish music 
were well aware of the difficulties they would face. These actors emphasize that they 
they entered not just “despite” these difficulties, but also “because of” them. Many of 
them perceive themselves as dedicated to the Kurdish cause - the “dava” as they 
referred to it in Turkish. Restrictions often led to moral outrage, grounded in the 
emotions of anger and frustration, and generated a stronger commitment to the 
“dava,” rather than convincing these producers to step away from the market. As 
producer Emre expressed in our interview: 
I am a Kurd. Millions of [Kurdish] people live in this country. Why should 
you face all those grand judges, those prosecutors, just because a man sung a 
traditional song named Xazal Xazal? [The prosecutors said] “this is producing 
[music] in an unknown language”. That kind of response is what makes a 
person more stubborn. So I kept on doing it. (Emre) 
  
 This stubbornness has to do with identifying as a Kurd, and of striving for 
recognition and attaining rights as a Kurd, and forms the basis for a shared normative 
disposition among the producers I interviewed. As with Emre, producer Murat was 
also motivated after hearing about the difficulties faced by many producers in the 
market: Originally from Diyarbakır, Murat already had experiences in radio 
broadcasting – and dalliances with legal enforcements – starting as a university 
student in the early 1990s. He recounted how police would raid their offices, 
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confiscate cassettes, and once badly beat up an employee at the radio. He frames his 
entry to the market as deliberately continuing to engage, alongside fellow producer-
activists, in struggle: 
[I started as a producer] around 1996... of course there are friends [here] who 
had been producing Kurdish music long before that. There were also many 
other companies, and most albums produced by these companies caused [the 
producers] to be prosecuted by DGM. At the DGM they would prosecute 
these people with very funny charges, so these people were prosecuted, their 
trade activities were restrained ... And then some of them got to the point 
where they wouldn’t produce Kurdish music anymore. I heard about all this, 
of course I was also following the [discussions on the Kurdish issue] in 
Turkey very closely ... so I decided to start producing Kurdish albums. 
(Murat, producer) !
 The indignation felt towards the general plight of the Kurds - that is, sharing 
in the common grievances - also served as a motive to join the market as an actor. 
Ismail, a singer who has been performing Kurdish music since pre-legalization, 
describes how the political atmosphere, combined with the Kurdish movement, 
disposed young artists to act in ways that was shaped by the movement – illustrating 
how the political frames espoused by the movement became entangled with the 
political-normative frames that shape market practices: 
… state policies at the time made it [difficult] not just to perform music or 
theater, but they denied you of your identity. In such an environment, one got 
the chance to express themselves a bit more after the 1980s, with the struggle 
for freedom, and with the development of a national consciousness. That’s 
when we started to inquire into our talents, those who had a good [singing] 
voice asked themselves, what can I do. I mean, what the national struggle 
made us see, made every individual see was this: that every individual needs 
to do something, that everyone needs to make use of their talents. (Ismail, 
performer) !
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Tahir similarly notes that he knew the risks associated with performing Kurdish 
music, but saw it as a part of the struggle he willingly took part in:  
I was aware of the bedel [price] I would have to pay… and as someone who 
lived in the 90s, as someone who paid that price, I am a supporter of freedom, 
I am a socialist, and undoubtedly this will be reflected in every field in which 
I produce [art]. And I am someone who has fought for this on a legal[ly 
sanctioned] platform. I never had any illegal connections, but I was sensitive 
towards the public’s problems. There were dozens of other artists like me, we 
tried to establish an artistic sphere. … I believe in the liberatory [potential] of 
the arts. (Tahir) !
 Singer Mehmet Atlı (real name), for instance, also frames his involvement 
with the music, as both a member of an audience/constituency and a performer with 
an ongoing political struggle and as situated within the larger pro-Kurdish “dava”: 
 … from the beginning I experienced music as part of a political struggle, a 
 struggle for [Kurdish] language, identity, and freedom. … [My music is  
 influenced] by my being a member of a community that overcame their  
 disadvantaged position by becoming  politicized.  14!
 This politicized “activist” identity was not only reflected in song lyrics and 
resistive encounters with authorities, but also through acts and dispositions that 
seemingly have nothing to do with the music or the market: musicians’ attires, for 
instance, was expected to be appropriate to their political orientation. Women did not 
wear much make-up; and blue jeans-sweaters were more or less the expected “dress 
code.” Consuming alcohol, while performing/listening to the music is also frowned 
upon - this has been explained as a “political issue” and not a “religious one” by 
informants. My informant Tahir, who is a performer and sound engineer, has referred 
to a whole “lifestyle,” which includes clothes and hairstyles, that is shaped by pro-
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 Özgür Gündem, August 12 2014)14
movement values. While there may have been outliers, there were also people who 
were rejected in part due to the way they look. Singer Rojin, for instance, was turned 
away from a cultural center. One of my informants told me that “[Rojin] came to [our 
organization] years ago. She was really strange, her clothes, her manner. I sent her 
away.” Rojin, in a printed interview, noted that she was turned away from the 
political circle, saying “I was criticized for wearing comfortable clothes, and for 
putting on makeup.” 
 The activist frame, as discussed earlier, was initially employed to describe the 
acts of boundary-pushing and illegal circulation that preceded 1991. With the 
legalization of the market, and the strengthening of the Kurdish movement as a 
player in not only the political but also the cultural field, the field of musical 
production and performance was constituted more explicitly as a “battlefield,” and 
actors as fighters in this field of contention (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). The 
following quote from Ismail is lengthy but worth reproducing here, as it is 
particularly explanatory about how he saw their role, as performers / political 
activists and as the audience as people whose spirits they had to boost. There is, thus 
a sacred sense of duty that infuses the activist frame, which Ismail invokes in 
explaining what they, as a collective, accomplished, despite the threat of sanctions 
imposed upon them. In Ismail’s words: 
When we started, it was no rose garden, we knew that we would get into 
trouble, there were times when we received death threats. But when we 
started, we didn’t just get into this to make music or to make theater, we 
joined so that we could contribute to the struggle. So it was not our purpose 
to make really amazing music. We didn’t join with the intention of becoming 
popular, singing and composing songs. Yes we were artists and musicians but 
we had responsibilities, political responsibilities. We had to choose our side. 
$
That’s why, when the Center was established, we became a battleground, the 
cultural battleground. … We saw The Center as the ministry of culture for the 
future and saw ourselves as laborers of culture. So we did go through a lot of 
trouble back then, and we knew that would be the case. But there was also a 
serious togetherness, and a belief, a support for the struggle. There was a lot 
of excitement, because everything back then was also really beautiful, it was 
really natural. Singing in Kurdish was really exciting. When we would go to 
weddings, for example, all those people would give us a standing ovation, it 
was amazing… and we knew that people didn’t applaud just for our voices or 
our appearance, they applauded our courage and maybe they saw us as 
representations of those old cassettes which were once buried underground. 
That was important for us. Maybe we were not a hundred percent aware of 
this, but we felt it and we gradually understood it. On the one hand, there was 
a war going on, people were dying, villages were being evacuated, there was 
a war and we were trying to do something on the cultural side, that’s why we 
thought of ourselves as people’s warriors. … as supporters of Kurds in this 
war… The music of that period is mostly agitative music, and aims to give 
moral support to the people. When you look at the lyrics, they are mostly 
agitative. There were songs written in memory of fallen martyrs. Songs about 
people who have become symbols, they have become classics. About Zilan , 15
about Ronahi and Berivan , about fallen journalists, about Ape Musa , even 16 17
about Kurdish politicians, like Vedat Aydın . … That’s what was keeping us 18
on our feet, keeping the people standing.  (Ismail) 
 In this sense, these market actors frame their experiences in a way that 
symbolically placed alongside  - but also separate from - as the efforts of guerilla, or 
other pro-Kurdish activists, including politicians, journalists, writers, and prominent 
musicians. Framing their decisions in this manner gave these actors in-group 
legitimacy – but, as with many instances of attaining in-group legitimacy, this did not 
translate to legitimacy in the broader Turkish context. These tensions, and the lack of 
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 Pseudonym of Zeynep Kinaci, female suicide bomber.15
 female PKK members who self-immolated on Newroz in 1993, in Germany.16
 Musa Anter, Kurdish intellectual who was killed in 1992.17
 Leader of the Diyarbakır office of the pro-Kurdish political party HEP, disappeared and later found 18
dead in 1990 after taken into police custody.
legitimacy attributed to Kurdish music in the broader, predominantly Turkish, 
cultural sphere are evident in Nilüfer Akbal’s narrative, from a published interview: 
Some very famous artists … told me, many times, “don’t [perform] in 
Kurdish”. They said, you can’t get anywhere with this music. If you make 
Turkish music, then all the doors will be wide open to you. But if I’d done 
what they told me to do, I would have taken myself to the edges of denial. 
That is because I’m a Kurdish artist and I don’t intend to give up on making 
Kurdish music. I know that this is a difficult path. It is a matter of choice for 
me. If I cannot shout in my own people’s forbidden language, how can I be at 
ease? As a Kurdish artist, I don’t think I can ever be famous in Turkey by 
employing this attitude. That is why, for 17 years, I’ve been trying to survive 
…  and always uncertain about [whether I can make a living]. And it seems it 
will go on this way. (Interview conducted by Latif Epözdemir, 2005)  19!
 [NOTE: It should be noted that Nilüfer Akbal eventually joined the state-
operated television channel, TRT-6 as a presenter in 2009. While she continued to 
perform in Kurdish, and presented a Kurdish-language program on this television, 
this act was perceived amongst some (particularly the Center artists) as betrayal. One 
informant noted that, while they used to be good friends, they no longer even 
“exchanged greetings with” Nilüfer Akbal. Thus, gaining a degree of legitimacy 
within Turkish sphere led to a significant loss of legitimacy within the “Kurdish” 
sphere. This issue shall be discussed further but I felt that after quoting from Ms. 
Akbal’s interview, I needed to briefly engage with it here as well.] 
 As with pious Muslim women who willingly take on the stigma of wearing a 
headscarf (Sandıkcı and Ger 2010), these actors willingly and deliberately took upon 
the stigma of performing and producing Kurdish music. Whereas informants in 
Sandıkcı and Ger’s (2010) account placed more emphasis on wearing a headscarf as 
part of a personal relationship with religion, these quotes from the Kurdish music 
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market are more illustrative of communal and collaborative relationships: stigma is 
taken on in solidarity with similar others who are stigmatized, and a stubborn attitude 
serves a distinctly communal, rather than personal, goal to attain recognition and 
cultural liberties.  
 The lack of recognition afforded to Kurdish producers in the marketplace is a 
source of frustration - but also a motivation. As Robbins (2009) as well as Walsh 
(2009) have noted, exchange (whether through gifts, or within capitalistic markets) is 
a site in which recognition takes place. In the eyes of many Kurds, they were denied 
recognition by the state, the mainstream media, as well as most of the Turkish public 
– and the market was one site, among many, in which this non-recognition took 
place. Thus, the market became one battlefield, among many, in which a fight for 
recognition, as a distinct ethnic community, took place. These communal frustrations, 
regarding lack of recognition and legal difficulties, go hand in hand with a shared 
political orientation and collective identity.  
!
3.3.2.3 Frame 5: Being Yurtsever and Örgütlü: Collective Identity 
Shaping Business Practices 
Related to the activist frame is the frame of collective identity: being aligned with 
like-minded and pro-movement oriented actors, and being affiliated with a political 
organization. While the activist frame was used in explaining personal orientation, 
the collective identity frame relates to both communal alignment and boundaries 
against the “outsiders.” The notion of being a “yurtsever” (patriotic) actor, which 
first emerged in the illegal period, served as a unifying collective identity as well as a 
moral boundary-making (Lamont 1992) device: those who did not affiliate 
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themselves with, or were not perceived as “yurtsever” people were considered to be 
“outside” of the market. The producers  and artists who, attracted by possibilities of 
high profit in the early 90s, produced a limited number of Kurdish albums, on one 
hand, are seen as “outside” of the community of actors that comprise the market. On 
the other hand, the producers and artists who entered the field after the late 90s/early 
2000s are also left outside of this collective identity. Thus, in a sense, this is a frame 
that emerged in the 1990s, but it was more commonly employed to delineate amongst 
actors in the 2000s, after which it became possible to produce and perform music 
without necessarily aligning with a pro-movement orientation. Thus, its application 
as a boundary-making device becomes more prominent in the 2000s. 
 Unaware of some of these dynamics at the very beginning of my fieldwork, I 
made the rookie mistake of mentioning Kalan Muzik, a company that is well-known 
and quite well-regarded amongst Turkish audience, in my first interview. A number 
of artists and groups whose albums were produced by Kalan Muzik - such as Kardeş 
Türküler and Aynur Doğan - had attained a degree of mainstream success. My 
mentioning Kalan and Aynur to the owner of another company resulted in a rather 
lukewarm reaction, although Nizam, my interviewer, perhaps sensing my ignorance 
was very polite in the way he phrased his response. He noted that he regarded Hasan 
Saltık, the owner of Kalan Muzik, as a friend, but he did not think of Kalan Muzik as 
producing “Kurdish music” - Yes, the company had produced a few Kurdish 
language albums, but only a few. Kalan had been producing music since the early 
1990s, but had not produced much Kurdish until the post-2000 era. According to 
Nizam, the sales figures for Kalan’s Kurdish language albums were not very high, 
either, but the media bestowed interest upon this company and its limited roster of 
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Kurdish performers. Thus, as a number of producers mentioned, the Turkish public 
knew about Kalan Muzik. Later on, but still somewhat early in my fieldwork, my 
interview with Deniz, a book publisher who had friends and contacts in the music 
scene, shed light on the somewhat apprehensive reactions when I mentioned the 
company:  
There was this period where, in the 90s, particularly until 1995, you could not 
do anything unless you were part of a political organization [örgütlü]. Kalan 
was not part of [any] organization, it is in that sense an independent company. 
The owner is Hasan Saltık, right, and he is from Dersim . Hmm, in terms of 20
producing Kurdish music, or that kind of music… let me put it this way, from 
what I know, they started to produce and sell that kind of music once the 
price [bedel] to be paid had subsided  and the gains were higher. And maybe 
that’s why they’re recognized by the Turks as well. But these other 
organizations that I’m talking about, they started doing this work when the 
bedel was high and the profit was none. And they’re still doing it. I mean, 
back then you would get arrested for doing this work, forget about the money, 
there was no money in it. This was like a field of combat, I mean, some 
people wrote books and went to jail, some engaged in politics and got killed, 
some made music, and there was the sense that “this is what we’re doing.” So 
during that period, when the losses surpassed the gains by manifolds, you 
couldn’t do it on a personal [independent] level, so that’s why it was done by 
organizations. Kalan started doing this after the 90s, after 95, after the 
restrictions had been loosened. (Dicle, book publisher) !
 Thus, Kalan was seen as having entered a market once restrictions were 
loosened, as not having taken an overtly “yurtsever” political stance. In other words, 
Kalan was not perceived as having paid the same price - whereas for others 
producing Kurdish music in the 1990s, there was “no other way.” (In contrast, and as 
I shall discuss in chapter 4, Hasan Saltık framed himself as having taken risks and a 
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 Dersim is the historical name of a region in Eastern Turkey – modern day Tunceli and parts of 20
Erzincan -  with a population that is predominantly Zaza, some of whom identify as Alevi Kurds. The 
reference of Hasan Saltık being from Dersim indicates an acknowledgement of his being a 
“politicized” figure - albeit not one who is aligned with the rest of the market actors. 
political stance - though not necessarily one aligned with the PKK-line Kurdish 
movement. He also distanced himself from other companies in aesthetic terms.) 
While this delineation is more relevant to the 2000s, the framing of Kalan and other 
post-2000 entrants as “the others” also helps to understand how the actors in the 
1990s cultivated a collective identity that was influenced by affiliations with the 
movement.  
 Being “örgütlü” in the 1990s meant being affiliated with a political 
organization - in the case of the Kurdish music scene, this often indicated the PKK, 
but might also involve membership to legal organizations (such as derneks) or 
cultural centers (kültür merkezi ) that had some “organic” links to, and followed the 
ideological tenets of, the PKK. Dicle noted that being a “member” also had some 
practical implications for the music as well as the publishing industry: if, for 
instance, some personnel working for the business were arrested, then the political 
organization would provide/recruit replacements. During a tumultuous period, when 
music companies were frequently raided, being “örgütlü” served as insurance. 
Moreover, in an interview with a Kurdish performer who used to be affiliated with a 
PKK-line cultural center, I asked about the financing of albums. I was told that the 
“Kurdish movement” allocated funds for “cultural production.” “There was a war 
going on in the 1990s, and that war had its own economic resources,” I was told. 
Some of them were distributed throughout the “cultural battlefield.” I was told by a 
number of informants that it was practically impossible to exist in the music scene in 
the 1990s without being “örgütlü.” 
 Organizations and cultural centers were very influential in cultivating 
collaborations and political alliances with the movement. An exemplary organization 
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of this variety is a school and venue for the performance arts that I refer throughout 
the dissertation as “The Center.”  The Center was, according to informants’ accounts, 
the most prominent organization that facilitated interaction between the PKK-line 
movement and the arts scenes (foremostly music, but also dance, theater, and film). 
Tahir, a former member, has referred to The Center as being established as a result of 
the movement’s efforts to “represent itself” in the arts scene. Ismail, also formerly a 
member, told me that in addition to providing education and opportunities for 
collaboration, The Center also financed album production costs in the 1990s. All 
informants have noted the close relation – what some have termed an “organic 
connection”  (organik bağ) – between the Kurdish movement and The Center, but 
they have also taken care to discursively delineate The Center’s activities from the 
armed factions of the PKK, arguing that everything done within The Center was 
within the boundaries of legality. Nonetheless, activities taking place in The Center 
drew heavily from the frames of Kurdish identity and resistance that were generated 
by the movement. 
 Some groups and individuals that had already been making music before 
1991 also became involved with The Center – in Metin’s words, they became part of 
the “organized” social movement (örgütlü) and also more “aware” (bilinçli) of the 
political implications of the work they were doing. The Center served as a home, or a 
“roof” (çatı), as a common phrasing goes. Newcomers to Istanbul, who may or may 
not be involved with the performing arts, came to The Center to learn more about 
Kurdish issues, to listen to music, to buy political books and magazines, and to 
socialize with other Kurds. Students/participants at The Center formed bands - called 
“kom”s (“group” in Kurdish), many of which became prominent and were seen by 
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the audience as closely associated with the pro-Kurdish struggle in the 1990s. The 
Center thus served as a hub, especially throughout the 1990s, for the politically-
minded artists and aspiring artists to get together, learn how to play musical 
instruments (or receive education in the other arts), and also become educated in left-
wing and pro-Kurdish ideology. 
 The Center doubled as a home and educational institution for some Kurdish 
artists, with some people even sleeping at The Center. Ismail recalls that they would 
give its address if they were detained by the police – which happened numerous 
times with many of the artists. Daily life included not only lessons and activities 
regarding their artistic endeavors, but also “theory” workshops, which involved, in 
Ismail’s words, “discussions on daily events, evaluations of the [political] processes 
taking place at that moment, lessons on philosophy, sociology, and, in general, 
meetings during which we discussed politics”. It is easy to see that The Center thus 
educated its members in terms of the movement’s frames and discourses – which 
many of them incorporated into their musical activities, as well as into their daily 
conduct. In other words, performers as well as visitors were habituated into a shared 
political orientation, and turned into activists.  
 For Kurdish audience, on the other hand, while the political affiliations and 
inclinations of performers and cultural centers was appealing to many, it could also 
be alienating to others. Sami, one of my “illegal circulation” informants, noted that 
the Center was on one hand, an “oasis” for young Kurds arriving in Istanbul, but that 
it could also be somewhat intimidating for those who were not as politically active, 
or as convinced about some of the tenets of the Kurdish movement, as some of the 
core members of the Center. He, for instance, went there every once in a while, to 
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buy cassettes and take a look at the publications that were issued, but never felt that 
he quite belonged there. 
 The notion of collaboration in the music market, or in a broader sense, in art 
scenes, is hardly new. Becker (1974) famously coined the term “art worlds” and 
detailed the cooperation and collaboration that went into both the production of art 
that is “artistic” (i.e., in bringing out the skills and gifts of the artist) and also in 
terms of business. The coordination of these collaborations depend highly on  well-
established “conventions” that pertain to a specific form and field. How these 
“conventions” are shaped by political-normative frames, and how they also translate 
to a market culture are my concerns in this section. 
 Amongst the Kurdish market actors, while competitiveness or personal 
disputes may have existed, there was also an overarching sense of “being together” 
in an upstream struggle. While this type of mutual trust and the willingness to even 
forfeit bureaucracy, at times (see e.g., Walsh 2009) may be observed in other 
markets, it should be noted that non-Kurdish actors did not feel this sense of trust 
towards the Kurdish producers (possible reasons for this include business concerns, 
such as the Kurdish producers’ inability to repay debts; holding anti-Kurdish 
sentiments; or fear of appearing to be supportive of pro-Kurdish politics to 
authorities and other businesses). Kurdish actors, on the other hand, often tried to 
look out for each other, motivated by their political orientations and aspirations - 
their having been habituated into a shared emotional structure, their common identity 
as “yurtsever” market actors, their affiliation to political organizations, and their 
commitment to being “activists” for the pro-Kurdish cause.  
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 These actors were involved in the market “even though they didn’t have to,” 
in Tahir’s words. This speaks back to the issue of “choosing” to produce Kurdish 
music as choosing to take a particular political and moral stance. The actors actively 
and voluntarily take on the stigma associated with performing, producing and selling 
Kurdish music (as in Sandıkcı and Ger 2010). It is a desirable choice because of this 
morality that has infused the production and performance of music: these people are 
“yurtsever” and thus, it almost naturally follows that they will share a certain 
normative-political orientation with regards to how business shall be done. This does 
not mean that they create a non-competitive environment – but a sense of 
camaraderie and common purpose surpassed competition amongst the companies. 
 An important and somewhat challenging issue was that of finding 
professionals who would be willing to work on producing albums for Kurdish artists: 
this involved not only finding the right production company for a performer, but also 
to find studios to do recording and people who would arrange and “engineer” the 
music. Performers who came into Istanbul to record music would visit the offices of 
Kurdish producers and try to find the company with which s/he could have a better 
fit. An informal system of “referrals” was at place amongst producers - if they felt 
that the performer might have better success with another company, they might send 
the performer over.  
 According to my informants, there were not many Kurdish individuals who 
were equipped to perform recording-studio roles such as arrangers, sound engineers 
and tonmeisters, in a “professional manner.” A prominent non-Kurdish arranger/
sound engineer (aranjör), however, was willing to work on Kurdish recordings – his 
name is Oğuz Abadan, and he had worked with Şivan Perwer, in Europe, as early as 
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the 1980s, using the pseudonym “Bozo Çerkes.” Using his real name, according to 
Abadan, would have been a “Quixotic act”  during this period in which people 21
affiliated with Kurdish cultural production were held under scrutiny and, depending 
on their involvement with political movements (such as the Kurdish movement, or 
the left-wing movement), could get into legal trouble. Berdan notes that Bozo Çerkes 
was the go-to guy, particularly in the early years of the legal market, due to his 
experience with Kurdish music: 
We preferred to work with an arranger who knew Kurdish music well … and 
who could also contribute to us, musically. Friends from the group Koma 
Mezra Botan … were working with Bozo Çerkes, and you know, Bozo 
Çerkes is a very important person in terms of Kurdish music in Turkey, he 
worked on many of Şivan’s albums, and he made a large contribution to 
Şivan’s musical career. When you look at it from this perspective, [we 
thought], what should we do, he has a studio in Turkey, and he is open to 
[working with Kurdish musicians], so we worked with him. [Other groups] 
also worked with him, many Kurdish musicians did so. (Berdan, performer, 
founding member at The Center) !
 In Unkapanı, the company generally involved with producing and issuing 
these albums was Emre’s company. While other companies gradually entered the 
scene following 1991, Emre had a longer history with Kurdish music production and 
circulation. He had also been working with Şivan Perwer, as well as other Kurdish 
groups and artists, some of whom had international renown (such as the group 
Kamkars from Iran). From 1991 up to 1997, he was the “go-to” person for The 
Center artists. In 1997, however, two significant developments took place. Some 
young musicians who trained with Oğuz Abadan established their own recording 
studio. Additionally, a new music company - which I refer to as [A] Muzik - was 
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 Interview with Abadan, http://www.edebiyatdefteri.com/yazioku.asp?id=90715, accessed online 21
November 28 2014.
founded by individuals affiliated with The Center. The reason for establishing a new 
company has been explained to me as a result of the increase in volume of 
production by artists from The Center - to the extent that Emre, who represented 
other groups and artists outside of The Center, was having difficulty meeting the 
needs of artists from the Center. This account was corroborated by Utku from [A] 
Muzik, as well as Emre himself and musicians (formerly) based in The Center such 
as Ismail and Tahir. I was not told if there were any other reasons. It is my 
understanding that the “parting of ways” with Emre’s company was a friendly one, 
Emre continued to assist [A] Muzik and artists from The Center when help was 
needed. In 2012, when I wanted to interview Emre, I was introduced to him by an 
employee from [A] Muzik.  
 The founding of [A] Muzik, and the way it is framed, is particularly evocative 
of the political ethic and collective identity that characterized the 1990s market – 
these aspects surpassed the economic competition between companies. Moreover, its 
forming is seen as a collaborative act with the involvement of performers from The 
Center. Ismail, who was based in the Center in the 1990s, and who still produces 
albums with [A] Muzik, explains: 
I: There was a serious support from people in Unkapanı. Maybe if it weren’t 
[A] Müzik, [but just some music company], those guys would just see it as a 
commercial firm and would defame it, or would try to compete with it. But 
because [A] Müzik had a political stance, because it was [affiliated with] a 
political organization, what happened was the exact opposite. They supported 
it, they made [the members of A Muzik] feel that they were standing next to 
them, they helped them in many ways. 
A: In what ways did they help, could you give examples? 
I: When we established [A] Müzik, [we] didn’t know anything about the 
market, it was strange [to us]. How is an album issued? How do you apply to 
the ministry of culture? What types of paperwork do you need? [A] received 
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a lot of help in such instances. In fact, other firms helped out by doing things 
that [A] would not be able to do itself, they acted as mediators, or loaned 
personnel to do things for them…They also helped out in terms of [sharing] 
music archives… And I really should emphasize, of course there was a factor 
of humaneness in such support, but for the most part, it was because of [A]’s 
political stance. !
 [A] Muzik’s impeccable embodiment of the yurtsever ethos leads to it being 
heralded, and also assisted, by other companies. Support was similarly lent to 
performers who embodied the yurtsever identity. While the political-normative 
framing was common amongst producers, and formed the basis for the “yurtsever” 
collective identity, there was nonetheless a hierarchical structure within the subfield. 
Companies were valorized in connection to the importance they were perceived as 
attributing to the moral-political frames of producing music, as opposed to pursuing 
commercial or other interests. 
 Young performers in music scenes, in general, rely on networks and 
relationships based on friendship, mutual benefits - lacking economic capital, they 
often try to convert other forms of capital (M. Scott 2012). This in some ways 
parallels, yet is also distinct from the way in which collaborations and alliances took 
place in the Kurdish music market. The “lack of economic capital” was certainly true 
for the Kurdish music market in the 1990s; many young artists came from lower-
income families, some had only recently migrated from the “region” in order to 
pursue musical careers, many were trying simultaneously to attain university 
degrees. The purpose of collaborations, of helping the younger artists (as well as the 
organizations that supported these artists) was framed as related to serving the pro-
Kurdish cause, in addition to serving artistic or business purposes. So it is possible to 
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talk about the organizations – companies, cultural centers, and other intermediaries – 
accruing moral capital through “helping” the artists, which in turn translated to 
economic, cultural, and social capital for all parties involved. This process did not 
preclude exploitation (as I shall discuss shortly below) but nonetheless was distinct 
from the ways that capital was accrued in other music markets. 
 The “politically correct” way to be involved in the music market, as 
mentioned previously, meant that market actors framed themselves as taking upon 
the role of a political activist. Thus, they approached aspects of production – 
including collaborations and assisting other people in the field – as part of this 
politically motivated agenda. The manner in which The Center operated a case in 
point. Funded mainly by donations, The Center helped finance the costs for 
recording, publishing, and distributing music. [A] Muzik was thus funded as a direct 
outlet through which these business activities could take place, as was [The Studio]. 
While [The Studio] would go on to work on many non-Kurdish recordings, 
becoming more prominent in the Turkish music industry - [A] Muzik remained 
focused on Kurdish albums.  
!
3.3.2.4 Business Practices: Alternative Media Outlets and Word-of-
Mouth 
In the absence of access to more mainstream distribution channels and retail 
opportunities, especially in the 1990s, producers established their own networks, 
formed by companies and actors who were themselves Kurdish, or at least willing to 
be associated with the Kurdish music scene. Emre notes that through such a network, 
he was able to distribute his albums to every corner of the country where Kurds 
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lived, including places where Kurds did not comprise the majority of the population. 
Formed very much through personal connections, these networks often relied on 
direct contact with and purchase from the companies in Unkapanı. (Arguably, this 
was the case for many smaller firms operating in Unkapanı, but was more 
pronounced for Kurdish music, as not all channels and retailers were willing to sell/
be associated with Kurdish music). 
 In the scarcity of advertising and promotional activities, word-of-mouth was 
the most powerful means of spreading the word. Berdan explains: 
A: So in the beginning of the 1990s, when your album came out, how did you 
distribute it, how did you reach the people? 
B: For one … it was from hand to hand … people would come to the Center, 
buy [cassettes], take them and sell them. 
A: Was that the case for cassettes with bandrol? 
B: Yes, for both those with bandrol and those without bandrol, which were 
illegal … but loved by the masses, such as Şivan, Ciwan, Koma Berxwedan, 
and the ones that had the themes of the Kurdish national movement, those 
emotions and musical themes, those were mostly sold under the table, people 
would buy 20-30 blank tapes and reproduce them, and circulate them. 
A: So would people come here [to the Center] and buy them… 
B: Yes, yes of course …  for example, someone would say to his 
[acquaintances], Koma Ciya has made a new album, or Koma Amed, or 
Koma Azad, he would organize people around him. He would come to the 
Center and buy 30 or 40 cassettes, and would sell them [through his 
acquaintances]. The Center was new, the situation regarding music was 
new[ly legal], so in both the region and here cassettes would be mostly sold 
through pushcarts and under the table. In the region the situation was worse, 
because some groups were identified as being allies of the Kurdish movement 
for freedom, so they were illegal[ized], so what happened, they went under 
the table. They were sold [from under] the counter. (Berdan)  !
 In addition to the legal and physical “prices” that were paid, thus, more 
practical issues also contributed to the construction of a difficult, contentious scene. 
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Finding venues to give concerts, and to advertise and sell recordings was yet another 
issue. Weddings and political “nights” (gatherings) were two of the most common 
places for both tasks, and they also served as platforms through which people could 
be informed about and recruited to the movement. Berdan again explains: 
Berdan: The situation was very tough, it was so tough that you had to find 
stages to perform on one hand, then you had to make cassettes on the other 
hand, then you had to work on selling the cassette on one hand and also 
advertise on the other… 
Interviewer: How did you advertise? 
Berdan: There were no advertisements, I mean you were the advertisement. 
Which means, you had to meet the people, both inside the Center [and 
elsewhere]. We used to go to [perform at] weddings, and at those weddings 
we would sell sometimes 50, 60, 70, 80 or 100 cassettes. We sold them by 
hand. At each event, we tried to get results with many different arguments… 
Interviewer: With different arguments…? 
Berdan: I mean, you go on stage and sing, you get off stage and sell cassettes, 
and while you’re selling cassettes you form a relationship with the people, 
you invite them to the cultural center, and ask them to be involved with 
cultural matters.  !
 Singing and selling were thus both seen as instruments to forming a 
relationship with the audience. Such acts served to cultivate an audience, and thus 
played a part in generating the “social imaginary of the market” (Spillman 1999), 
they also simultaneously serve to generate a political imaginary of the (pro-)Kurdish 
community. The pro-Kurdish community, on the other hand, supported the market by 
purchasing the products, by spreading the word around, by donating funds, by hiring 
pro-Kurdish performers, musicians, and bands to perform at their weddings or other 
organizations, and by collaborating in various other ways both within and also from 
outside of the market. 
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 Nizam also notes the roles played by  pro-Kurdish newspapers, especially 
Özgür Gündem, as well as radios that were sympathetic to the Kurdish cause: 
: … so how were you able to announce that you had new albums? 
N: Well there was the newspaper [Özgür] Gündem, Radyo Umut … as I said, 
there was Cem Radyo but later it was shut down… for a period Radyo Gün 
also ran commercials. We [especially advertised with] the newspapers. And 
then it was from ear to ear, and by [hearsay]… the people were paying 
attention. They were interested in every album we produced, there was a lot 
of attention, there was a lot of [word of mouth] advertising. 
A: That is an effective form of advertising I suppose? 
N: It was very effective… any audience member who bought our album was 
advertising for us. When an audience member bought a cassette, s/he would 
say, to everyone s/he talked to, look there is this album which just came out, 
you should buy it too. … In all of Anatolia, even in the Black Sea region, I 
was selling [a lot of] albums for a period. … people would go and ask the 
cassette stores there, “do you have Kazo’s album, do you have Aydın’s 
album?” And so the retailer would call me and ask if so and so album had 
come out, and would say, “send me 50 or 100.” So in the Black sea, in the 
Aegean, in the Mediterranean, and there always was a lot of sales in the 
Marmara region... so we would sell a lot of Kurdish albums without 
commercials, through word of mouth. (Nizam, producer) 
  
Another very important alternative channel for playing and advertising music was 
established in the mid-1990s: Med TV started broadcasting in 1995 (Hassanpour 
1998) with headquarters in London, and production studios in Brussels, Berlin and 
Stockholm. This was a breakthrough: since the channel was not based in Turkey, 
none of the legal restrictions (such as surveillance by RTUK) applied. Programs 
ranging from clips of the lives of PKK members (gerilla - emic term) in the 
mountains, concert performances of famous Kurdish singers, performances of 
dengbej were aired. The channel was outside of the jurisdiction of Turkey’s TV-
Radio broadcast controller (RTUK). However, watching MED TV was not a legally 
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sanctioned act. It was not part of any cable TV package available in Turkey – thus 
people had to purchase an additional satellite dish, apart from the legally available 
satellites and antennae. Installing this second dish was, according to Talat, admitting 
to Turkish officials that MED TV was watched in the household – an act which was, 
in the mind of officials, associated the PKK and terrorism. Owners of the dish would 
set MED TV at an obscure channel number on their TV set – such as channel number 
935, so that in the case of a raid in their home, the enforcement might take a long 
time to find the channel, or give up on it altogether. However, the presence of the 
satellite dish was, in general, the largest giveaway and was sometimes counted as 
evidence towards affiliation with illegal acts, and at other times (depending on the 
situation) treated with a blind eye.  
 For Kurds, watching MED TV was yet another instance of everyday acts of 
counter-hegemonic nature. To share the costs (both monetary and in terms of security 
risks) households would often share a single satellite dish. Talat notes that one 
household would buy one (in Talat’s case, his uncle had bought one) and the 
neighbors would connect their TVs to this dish with a simple cable. This design had 
one caveat – the owner of the dish had the control over what the other households 
watched. If the owner changed the channel, the TVs in the other homes would also 
switch channels. Talat recalls, with humor, that this often sparked fights. Watching 
the TV programs with families and neighbors is a memory that several Kurds have 
talked about. 
 MED TV’s programs featured a great deal of music videos and concert 
recordings. Most videos were shot in a more or less amateur manner, and depicted 
scenes from the region. Nature figured an important place, the mountains of the 
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South/Eastern regions (the places that is commonly imagined and referred to as 
“Kurdistan”) were featured prominently, along with rivers, livestock, the scenes of 
daily life in the villages. There were also videos – some accompanying music, but 
some standing alone – depicting the life of the PKK in the mountains. Importantly, 
many singers and groups that were loved by the people appeared not only in these 
videos. Concert recordings were often specially made for MED TV, and featured 
some of the most beloved groups and artists. Talat, an NGO employee, talks about 
the significance of these concerts as follows: 
T: It was so [amazing] for us, there would be Kurdish New Year’s, that is 
Newroz concerts on Med TV. When we [saw] Şivan Perwer live on New 
Year’s, it was an incredible thing. 
A: What was it like? 
T: One felt, on one hand, there was a kind of rebellion about it. Like, “[the 
authorities] can’t stop us, despite everything [they try] we’re still doing this” 
kind of feeling. But there was also this … sadness about not being able to 
[have those concerts] here, you can’t do it in your own country, but you’re 
still not giving up on the [resistance], there’s this protest about it. (Talat, 
NGO employee) !
 Many informants referred to MED TV’s early broadcasts with a similar 
mixture of awe, sorrow, and anger. The broadcasts constituted the first time these 
well-known singers appeared “in the flesh” before the eyes of the audience. Like the 
(ongoing) circulation of cassettes, these broadcasts served to unify people in both the 
real and the imagined sense. Watching TV also served as common experience and 
generated common repertoires, similar to the cassette sessions. Moreover, they were 
instrumentalized by the political movement. Utku, who worked for the pro-Kurdish 
party HADEP (which was operational between 1994-2003) before working in the 
music business, recalls the central role the TV channel played in the daily lives of 
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many Kurds, and how it constituted a turning point for the music business. Moreover, 
the political party provided space for people to watch TV: 
It was a turning point, not only for Kurdish music and musicians, but a 
turning point for the whole public, a historic event ... I had just finished high 
school ...  I think it was the HADEP period. At the time we were working for 
its youth commission, around the age of 16, 17. That’s when Med TV was 
established. The broadcast initially only consisted of archival shots: 
mountains, valleys, villages... streets... and [accompanied by] the music. No 
story, no nothing. Hundreds and hundreds of people would file into 
[HADEP’s district headquarters] just so they could see this, every day. And 
we, the members of the youth commission, would serve them tea the whole 
day long. After that, music groups also started thinking about visuals, and the 
audience started seeing [the owners of the voices] that they already knew 
very well from the cassettes, and then things changed completely. After that, 
those involved in music started producing [music videos] and television 
influenced production in this direction. Groups started going very frequently 
to Europe, to make television programs [produced] in Europe. And anyone 
who went [on tv] became famous. Because people see them on television, and 
also you cannot find any [representation] on any other [Turkish] channel. (...) 
that was what we watched [all the time], I mean there was that music and 
nothing else. I remember so many people who watched [the music videos on 
TV] and cried. (Utku, producer) !
 In terms of the market, then, MED TV provided a new venue for artists to 
showcase their works, to advertise their music and new albums, and to also 
participate in the recruitment of adherents to the movement. For the public, it served 
as a means of creating communitas: both physically – in the sense of watching 
together, but also in the imagined sense, of seeing and dreaming about a shared, 
“national” geography (supported by the imagery of landscapes shown in the music 
videos). It moreover served the very practical means of learning & sharing language/
vocabulary. Aktan (2012) argues that Kurds became more self-confident about 
speaking Kurdish in public after MED TV broadcasts, it took away some of their 
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self-perceptions of stigma, and moreover helped them use a richer vocabulary and 
fewer Turkish words thrown in between Kurdish conversations (Grabolle-Celiker 
2009). Addressing this issue of “emboldening” after MED TV, Berdan notes: 
The environment changed, the political conjectures changed, the Kurdish 
movement gained an even larger following and gained more freedom [for the 
Kurds]. These are gains that were made on a public level, otherwise there was 
no change in terms of legalities. Especially after 1995 … the developments in 
Kurdish media, … particularly with Roj TV and Medya TV , music groups 22
started going to Europe [to appear on TV], and masses started to see [the 
groups], so therefore demand increased [tenfold], because now [we]’ve been 
seen in the media, [our] works have been seen, [our] artistic productions have 
changed the auditory culture of the public… this has increased demand for 
[us] … and people stop thinking about the bans, they started to invite [us] 
without hesitation to their weddings, they started to play [our music] on the 
streets. (Berdan) 
 While television broadcasts had this type of impact on the Kurdish 
constituency, the Turkish government, aware of the role of TV in recruiting adherents 
to the movement and drawing more support for the PKK, successfully pushed to 
revoke MED TV’s license. Shortly after MED TV was shut down by the Belgian 
government, Medya TV was established – which the Turkish government also 
succeeded in having shut down. Roj TV, the final broadcaster in this chain, had its 
headquarters in Copenhagen. However, its license was similarly revoked as of 
January 2014 . 23
!
3.3.2.5 Section Summary: 
!
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 Successors of MED TV22
 http://www.aa.com.tr/tr/haberler/294388--turkiye-danimarka-yuksek-temyiz-mahkemesinin-23
kararindan-memnun 
 In this section, I examined the emergence and strengthening of a collective 
identity in the market, and illustrated how this collective identity was reflected and 
reinforced through business practices. There were a limited number of companies 
and other organizations (e.g., studios, distributors, retailers) that were willing to take 
on the task of making and circulating Kurdish music. A somewhat convivial 
atmosphere characterized the relationship amongst these actors. Common 
backgrounds in underground performance/production, experiences in dealing with 
the state, and support for the Kurdish movement were some of the elements that 
informed a collective identity and the moral stance that accompanied this identity.  
 The participants in production, exchange and consumption were thus 
constituted as moral-political subjects. Norms of business relationships and exchange 
(Spillman 1999) were importantly shaped by this stance. Producers and audience 
were viewed as inhabiting a community (Penaloza and Venkatesh 2006). Alignments 
and boundaries are (re)produced, in part, through market-mediated relationships and 
practices. Informal contracts, assisting other businesses and performers, forming 
alliances along networks of recording, printing, distribution, and sales are some ways 
in which the collective identity is both forged and reflected in the marketplace. 
 Yet, accompanying this collective identity and sense of communality within 
the market, there is a sense of status and hierarchy within the field, that I started to 
explain in this past section and will further explicate in the following section and 
chapter. This hierarchy manifests itself particularly in discussions regarding the the 
companies’ political service and thus the “pureness” of their political-normative 
orientation. While commercial logics and artistic logics are also at play in the field, 
the “style” with which they are embodied by market actors is what generates 
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distinction: making profits and pursuing aesthetic superiority are desirable if they are 
held in pursuit of serving the Kurdish community and the pro-Kurdish (and, in 
particular, pro-PKK) political cause.  
!
3.3.3 Competing Logics in a Field of Artistic Production 
In fields of artistic production - including music markets - the central tension is often 
conceptualized as being played out through the contradiction of two central 
institutional logics: artistic, or aesthetic with commercial, or market logic (e.g. Cave 
2000; Craig and Dubois 2010; Glynn and Lounsbury 2005). In the field of Kurdish 
music, I have detected this tension as well - yet this tension, I find, was to a great 
extent negotiated in the 1990s through the employment of field-level frames and the 
emergence of the proto-institutional logic: a political-normative logic grounded in 
such frames as national consciousness, grievances, patriotism, and resistance. This 
proto-institutional logic was employed in a rather flexible manner to justify the 
adherence to, as well as the ignoring of, both artistic and commercial concerns.  
!
3.3.3.1 The Emergent Political-Normative Logic 
As discussed earlier, performers and music groups in the period of illegal circulation 
took on the Kurdish movement’s agenda to transform the “everyday conditions” of 
the Kurds, to instill in them a sense of “national” identity, and a sense of “liberation” 
from both the [Turkish] state and the feudal relationships. This agenda was also 
appropriated and reworked by the actors of the formal market. One way in which it is 
possible to trace the presence of this frame is in debates regarding the difficulty in 
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addressing concomitantly “artistic concerns” (sanatsal kaygı) in music while 
“relaying a message” (mesaj verme kaygısı) at the same time.   
The emergent and dominant political-moral frames, and in particular the frame of 
“raising consciousness” shaped not only the way in which market actors networked, 
but also the style and lyrical content of the music produced. This application of the 
frame sometimes took place at the expense of artistic concerns - which some of my 
informants today note in retrospect. In Emre’s experiences: 
With artists who wanted to make albums, we weren’t thinking in artistic 
terms, [this includes] myself as a producer. We all had one purpose, and that 
was this community’s [political] awakening, their demands... it was a political 
phase. That’s why we weren’t really thinking about the artistic dimension. It 
was more about political discourse, [articulated] through the lyrics. (Emre, 
producer) 
The style of music that Emre talks about, and his explanation of their motives for 
performing, recording, and producing music in the early 90s is quite similar the role 
that has been attributed to music by other pro-movement actors. As explained earlier, 
Koma Berxwedan was one of the forerunners of the style of music termed 
“agitative.” Berdan,  one of the founders of the Center, provided even further 
context, noting that Istanbul in the early 1990s was a vital locale in a “renaissance” 
for Kurdish cultural production. In this urban setting, the younger generation had 
better access to education compared to their parents – and they were (and still are) 
more politically engaged. Thus, they were seeking out different sounds - and 
different ideals - when compared to the generation of their parents. It was at this 
particular junction of time and place that the Center was founded, in 1991, and this 
style found popularity: 
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The 1990s were the years in which Kurds were forced out of their lands, 
when they were forced to migrate. There were burned and destroyed villages 
there, and along with the national consciousness that was generated by the 
Kurdish movement, a cultural [legacy] was forced to move from there to 
here, the large cities. And when you look at it from that vantage point … 
Istanbul was the city that received the largest Kurdish cultural and political 
migration. [The migrants] had discussions amongst themselves, in order to 
find a place where they could congregate and work on [cultural production] 
…  as a result of these discussions, in the beginning of the 1990s we 
established [the Center]. With this group, we decided to focus on [creating a 
space for] communal living, and with this community to take different 
sounds, different instruments to the people, to carry the developing Kurdish 
consciousness to the people. To take these cultural values, that Kurds were 
recreating, and to present it [to the people] in new folk music formats. 
(Berdan) !
 Thus, the translation of political ideals and agendas into the music scene 
resulted in a period dominated by music performed with an “agitative” purpose. 
Lyrics, melodies, and album covers were part of this “agitative” music. However, due 
to restrictions on certain words and imageries, the performers, songwriters, and 
producers took a number of tactical (DeCerteau 1988) measures to make the music 
“safe” for passing inspection. A repertoire of code words and images was generated 
and employed: for example, the word Gülistan (rose garden) was commonly used in 
lieu of Kürdistan. (A semi-official ban on the public usage of the word was in place 
until recently, and its usage is still a somewhat contentious issue amongst Turks.) 
Allusions to the mountains were disguised within lyrics on the nature and the land, 
but often constituted references to the PKK, who were based in the mountainous 
areas of the Southeastern regions of Turkey. The word “Adare” (March) was 
sometimes an allusion to  Newroz, as well as the liberatory and “self-governance” 
ideals that the “Newroz myth” was perceived to entail. The colors green, yellow, and 
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red, often referred to as the “Kurdish colors,” were used both as words in lyrics - 
kesk u sor u zer - and were featured prominently on album covers. While these 
“codes" were sometimes detected by officials, or cassettes were recollected despite 
having (allegedly) no political references, their usage still constituted a means of 
tactical evasion (De Certeau 1988; Scott 1990). 
 The emphasis on politically charged music-making also led to the 
marginalization of certain genres within the market. For example, the dengbej, while 
still popular, were somewhat derided by younger audience, particularly those who 
were adherents of the movement. Dicle explained that the dengbej were seen, by 
younger pro-movement Kurds ,as representatives of an archaic order – one that was, 
in fact, at odds with the (initially) Marxist-Leninist central ideologies of the PKK-
line politics at the time. Many of the stories told in the dengbej songs were seen as 
linked to the “primitive” and “regressive” tribal past of the Kurds, which did not 
aspire to a national unity – this past being precisely what held the Kurds “behind.” 
The politically charged music performed by the Koms were perceived as more 
culturally and politically relevant: 
After the 80s, there were these more professional people who made music, 
the groups. … the Koms. These were groups that were influenced by Turkish 
left-wing groups. Back then left-wing groups would have their cultural 
organizations, and the cultural organization’s groups would have cassettes, 
they would sing folk songs about this comrade and that comrade. Kurdish 
cassettes in a similar vein started emerging. It was both that [folk] style, but 
also more modern, Western music, even march-style things, influenced by the 
Soviet [marches]. We found them really nice, we’d listen to them. The 
dengbej, we thought they were very primitive. That’s how most of the 
younger generation saw them, as primitive. Friends who were revolutionaries 
(devrimci), for example, they would say to my uncle … you keep listening to 
this stuff, where [the dengbej] talks about these events where this guy killed 
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that guy, and then this happened, there is always some story about honor. 
[The revolutionaries] would say, you keep listening to this, and then you go 
and kill each other. Why don’t you oppose the state instead? All you do is 
engage in blood feud… that’s what they thought, that this [dengbej music] 
directly represented feudalism. (Dicle) 
 Despite the heavy circulation dengbej cassettes enjoyed in the 1980s, their 
non-adherence to the political norms of the 1990s scene led them to be briefly 
delegitimated. Rather, music that was seen as more politically relevant and also in 
line with (what was imagined to be) urban and “global” tastes was more actively 
promoted and represented within the Kurdish music market. I continue by examining 
how market actors framed “good music” as adhering to various criteria - through 
more “modern” instrumentation as well as lyrics - that adheres with the pro-Kurdish 
cause. 
!
3.3.3.2 Frame 6: Good Music as “Taking Kurdish Music Forward” 
The notions of artistic quality/merit and concerns are also closely linked to the 
political-normative proto-institutional logic that shaped the market and its products. 
With respect to “sanatsal kaygı” (artistic concerns), some of the music produced by 
the Koms at The Center in the 1990s is evaluated in a very positive light, for having 
lived up to certain ideals and evolving tastes. One way of doing so is by employing 
the frame of “taking the music forward” (ileriye götürmek). For example, 
synthesizing “traditional” sounds with “Western” sounds and polyphonic 
instrumentation is evaluated in accordance with this frame. Several informants used 
phrases akin to “different sounds” (farklı sesler) to explain what performers based 
inThe Center aimed to create. Utku notes that many of the early music groups 
engaged in such re-interpretations of traditional songs and melodies and explains: 
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[The artists at The Center] took the songs that the people would sing without 
a [definitive] melody line, without rhythm or maqam, they modernized them 
and performed them in more Western-oriented ways. This was the point 
where Kurdish music encountered the guitar. (Utku) !
Metin explained further: 
[The Center]’s artists … were pioneers in the re-mixing and re-interpretation 
of traditional works, which are called geleri [anonymous]. But they also were 
aware that Kurdish music could move forward through creating new 
compositions, and not just sticking to and re-voicing traditional structures. So 
people started to say, yes, the dengbej tradition is the foundation of Kurdish 
culture, yes folk music is its foundation, but we can build new things on top 
of this. … Initially this was done within groups, then after 95-96 more 
personal (solo) initiatives emerged, and some started pursuing even newer 
musical quests, now there are hip-hop and electronic musics in the mix, and 
many other different sounds. The quest [for new sounds] is ongoing today. 
(Metin) 
Berdan’s following narrative complements the above excerpt from Metin, noting 
how, as artists, they found inspiration in various different musical genres in order to 
accomplish a normative goal of “developing” Kurdish music.  
On one hand you need to … stay within the traditional Kurdish music forms, 
but those forms also need to be developed and transformed. Let’s say, [you 
ask] can we add some Western instruments, and if we do so, would we 
deform its origins, would we degenerate it? Would we alienate [Kurdish 
music] from itself? We were having these discussions, we were discussing 
how we could preserve the main themes [in the music] and add different 
instruments, more Western [sounds] and open up Kurdish music to new 
venues. There were some examples before us, [within Turkey] there was 
Koma Denge Azadi, and [outside of Turkey] there were some 
experimentations done by Ciwan Haco, Nizamettin Ariç, and Şivan Perwer. I 
mean, we wanted to do similar things [to those] but, how should I put it… by 
taking a more radical [political] stance. So we wanted to preserve the 
traditional themes but also develop them, and make it a Kurdish music. 
(Berdan) !
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 These excerpts both indicate the intermingling of aesthetic and political 
concerns of the music-makers: New sounds were sought, not only for artistic 
innovation, but with a politically-motivated mission in mind: taking “Kurdish 
culture” or “Kurdish music” forward, making it sound more “modern”, but making/ 
keeping it “Kurdish” – not “degenerating” it to the extent that it became “something 
else.” Tahir’s narrative particularly illustrates this understanding of “forward”ness as 
a necessity, and also as something that needs to be accompanied by appropriate 
academic support and technical specialists:  
I mean, there was this problem, there were [artists with] good voices, but few 
could even play an instrument. So there was this need in our community, we 
saw that one could not just rely on the dengbej tradition to make art. So this 
turned into collective, group works. … we saw that to be a group, to produce 
collectively, would create a much richer musicality. And we saw that the 
studio was also a need, as art started to make progress. It all came from the 
[community’s] needs. The Kurds started to play the saz, but [we] saw that 
only a saz on the stage is also too weak, one also needs a guitar and a bass 
guitar, and percussions, and then you see that even symphonic [music] can 
also be made. So accompanying this progress in terms of instruments, there 
was a need for [progress] on the technical and technological side of things, as 
is the studio. And Kurds started to make progress in that arena as well. 
Because in the past, [we] used to go to [arrangers, engineers, and other studio 
people] who didn’t know anything about Kurdish music, they would make 
arrangements that made the melody sound more Turkish, or more Western, 
and only the lyrics were in Kurdish. So Kurds started to question this. How 
can we make this right, [Kurds] needed to acquire the technology, so this 
meant that [we] needed [our] own arrangers. (Tahir) !
 Informants believe that more progressive, “fusion” music was (and is) not 
only in sync with the global music scene, but it is (and to some extent relatedly) more 
relevant to young Kurds, some of whom grew up in the large cities and did not have 
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strong ties with a “traditional” life depicted in dengbej songs, or other traditional 
musical styles.  
 Other informants have also noted that the younger generations, rather than 
listening to dengbej music, preferred to listen to Turkish protest, pop, or arabesque 
music. The music produced by artists from The Center, on the other hand, was 
welcomed as a fresh alternative. In Talat’s words:  
… [their music is] more modern, you hear a cleaner sound, and it’s music that 
includes a more diverse set of instruments, such as percussions and guitars. 
Because with Kurds, I mean with Kurdish traditional music, the [human] 
voice is the main element. The prominent instrument is the voice. There are 
very few [other, mechanical] instruments [in traditional music] but [with 
Koma Amed], we started to really pay attention to the instrumentation. The 
percussions, for example are very lively in the Derguş album. After that 
album came out, I stopped listening to Turkish protest music and started 
listening to more of this type of music. 
 Two popular groups of the 1990s, which was also often cited in interviews, 
were Koma Amed and Agire Jiyan. While Koma Amed’s repertoire leaned more 
heavily on polyphonized traditional songs - particularly dance (i.e., halay) music - 
Agire Jiyan’s repertoire was more of the “agitative” kind.  
 It was not unusual for songs with political lyrics, or songs about the martyrs, 
to be performed even at celebratory occasions - such as weddings. In fact, according 
to Sırrı, a retailer and former political activist, guests at a wedding might get angry at 
the wedding band if they didn’t perform political songs. Talat likewise noted that 
people would dance the halay to songs about death. As evidenced earlier from 
Dicle’s comments, younger audience particularly demanded political songs over 
songs about love, or traditional dengbej songs. Utku, producer with [A] Müzik, notes 
that especially in the 1990s, people “needed” these politically relevant songs, in 
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concert with the rising influence of the political movement amongst common people. 
This also translated into sales success for [A] Muzik, which took on the production 
of the politically charged albums after 1997. Utku notes that “practically all of the 
albums that [A] produced would sell out.” 
 The intensity of conflict between the PKK and the Turkish military was an 
integral part of the institutional environment that shaped the types of music that was 
produced and demanded during the 1990s and beyond. The conflict and political/
regulatory/cultural grievances prevailed through most of the 1990s, but there were 
intermittent periods characterized by relative peace. In 1993, the PKK declared 
unilateral ceasefire for a period, for instance, and during such periods, Ismail notes 
that the artists at the Center were unsure of what their role would be if peace were 
declared once and for all. 
Well in that period, during times when the war paused, we would discuss 
what sort of art we would make if the war stopped for good … would we still 
be using agitative discourses [in the lyrics] if the war came to an end? Those 
discussions would start and get to a certain point, but then there was a return 
to the 1990s after the Rome processes… after [Abdullah Öcalan] was brought 
to Turkey from Nairobi, and the war inflamed again. I mean, the period after 
2001, 2002. I mean, initially there was a serious relaxation [period] in both 
Kurdish politics and the Kurdish movement, and in the Kurdish cultural 
movement as well, there was a feeling that no one is interfering with us 
anymore, we are singing our songs, so there were [experimentations] in 
different musical [genres], rock and pop. This had happened once before, 
during the 1993 ceasefire as well. I mean, whenever there was ceasefire, 
when the forces retreated, when the war stopped for certain periods, we 
would start discussing why are we doing art, what kind of art should we do 
… but when the fighting and chaos would resume, we would go back to 
saying, we have to do something, so we’d make agitative songs again. … So 
what I mean is, these cycles really constructed our artistic stance, our identity. 
(Ismail) !
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 The strong link between politics and the workings of the music scene are 
evident from this quote: changing social and political conditions were evaluated by 
performers and producers, and were reflected in music-making practices. Thus, as the 
conflict ebbed and flowed, so changed the form and content of the music that was 
produced. While the “agitative” songs fit well with the turbulent times, the more 
peaceful times led the performers to question “the role of the artist” and, as I shall 
further discuss, to pursue aesthetic/artistic concerns as well as audience demands for 
something “different.”  
 Emre’s quote from earlier on (“With artists who wanted to make albums, we 
weren’t thinking in artistic terms…”) indicates that trying to be politically active and 
relevant sometimes came at the expense of pursuing artistry. The politically charged 
atmosphere likely influenced this: Tahir, for instance, notes that artists who met with 
success in the 1990s were those in close affiliation with the movement (and hence 
those that produced more politically significant music) – which led to a monopolistic 
situation. Several informants also mentioned the “repetitiveness” of the music of that 
period – that is, the abundance of “agitative” songs that sounded similar to each 
other. Kerem, a rock musician, notes that while that type of music may have served 
the political needs of the early 90s, in terms of aesthetics it was insufficient. He 
recounts a friend’s “I’ve heard all of this before” attitude in response to the popular 
songs of the 90s: 
I was in prison for a short period, and when I was there I had [a guitar] with 
me, I would play [agitative songs]. My friend in the prison ward, a guerilla, 
said to me, [Kerem], don’t do this to me (laughs) To whom are you [singing 
these lyrics], to me? Play me some [real] music. (Kerem, performer) 
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In addition to Emre’s earlier comments about the artistic concerns taking backseat 
during the 1990s, some other market actors and audience members have expressed 
their unease and criticism regarding some of the music that was performed in the 90s. 
Zeynel, a linguist and the director of a literary center, for instance, laments the low-
quality of some of the productions in that period, and particularly poor usage of 
Kurdish language in much of the early efforts: 
In the beginning this was done a lot, there was a lot of supply and demand, so 
people and companies approached [production] in a somewhat careless 
manner. When you look at the language, the pronunciation was bad, [the 
artists] were not fluent in Kurdish, they were singing lyrics and playing the 
music incorrectly. [Back then] we wrote about this [in magazine and 
newspaper articles]. Ranging from some very popular singers to the local 
ones, we saw many errors being made. A lot of them also lacked musical 
knowledge… at least the companies should have worked with experts who 
knew [about the music], they could have also checked whether the 
pronunciation was correct. Some of the songs [that were performed 
incorrectly] had already been recorded by [artists living in exile in Europe], 
so people already knew these songs, but when they were re-interpreted, you 
see that they were damaged, they were sung carelessly, the lyrics became 
incomprehensible. !
Countering this type of critique is the argument that making Kurdish music in such a 
tumultuous period is in itself worthy of applause and thus, such “mistakes” should be 
excused and not dwelled upon. In a published interview, Nilüfer Akbal, who 
performed throughout the 1990s, but was not affiliated with The Center, exemplifies 
this argument: 
Me and a few of my artists friends, during those difficult times in Turkey, 
kept making Kurdish music, even though there were only a few of us in 
number, and despite all the difficult situtations. Naturally, there were times 
when we sang incorrectly and we frequently made pronunciation errors. 
Perhaps that was a very important mistake. But back in those days, it was 
more important that we were making music with Kurdish lyrics. This can be 
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seen as a political attitude. Moreover, we didn’t receive that much criticism 
from Kurdish intellectuals [back then] when we sang incorrectly or 
incompletely. On the contrary, we were supported, assisted, and applauded. 
Those who listened, were proud that we were singing Kurdish. The applause 
we received was for making Kurdish music…  (Interview by Latif 
Epözdemir, 2005)  !
 Attitudes about what constituted “good” music, not only in the context of the 
1990s, but also for the later period, are often entwined with a moral and political 
stance. Importantly, artistic concerns for making “good music” are often expressed in 
conjunction with political (pro-Kurdish) agenda: “good music” is what informants 
emphatically designate as “Kurdish.” This “Kurdishness” of the music comes from 
the language of the lyrics as well as the imagery and values that are embedded in the 
music: it should refer, somehow to issues and sentiments that have some significance 
to the Kurds. As such, this “Kurdish” music should be a viable alternative to Turkish 
or foreign-language music. Making “good” and “Kurdish” music is a moral issue – 
the morality being tied, in the expressions of informants, to “representing” Kurdish 
culture, mainly to the Kurds, but also potentially to other constituencies (such as an 
international audience). The making of “bad” music is often tied to the oppression of 
the Turkish state: a result of the deprivation of Kurds from the right to establish 
cultural institutions - such as academic settings (e.g., conservatories) that focus on 
Kurdish music; and, moreover, many informants believed that Turkish arabesk was 
actively promoted by the hand of the state in the region. “Bad” or “degenerate” 
music – such as arabesk, which rose in popularity particularly after the 1980 military 
coup, as well as cheaply produced “halay” music that has surged after 2000 – are 
seen as trends that benefit the Turkish state: it is framed as depoliticizing and 
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inactivating the masses, putting them into a lulled state in which they do not aim 
towards “progress.” “Good” music is thus framed as music that is not necessarily 
overtly political, but still serves a political agenda: it is either faithful to oral musical 
traditions, and/or is in tune with musical developments around the world – thus it 
constitutes music that the Kurds “can be proud of” on a national and global scene. 
 Mirroring these discussions on good/bad music in the early years are 
discussions on good/bad music in the more recent years. Several people I interviewed 
are very unhappy about what they perceive as  “a drop in quality” in the music scene 
during the recent years – this drop refers not only to cheap productions, but also to 
music that is made only for weddings or other forms of entertainment. Albums made 
by producers and artists who don’t care much about the politics and see the music as 
a way of making money – and particularly those who have not “paid the price” in the 
1990s are perceived as the culprits. In a sense, these people have no excuse - whereas 
the early 90s performers and producers were burdened with the difficulties and 
restrictions and thus sometimes had to forego “quality,” in recent years this is no 
longer the case - thus, “just anyone” can become involved in production and 
performance.  
 On the other hand, performers who are able to attain “world standards” of 
quality and musical success are lauded. Cem, an informant with no affiliation with 
the music industry, for instance, talked with pride about Şivan Perwer’s success 
abroad. As an example, he showed me the video of Perwer performing a number of 
his famed songs with an Austrian TV singer and TV presenter. Another evocative 
example is the success of the group Trio Mara, which has been featured at a 
prominent world music festival. They recorded their latest album, “Deri/ Behind the 
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Doors” at Rudolf Oetker Halle, a well-regarded performance hall in Germany. A 
documentary about the recording process (Yarar 2013) features an interview with the 
director of the music hall, who praises the group and their music. At a screening of 
this documentary at a cultural center in Istanbul, there was a palpable pride, in the 
predominantly Kurdish audience, regarding the group’s accomplishments on the 
world scene.  
 Thus, the normative-political logic negotiates the logic of aesthetics/artistry 
by linking artistic merit and concerns to a political purpose: taking the music 
“forward,” encouraging young Kurds to listen not to Turkish music but to Kurdish 
music, and demonstrating to the Others, including the Turks and a (possibly) global 
audience, that Kurds have “good music” too. While “good” music has a positive 
influence on generating communal feelings, upholding the resistance, and taking the 
culture “forward,” “bad music” is seen as regressive and assimilative. I illustrate next 
how the emergent political-normative logic similarly negotiates “commercial 
concerns” by linking sales success to market representation and furthering the pro-
Kurdish cause.  
!
3.3.3.3 Frame 7: Sales as Service versus Commercial Orientation 
In informants’ accounts, “maddi kaygılar” (material concerns), “kar kaygısı” (profit 
concern), or more generally “ticari kaygılar” (commercial concerns) are a few emic 
terms that arose. There were two ways in which these concerns were adopted or 
negotiated: One type of account relates to the profit-making concerns held by non-
Kurdish as well as some Kurdish producers – opportunists, as framed by pro-Kurdish 
actors, who tried to capitalize on the high early sales of Kurdish music, as well as 
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later entrants who became producers, artists, or other types of actors, in order to 
“make profits.” This framing largely coincides with what has been referred to as a 
logic of commerce, or a market logic (Bourdieu 1996; Glynn and Lounsbury 2005) 
which is associated with “non-aesthetic economic concerns” (Glynn and Lounsbury 
2005: 1040). The framing of certain actors as pursuing these concerns, and thus 
adopting a commercial/market logic, is used in these cases as a boundary-making 
device. The other account, which is is more complex, relates to generating sales as a 
way of “reaching the people” and also “financing new productions and helping 
performers.” Framed in this manner, “making money” then becomes morally 
sanctioned and is also subsumed by the political-normative logic of serving the 
Kurdish people.   
 According to informants, the linking of the music “market” with financial 
concerns took place after legalization. While money did change hands sometimes 
during some of the pre-legal circulation of the 70s and 80s, the monetary returns to 
the performers in this scheme was usually none, and there were no professional 
“producers” to make a profit out of their productions. Zeynel notes that artists were 
not concerned at all with making money in the pre-legal period: 
When there were no bandrols [issued to Kurdish music], there was a lot of 
piracy. What I mean is, piracy did not start when [legal] Kurdish music was 
introduced to the market, piracy [of Kurdish music] preceded that. Of course, 
back then artists didn’t have such concerns as, “I made an album, I will put it 
on the market, then I will receive [royalties]”, there was nothing [the artist] 
could receive, they were making music illegally. Their only purpose then was, 
no matter how, these products must reach the people. So it would be sold 
under the table, and those who did so would duplicate the cassettes and sell 
them. So artists had no expectations. [Expecting royalties] started after the 
90s, when it became legal to [make Kurdish music], and the artists now were 
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able to receive royalties from the sales of their works. To do so they began to 
sign contracts with the firms. (Zeynel, director of a cultural center) !
 However, despite the possibility for making profits out of producing Kurdish 
music, the commercial activities were still framed with political terms. As mentioned 
earlier, during the very first years of legalization, a large number of companies in 
Unkapanı produced Kurdish albums, and many of these were businesses that 
primarily produced Turkish music. Emre notes after he and some other Kurdish 
producers had produced Kurdish albums, Unkapani realized that there was large 
demand for Kurdish music, but, to repeat some of the points made in the previous 
sections, this initial enthusiasm could not be sustained, due to the political 
complexities of the time.  
E: … to know that there was such a [public] reception, that there was a 
commercial demand, this triggered all the other [companies in Unkapanı] as 
well. So in the following year, Raks, for example, which was a very large 
company, even they produced 7 or 8 albums. I think there were very few 
people here who didn’t produce any Kurdish albums, because there was a 
demand, an economic demand. 
A: Did those people continue to produce Kurdish music? 
E: No, they didn’t, what happened was they realized, they saw that producing 
Kurdish, was so political, that it used to be impossible to even speak it… 
they at first didn’t know that it was loaded with political and ideological 
meanings. They just thought, oh look it’s being sold, and just like they could 
produce Ankaralı Turgut, they thought [producing] Kurdish music would be 
something like that. But then they saw that it’s a political thing, and when you 
do it you might have to go to the DGM courts, and they realized, this is not 
what they thought it was. So most of them stopped producing [Kurdish 
music] after a couple of albums, after realizing that [producing] had a 
political dimension, they all left it and only a few firms remained.  !
 The distinction that Emre makes between making Turkish music with a 
commercial orientation and the production of Kurdish music is particularly 
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evocative: Emre’s reference to Ankaralı Turgut is not coincidental – Ankaralı Turgut 
was a singer from a working-class background, whose initial grassroots popularity in 
the türkü bar’s of Ankara’s periphery in the early 1990s converted into widescale and 
national market success in the late 90s. However, Ankaralı Turgut, despite not fitting 
traditional appearances and expectations of “stardom,” was nonetheless “unmarked:” 
Turkish songs, sung by a Turkish singer with no overt political proclivities, didn’t 
attract the type of surveillance, censorship, or lack of retail space that was so often 
the case for Kurdish music. Therefore, this comparison is particularly significant: 
Kurdish local performers, despite having similar backgrounds (in terms of economic 
and cultural capital) with their Turkish counterparts, were unable to hope for a 
similar degree of mainstream success or acceptance.  Thus, Emre draws attention not 
just to the undesirability, but in his view, the impossibility of making Kurdish music 
by embracing a predominantly commercial logic. 
 Money was made in many cases following 1991, although several market 
actors claim that this was not the main purpose, nor was it always the case. Emre, for 
example, argues that for many of the Kurdish albums he produced and supplied to 
the market, he barely made a profit. Sometimes the costs incurred through legal 
issues surpassed the profits he made. But, he argues that he was stubborn about 
continuing to produce the music - thus, he found the solution through make money 
via other musical endeavors: procuring and selling the European distribution rights 
for popular artists singing in Turkish, such as Muazzez Abacı, Burhan Çaçan, and 
İbrahim Tatlıses. He “made a lot of money this way,” he says, “so I no longer cared if 
I lost money when I made Kurdish music and it was recollected from the market.” 
This account is also a clear example of how Emre devised a tactic (De Certeau 1988) 
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or a form of “local knowledge” (Scott 1998) in response his encounters with the 
state: by making money on other types of business ventures, he was able to keep the 
practice of producing Kurdish music apart from the commercial concerns that went 
along with keeping a business afloat. Informants also noted that some producers were 
willing to “engage in piracy” - that is, if their productions were recalled from the 
market, or failed to pass inspection, they would find ways to illegally distribute their 
albums via informal vendors, or through retailers who were willing to undertake 
under-the-counter sales.  
 That being said, placing some effort to sell cassettes and generate profits was 
not necessarily perceived as a bad thing, either. Once again, it has been treated as a 
“moral issue”, related to furthering Kurdish music and reaching the Kurdish public. 
Companies who do not take the necessary steps to ensure some market success are 
failing not only the performers, but their audience as well. Ismail noted that 
sometimes he would receive messages from fans in smaller towns in the region, 
asking when his new album would reach the shops in their towns. This frustrated 
Ismail, who felt that he was having a hard time reaching these people:  
For example, we can’t see our albums on the shelves [in the region]. You can 
go to many places that sell albums, and you won’t find mine, for instance. 
There is definitely a problem regarding distribution. They say they send the 
album to Diyarbakir but it’s not there. [Other music companies] don’t do that 
– they go and deliver the album, sometimes with their [personal] vehicles… 
of course, that’s because they want to make money, because they need to 
deliver it [to the retailer] to be able to make money. [A] does not have such 
concerns, but should [A] have those concerns? I think it should! Because you 
need to take your products [to the retailer and the customer], not in order to 
make money, but to deliver the product. … I think this is something to be 
criticized about [A]. You can’t do these things just by phone, this is a market 
and if you want to exist in this market, you need to place some effort. You 
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might have an identity, fine, use that identity, but also do what other 
companies do. … Look at [X] Müzik, their albums are sold even in Europe, at 
the airports. Kalan as well. But our albums are not there. So we are a bit 
distressed. (Ismail) !
 Ismail’s words express the (potential) way in which the tension between 
commercial interests and a political-moral framework can be negotiated: the morally 
correct way of having commercial aspirations is to transcend materialistic aims, but 
rather, to think about commercial success as a service to the artists and the audience - 
and thus, to the Kurdish public. Service and “existence” in the market is justified by 
reaching people – and this is vital in the political sense. Moreover, being able to sell 
many albums verifies the broad interest in Kurdish music, and is seen as a step 
towards recognition as a distinct, and very large community within Turkey - many 
times, the “hundreds of thousands” of albums that were sold for so-and-so artist were 
recounted, which I think indicates the “presence” of Kurds and is shown as evidence 
of their actively seeking Kurdish music. Thus, this is a community that will not 
“make do” with Turkish (or other non-Kurdish) music, they want Kurdish music, and 
they do, indeed, buy it. The market’s existence is thus also justified. [A]’s reluctance 
to become commercially oriented is, in Ismail’s mind, a disappointment not in the 
commercial sense, but in the political sense – thus the “yurtsever” ethos is not 
divorced from commercial success, but is delineated from an overtly commercialistic 
orientation.  
!
3.3.3.4 Pure versus Mixed Employment of Logics 
[A] Müzik is perceived, despite its relatively late entry, as having embodied and 
demonstrated the strongest dedication to “reviving” Kurdish culture and producing 
$181
music that is politically relevant to the Kurdish cause. Owners of other companies 
(with the moral-political orientation) at Unkapanı often admit that [A] Müzik has a 
“special place” (yeri ayrı). Murat (owner of another company) for instance, 
explained: 
[A] is foremost amongst all the companies producing Kurdish music. They 
are involved one hundred percent with Kurdish music. I mean, I am talking 
about a company which produces only Kurdish music albums, and they hold 
the majority of the market. Well-regarded artists who make high quality 
music work with [A] today. Of course, in the past a lot of them also worked 
with [Emre’s company]… and now there are other companies heavily 
involved in Kurdish music, such as … [names of some companies in 
Unkapanı]. (Utku) !
 Emre’s company also receives special recognition, particularly because he 
had been willing to push the limits and to produce the albums of groups from the 
Center during the more tumultuous times. When I interviewed Utku at [A] Muzik, 
for instance, he emphasized that I needed to interview Emre, and took me to his 
office to introduce me at the end of our interview - despite, as I will discuss in the 
next chapter, Emre having shifted his orientation more recently towards the 
employment of “artistic logics.” [A] Müzik, however, received a special reverence 
from affiliated artists and other actors in the field – and this reverence moreover 
translated into consumer interest in whatever [A] produced. In the words of many 
artists affiliated with [A], but also according to other producers, [A] was the only 
company that had no commercial concerns. Freed from the claws of commercial 
interests, the company was thus seen as the most morally and politically “pure.” In 
general terms, this “pure” political agenda meant that whatever the company did, it 
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did in the name of the pro-Kurdish cause. Thus, artistry as well as commercial 
success were framed in moral and political terms, as I shall further discuss.  
 Some other companies and producers, on the other hand, are seen as having 
employed more “hybrid” agendas – a mixture of commercial and political concerns, 
and are thus viewed not quite as “heroic” as others. The amount of “bedel” paid, and 
the degree of “yurtseverlik” that is demonstrated through various practices, as well as 
the “quality” of the music they produce, have an impact on the position a company 
and actor enjoys within the market. For instance, referring to a company owner in 
Unkapanı, Tahir (performer and sound engineer) made the remark “yes, he’s a 
yurtsever, but…” and indicated that no company was as purely dedicated to the 
Kurdish cause as [A] Muzik. This valorization of [A] Muzik, however, also made it 
somewhat immune to critique - as I discussed with Ismail’s account, some 
performers complained that [A] was not as dedicated as promoting and distributing 
its performers as some of the more commercially-oriented firms. [A] Muzik was, 
according to these performers, confident of its being a “brand” (several informants 
referred to [A] Muzik as a brand, “marka”) and relatedly its ability to sell on account 
of its valuable name.  
!
3.3.3.5 Section Summary  
So far, I have tried to illustrate the different framings that formed a basis for an 
emergent market culture. These morally charged and politically significant framings, 
widely shared among the producers that “survived” the 1990s, constitute the central 
logic of what has been referred to as a “proto-institution” (Lawrence et al. 2002). In 
other words, a political-normative “proto-institutional logic” emerged and came to 
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take a central role in the market. While the tensions that are generated by artistic and 
commercial logics were also relevant to the market for Kurdish music, they were to a 
large extent negotiated by placing weight on the political-normative logic. Both 
logics were, when convenient, ignored or justified through the employment of 
political-normative frames. As such, the market actors tried to demonstrate a fit, not 
so much with the normative and cultural structures of the broader (and pre-
dominantly Turkish) society, but more so with those of a largely pro-movement 
Kurdish public. The market served as another space where an ideal “Kurdish nation” 
was imagined.  
 That being said, within the market, all producers are not considered as equal. 
Amongst the “yurtsever” producers and companies that I examined in this chapter, a 
certain hierarchy also exists. The political-normative proto-institutional logic also 
serves to delineate which companies and actors have been more “purely” devoted to 
a political agenda, and which ones have pursued a mixed political-commercial 
agenda.  
!
3.4 Discussion 
In this chapter, I set out to understand how the socio-political dynamics of stigma 
and domination influenced the process of market emergence. In contrast to processes 
of market creation that result in mainstream legitimation (Humphreys 2010a,b; Press 
and Arnould 2011), an alternative and ideologically-charged (Sandıkcı and Ger 2010; 
Thompson and Coskuner-Balli 2007)  market culture, with close ties to an 
oppositional social-movement (Lounsbury et al. 2003; Sine and Lee 2009; Weber et 
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al. 2008) emerged and evolved. This market emerged in a context characterized by 
multiple constituencies with different demands (Pache and Santos 2010).  
 I found that stigmatization, domination, and marginalization were reflected, at 
the level of the field (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992; Swartz 1997) of music 
production, as barriers towards mainstream inclusion - that is, in attaining adherence 
to mainstream normative, cognitive, and regulative orders, and thus being perceived 
as “legitimate” (W.R. Scott 1995) by broader society. Rather, market actors were 
“marked,” through legal restrictions, close surveillance of market activities and 
products, (arbitrary) recalls of “offensive” materials, longstanding court trials, and at 
times, through physical violence. Despite the state’s conferral of legal status upon the 
market in 1991, the lack of cultural and normative legitimacy of Kurdish identity, 
language, and music are reflected in difficulties finding recognition in the 
mainstream culture and representation in mainstream retail and media outlets. This is 
in contrast to other cases where the state’s conferral of legality engendered 
mainstream acceptance (e.g., Humphreys 2010a,b). The conferral of legality led to 
centralized production, but also, accordingly, centralized state surveillance and 
restriction.  
 The “tensions” that characterize the emergence of this market are, 
importantly, twofold: market actors engaged in a field-level struggle over “meanings 
and resources” (Lounsbury et al. 2003: 72); and this struggle was also bi-
directionally linked to a broader, societal-level struggle - particularly contra the 
dominating state.  The marginalized and “marked” position of the actors, and the 
ongoing struggle, in turn, cultivated a resistive response in actors. With many of 
them already habituated into a particular pro-Kurdish political orientation and 
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accordant collective identity, market actors - including producers/company owners, 
performers (singers, musicians), sound engineers and other studio personnel, as well 
as distributors and retailers - reacted to stigmatization by constituting themselves as 
activists of the Kurdish political movement, by framing their experiences and injuries 
in the marketplace, accumulating repertoires of shared knowledge and marketplace 
tactics (J.C. Scott 1990, 1998), and interacting with the pro-Kurdish political 
movement, often constituting themselves as “activists” of this movement.  
 I detected seven frames that were generated and narrated by actors in 
describing their situation and activities in the 1990s: Raising national consciousness 
and awareness; grievances; lineage of illegal circulation; market actors as activists; 
collective and collaborative action; good music as serving progress; sales as service. 
The first three frames were generated in relation to the illegal era of circulation. The 
findings that I present regarding illegal circulation in this chapter emphasize the 
emergence of a politicized collective identity (Simon and Klandermans 2001) that 
accompanied the generation of a unifying and boundary-delineating emotional 
habitus (detailed in Chapter 2, see also Kuruoğlu and Ger 2014), and which shaped 
the collective identity of producers (Weber et al. 2008) in the formal market. Once 
the market was legalized, the frames from the illegal era were revised and adapted in 
accordance with the changes in the socio-political atmosphere. Frames were also 
generated and adapted from the Kurdish movement. Codes that relate to “liberty,” 
“resistance,” “sacrifice,” “national consciousness,” and “service to the community” 
were particularly adapted from the movement articulated in ways that would shape 
actors’ political orientations and, accordingly, business decisions. 
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 Grievances and conflict, rather than dissuading actors from entering the 
market, had the unintended consequence of persuading them to “join in the fight” 
and to embody a moral, political, and resistive common stance that informed, and 
was articulated through, the production,  performance, and circulation of music. As 
such, producers were “produced” (Weber et al. 2008) - entrepreneurs were convinced 
to partake in market activities, not just “despite” but also “because of” the struggle. 
The object of exchange - the music (albums) - were loaded with political and 
normative lyrics, imagery, and emotions. Producers and performers engaged in 
tactics - including using allusions and code words in lieu of explicit political content, 
and sometimes distributed their albums outside of the legal market, so that it would 
reach the audience. The audience and the producers were imagined as part of a 
community - an “awakened” Kurdish public. Some companies were seen as 
embracing these norms and practices in a manner that is more pure, and disentangled 
from commercial concerns - those were the companies that were regarded with more 
respect amongst the producers, as being better “patriots.” Those were, moreover, the 
companies whose products received most interest from the audience.   
 The frames related to artistic and commercial concerns - in emic terms, 
“good music” and “sales” - were notably formulated after legalization, in response to 
the tension between artistic and commercial logics (Bourdieu 1996; Caves 2000; 
Glynn and Lounsbury 2005). The frames reflect that the resolution to this tension 
was sought through the employment of political normativity: when both concerns are 
framed within the political agenda of serving the Kurdish community, and 
representing the progress of Kurdish cultural production to “others,” and ensuring the 
continuation of the market, then they are deemed as acceptable for this market.  The 
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other five frames were more specific to the field of Kurdish music production, and 
were “built” consequentially: throughout the illegal circulation era, and 
encompassing the day to day experiences of the actors, in dealing with the state, in 
their frustrations regarding the broader dynamics of the music market in Turkey 
(including Unkapanı, distributors, retailers, and the mass media); and through their 
communications and collaborations with each other. 
 To summarize, and as illustrated by figure 2, these framings - drawn from 
movement codes, as well as everyday experiences and interactions, informed the 
ways in which actors collaborated with each other, shaping their business and artistic 
decisions in ways that serve the resistive pro-Kurdish political cause.  As such, actors 
generated a political and oppositional market culture within the broader market for 
music in Turkey. With these findings, I link two streams of research on collective 
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Figure 2 - The Emergent Market for Kurdish Music 
action in markets: one that treats social movements as a “metaphor” for the collective 
and collaborative efforts of framing, resource mobilization, and collective identity 
formation that takes place within markets and market organizations (e.g., Fligstein 
1996; Navis and Glynn 2010; Swaminathan and Wade 1999; Weber et al. 2008); and 
one that addresses the interaction of markets with social movements that originate in 
broader society (e.g., Lounsbury et al. 2003; Scaraboto and Fischer 2013; Sine and 
Lee 2009). I argue that the “codes” and “frames” that fuel collective action within the 
market are drawn from multiple sources - both from actors’ experiences “within” the 
market and through the interactions and co-constitutive relationship with the political 
movement that originated “outside.” The generation, adoption, appropriation, and 
articulation of frames, and the ensuing actions taken by the market actors enact a link 
between the “inside” and the “outside,” rendering a bi-directional bridge between the 
movement and the market.   
	
 The emergent literature on the creation and institutionalization of markets 
(e.g., Giesler 2008, 2012; Humphreys 2010a,b; Karababa and Ger 2011) 
acknowledges that market actors employ discursive devices - such as framing in 
overcoming cultural, normative, and/or legislative barriers to becoming widely 
recognized. Framing thus justifies the emergence and activities of the market to the 
dominant institutional order. Yet, this perspective does not take into account the 
multiple orders and constituencies, which exist in contention and do not enjoy the 
same status in society. I thus contribute to this research by examining how frames 
generated within the market can oppose the dominant institutional order. Such frames 
shape a market that caters to a dominated and stigmatized constituency - constituting, 
concomitantly, a “social imaginary” of a unified community. 	
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  I draw inspiration from the creation of a “parallel taste structure” by a 
stigmatized community (Sandıkcı and Ger 2010), and the deployment of 
“countervailing ideologies” (Thompson and Coskuner-Balli 2007) that structure a 
non-mainstream market. My fieldwork did not encompass taste and “lifestyle” 
outside of the market for music, thus I cannot generalize my findings to indicate the 
emergence of a “taste structure,” in addition to a music market. The ideology that 
fuels this market, moreover, is not popular enough in society to warrant the usage of 
the term “parallel.” Thus, I refer to the market culture as “alternative.”	

	
 As such, I also contribute to research that addresses the market-mediated and 
recognition-seeking activities of disadvantaged social groups. While disadvantaged 
groups may wish to be served in an equal manner by mainstream markets (Scaraboto 
and Fischer 2013), this may not be possible, due to ideological conflicts that 
characterize the source of disadvantage. The chasm between dominant ideology and 
“minority” ideology, for instance, often blocks the acceptance of marginalized social 
groups into “mainstream” dominant culture (Ustuner and Holt 2007; Ustuner and 
Thompson 2012).  Yet, a dominated position does not necessarily lead to “shattered 
dreams,” as Ustuner and Holt (2007) seem to suggest: domination and stigmatization 
often engender resistance. My findings support Sandıkcı and Ger (2010)’s argument 
that stigmatization may lead to the emergence of a parallel - or, in my case, 
alternative - order that is shaped by oppositional political norms.  I contribute to 
Sandıkcı and Ger (2010) by explicating how this normative structure is shaped by 
producers, and by detailing how market-level framing contributes to this process. 	

 In chapter 4, I explore how the market continued to evolve in the gradually 
more relaxed political atmosphere of the 2000s. The most important outcome of this 
period is the segmentation of the market: The political-normative logic continued to 
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evolve, and remained relevant for some market actors, while other actors also drew 
from competing ideologies and logics. I also discuss how segmentation was 
accompanied by competing social imaginaries of “Kurdish” identity; and social 
distance was cultivated amongst these competing segments. 
!
!
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CHAPTER 4: 
!
THE SEGMENTATION OF THE MARKET 
!
!
 “In the past there was more of a monopolistic [situation], and the reason for 
 this was the oppression [from the state]. For instance back then I was working 
 for a publishing house and it was a political one - I mean, it wasn’t  
 independent, it was a Kurdish publishing house. Because back then you could 
 get arrested, and then someone else would have to replace you. You couldn’t 
 do that unless you were part of a political organization. The publishing  
 business was like that, the music business was like that, everything was like 
 that. These were not things you could do [independently]. … after the 2000s, 
 though, after Abdullah Öcalan was brought to Turkey, some things started to 
 change in Turkey… and then you started to have independent   
 ventures.” (Dicle, publisher) 
!
!
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I discussed how the  illegal and informal circulation of 
Kurdish music transitioned into a legal market with a distinct market culture. I 
argued that an emergent moral-political proto-institutional logic was the dominant 
logic in shaping this market culture - influencing the types of music that was 
produced as well as the ways in which business was conducted. This framework, in 
turn was influenced by the pro-Kurdish movement (mostly PKK-line) with which 
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many actors in the market ideologically aligned, and also (inter-connectedly) through 
repertoires of knowledge, experience, and tactics that were accumulated in 
experiences and encounters with the state. The other two logics which were at play in 
the field - the logics of commerce and artistry/aesthetics, were often ignored or 
negotiated through employing the normative-political logic.  
 Scholars have drawn attention to the linkages among market segments and 
institutional logics. Organizations respond to multiple institutional logics in different 
ways - i.e., by engaging in different practices, which also accounts for heterogeneity 
in a field (Greenwood et al. 2010). This heterogeneity may correspond to different 
“segments” (Goodrick and Reay 2011; Kraatz and Block 2008; Marquis and 
Lounsbury 2007;  Thornton, Jones, and Kury 2005). While there was, as discussed in 
the previous chapter, a degree of diversity in practice in the 1990s, and thus a 
hierarchy amongst actors in the market; it was still possible to talk about a more 
unified and politically oriented market culture - in the accounts of market actors, that 
was the only way available to do business then, given the tense and restrictive 
political environment. Yet, starting in the early 2000s, this tableau started to change.  
 This chapter is a mostly descriptive account of how the market changed and 
became fragmented in the 2000s, in conjunction with the changes in the political, 
social, as well as technological environment. This is somewhat akin to the 
fragmentation in a “rebellious subculture” that results in “multiple forms and 
expression” (Martin and Schouten 2013). With the state relaxing some restrictions on 
the public use of Kurdish language, I shall argue that a wider space and more 
opportunities were available for a more varied type of market cultures in the market. 
Moreover, changes in digital technologies - particularly mp3s and streaming media - 
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dramatically changed the way and volumes in which music was sold on the legal 
marketplace, which in turn had created difficulties regarding the financing and 
production of new albums. I thus analyze the changes in market dynamics in light of 
changes in the broader institutional environment, arguing that a number of new 
“segments” emerged.  
 The “political segment” is constituted by the normative-political logic that 
developed in the 1990s - yet this logic has also evolved in certain ways. Grievance 
frames have shifted focus from oppressive policies of the state to a more general 
sense of having unequal status in mainstream culture, and finding it still difficult to 
sell, broadcast, advertise, and perform the music in mainstream channels and venues. 
Collaborations and a convivial atmosphere amongst market actors exists, but have 
lost their urgency and necessity. Moreover, illegal circulation has now become recast 
as “immoral,” as it leaves the producer-actors without the revenues necessary to 
produce new works. The aim is no longer to “circulate the music, no matter what.” 
The existence of other segments also means that producers do not have to subscribe 
into the political-normative frames and logic that are espoused by the political 
segment and the pro-Kurdish movement: different producer identities, definitions of 
objects, and exchange relationships are possible. Yet, for the political segment, the 
political-normative frame of “yurtseverlik and orgutluluk as collective identity” 
becomes more salient in this period: with new entrants to the market, these 
identifications become more important in terms of making and maintaining 
boundaries against the “internal other”s.  
 The “world music segment” is shaped by a higher weight placed on the 
“artistic logic” and also emerged concomitantly with the rise of Istanbul and Beyoglu 
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as a center for world/ethnic music. Kurdish music is recognized as a cultural product 
emerging from a multi-cultured Turkey/Anatolia, rather than produced/performed 
with a specifically pro-Kurdish political agenda. The two other segments, which I 
detected mainly through research in print/online media and through the framings of 
actors in the political and world music segments, are the “commercial segment” and 
the “challenger segment.” The commercial segment employs a commercial logic and 
is more profit and entertainment oriented. The “challenger segment,” which emerged 
after the government’s “Kurdish initiative” in 2009, comprises actors that are pro-
government.  
 The creation of new segments also had implications that go beyond “multiple 
forms and expressions” and relates to the types of audience that is “imagined” as 
being the constituents of the market. Markets, in Spillman’s (1999) framework, are 
“social imaginaries”  constituted by (potential) partners in exchange. With 
segmentation, sub-markets, each with their own culture, emerge - and this involves 
the generation of separate and sometimes competing social imaginaries of “who” the 
producers and consumers are. As I shall discuss, in the case of the Kurdish music 
market, the segmentation in the 2000s also involved the generation of sometimes 
conflicting constructions of appropriate “Kurdishness” amongst the Kurdish 
constituency. I thus ponder upon the creation and erection of moral boundaries 
(Lamont 1992, 2000; Saatcioglu and Ozanne 2013) that not only delineate the Kurds 
from the external Other - the Turks and in particular the State - but also serve to 
generate segments of “Internal Others.” 
 Segmentation and the accompanying salience of “internal others” also draws 
attention to both the tenacity and also, simultaneously, the lack of fixity in the 
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“relation between social distance and affective orientations” (Karakayali 2009: 545). 
While I detailed the emergence of an emotional structure that unified the Kurds and 
delineated them from their others - in particular, the State, but also relatedly the 
Turkish public - I did not find that social distance within the Kurdish community was 
a salient aspect of this circulation. Narratives on the market during the 1990s, 
similarly, overwhelmingly focus on the unity and collective identity within the 
market, in the face of the restrictive state, rather than on differences and distances 
amongst Kurdish producer-actors within the market. Thus, the findings I present in 
this fourth chapter necessitate further pondering on how/when “strangeness” that is 
associated with “negative affect” (Karakayali 2009) is cultivated amongst those who 
are “alike.” I discuss how multiple political orientations/ affiliations, which 
accompany the changes in the socio-political atmosphere, may account for the 
salience in boundary-making moral discourses and territorial conflicts amongst 
Kurdish actors that go along with segmentation within the market. 
!
4.2 Changes in the Social-Political  Environment 
!
There were a number of important political developments in the late 90s and early 
2000s that are relevant in terms of their impact on the market for Kurdish music. 
First of all, Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, was captured and imprisoned by 
Turkish authorities in 1999. The PKK declared unilateral ceasefire following this 
event (this ceasefire would last until 2004). Secondly, there were several changes in 
legislation - including at the constitutional level - accompanying negotiations for 
Turkey to enter the EU. These involved the reform packages that were termed  “AB 
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uyum paketleri” (EU harmonization packages) and included amendments to TV and 
radio laws, made it possible to establish of Kurdish language courses, and legalized 
the usage of Kurdish language by politicians in political rallies. In practice, however, 
full-time broadcasting in Kurdish language would not be possible until the “Kurdish 
initiative” of 2009, which implemented a number of other reforms related to 
language and cultural production. An important element of the 2009 initiative was 
the start of state-run Kurdish television broadcasts.   
 With respect to the broader musical production field in Turkey, this period 
coincides, also, with rising interest in “ethnic music” and the emergence of a “world 
music scene” in Istanbul. This interest had implications for Kurdish music as well. In 
this chapter, I detail the rising discourses on “pluralism” or “multivocality” in this 
period – particularly as they are co-constructed and utilized by the music market – 
and how Kurdish music figures within in this scheme.  
 Finally, the advancements in digital technologies had a monumental impact 
on the music industry in general. First through sharing, copying, and downloading of 
MP3s, it became much easier to copy and distribute large bulks of music (with one 
CD or VCD able to carry hundreds of songs), and later through streaming sites (such 
as youtube), music was easily accessed for free. This, in turn, translated to severely 
decreased sales in albums – and thus lower revenues that impacted the funds 
available to finance new album production. Illegal circulation was recast as an 
immoral (rather than political-tactical) practice, and it also put smaller companies at 
a disadvantageous position when compared to multi-national companies (and their 
subsidiaries).  
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 The problems of finding venues for performance, outlets for album sales, and 
channels to air music and videos persisted throughout the 2000s. Censorship and 
strict regulations on musical content and lyrics were, to a large extent relaxed – court 
cases dealing with “divisive music” became quite rare, according to producers. That 
being said, stigma on Kurdish identity and usage of Kurdish language in public did 
not necessarily subside. Somer (2005) has noted that while the presence of distinct 
ethnic identities – such as Kurdish identity – slowly became publicly recognized 
throughout the 1990s, “mainstream beliefs regarding the desirability or acceptability 
of any Kurdish ethnic-cultural and political rights and expressions did not necessarily 
change” (74).  
 A number of cases demonstrate the potential for contention that the issue of 
Kurdish music continued to carry throughout the late 90s and 2000s. One was the 
near-lynching of Ahmet Kaya, a very popular folk/ arabesk singer during the 
“Magazin Gazetecileri Derneği Ödülleri” in 1999. The awards ceremony was set up 
as a dinner-event.  Ahmet Kaya, recipient of the “artist of the year” award, made an 
acceptance speech which included a statement that he would record a Kurdish song, 
and make a music video for it. “ I know that there are brave people who will 
broadcast this video,” he said. The venue erupted in protest. Many people in the 
audience started throwing their silverware at the singer. During the event and in its 
aftermath, very few individuals voiced or demonstrated support for Kaya, and 
mainstream press went on to circulate allegations of his affiliation with PKK – 
including images of him performing, in the past, at a PKK-affiliated event in Europe. 
Ahmet Kaya eventually fled the country that year, but reports on his traitorship 
continued to circulate - a mainstream newspaper famously deemed him 
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“dishonorable” (şerefsiz) in 2000. Kaya passed away within a year, believed, by his 
friends and family, to have lost his health due to disappointment and heartbreak over 
what had ensued. 
 The atmosphere did start to change in the matter of a few years, however. 
Stokes (2011) notes that as little as two years after the Ahmet Kaya-Kral TV incident, 
Sezen Aksu, a very popular Turkish singer, embarked on a concert tour in Turkey and 
Europe, accompanied by a large orchestra and many music ensembles representing 
some of Turkey’s ethnic minorities: “the choir of the Ferikoy Vatanart Armenian 
Church in Istanbul, the Los Pasaros Sephardic Jewish Music Ensemble, the Oniro 
Greek Music Ensemble, and the Diyarbakır (Kurdish) City Council Children’s 
Choir” (Stokes 2011: 135). Aksu herself performed a song in Kurdish during these 
concerts. While these concerts were met with criticism from Turkish nationalist 
factions, they also received broad support, and were very well-attended. Moreover, 
the tour was sponsored by the Ministry of Culture (Stokes 2011). By the end of the 
decade, the “climate” changed to the extent that, many people who participated in 
protesting Ahmet Kaya started to speak out about their regret regarding what 
happened that night. Around 2013 and 2014, as this dissertation was being written, 
the Ahmet Kaya incident was still being discussed in mainstream as well as Kurdish 
media. 
 Public (rather than convert) music concerts, featuring both Turkish and 
Kurdish performers, began in the 2000s. Starting with 2000, Newroz celebrations in 
Diyarbakır were permitted by the authorities  and featured several prominent 24
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 http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?24
aType=RadikalDetayV3&ArticleID=664636&CategoryID=96 
performers. Sezen Aksu participated in the Diyarbakır Newroz celebrations in 
2002 , amidst extreme security measures. The following year, Ciwan Haco, a very 25
popular Kurdish singer from Syria (but with roots in Mardin in Turkey) performed 
his first concert in Turkey, in Batman. The audience for this groundbreaking occasion 
reportedly totalled 300,000. The second concert, which took place a few days later in 
Diyarbakır, attracted more than one million people. The experience is covered in the 
documentary “The Road to Diyarbekir” (Ahmed 2010), which shows the celebratory 
and optimistic atmosphere that surrounds the “return” of the artist to his symbolic 
“homeland”, and its significance for the Kurds of Turkey. 
 Despite the loosening of restrictions around Kurdish music, there were still 
grievances about perceived inequities that were commonly shared by a number of 
interviewees in the political segment. There is still inequality with respect to the 
representation of Kurdish music in the “marketplace”: in terms of shelf space, 
advertising, interview-articles in mainstream media, broadcast of music videos on 
nation-wide broadcasting stations, radio airplay, and also in terms of opportunities 
for live performance. Until the beginning of the 2010s, most venues in Beyoğlu were 
still unavailable to  most Kurdish performers, and live performances (in Istanbul) 
were limited to weddings, türkü bars , and political events. A number of Kurdish-26
owned venues that emerged in Beyoğlu in the early 2010s provided a outlets for 
performance, but the division between places where Kurdish artists perform, and 
where they don’t perform remains significant. As Veysel, a performer, pointed out, 
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 http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2002/mart/26/g10.html and http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr/2002/03/26/25
haberler/h2.htm for accounts of the concert
 pub/winehouse type establishments where folk/ folk-protest type music, as well as arabesk and was 26
performed. Often owned/ managed and also patronized by left-wing supporting or leaning individuals 
- particularly students, as well as lower-middle and lower income clientele (Aytar and Keskin 2003), 
türkü bars were spaces where Kurdish music could be heard.
festivals organized by private organizations or by municipalities tend not to feature 
Kurdish performers and groups - with the exception of municipalities in the 
predominantly Kurdish-inhabited towns and cities.  
 The AKP won the general elections and thus led the government in 2002, a 
few years following the imprisonment of Öcalan. While the EU-Adaptation 
amendments had been instated by the previous coalition government (headed by the 
now-defunct, DSP, the Democratic Left Party), they were continued by the AKP. 
AKP’s policies, and prime minister Erdogan’s public speeches regarding the Kurdish 
issue also seemed to continue on the track to affording a broader range of cultural 
rights and recognition to the Kurds. According to Somer and Liaras (2010), AKP’s 
efforts were rewarded in the 2007 elections, when AKP gained a sizable vote from 
the Kurdish-dominant areas, following which, AKP “declared itself “the real 
representative” of the country’s Kurds” (pg. 154), which led to debates that also 
translated into contention within the music market.  
 The Kurdish “Initiative” or “Opening” (“açılım”) took place in 2009, as part 
of the AKP government’s efforts to offer a “solution” to the “Kurdish problem” in 
Turkey. While many of the terms initially proposed by this initiative were left 
untended (see Cakir 2010) - and, moreover, its name was changed in the following 
months to become the “Democratic” rather than the “Kurdish” opening - one 
amendment that did take place was to make necessary arrangements to remove all 
legal barriers from Kurdish television broadcasts. While the EU-adaptation package 
amendments had legalized Kurdish broadcast in 2002, barriers on full-time Kurdish 
TV programming had still remained up to 2009, allowing only a limited number of 
hours of broadcast in Kurdish. Legally amending this situation, the government also 
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announced its plans to start broadcasts in Kurdish, on a channel named TRT-6 
(referred to as TRT- “şeş”, the Kurdish word for six), and started test broadcast in 
January 2009.  
 Discussions on the “Kurdish initiative” (açılım) and  TRT-6 took place in a 
very public manner in 2009. On one hand, there was a sizable resistance from the 
Turkish public (White 2013), which Somer and Liaras (2010) argue is based on the 
widespread belief that recognizing ethnic pluralism – especially “Kurdish” ethnic 
identity, which for so long has been associated in public discourse with “terrorism” – 
is a ploy backed by “foreign powers” that would ultimately lead to the disintegration 
of the nation-state. Amongst the political parties, the leaders and parliament members 
of CHP and MHP were both vehemently opposed to the initiative, with the leader of 
MHP referring to some journalists who attended Opening-related workshops as 
traitors (Cakir 2010).  An incident referred to as the “Habur Incident” in the press 
seemed to dampen the progress of the initiative amongst the AKP as well. In this 
incident, a number of PKK-members returned to Turkey entering through the Habur 
border, turned themselves in to authorities, and were released after questioning, as 
part of a deal struck within the Initiative Processes. This turning in and release was 
designed to be the first step in a broader amnesty encompassing many PKK 
members. However, the celebratory manner in which these initial returnees were 
greeted by Kurdish public and politicians, and the fact that the PKK-members were 
making victory signs upon their arrival, created a strong reaction amongst the more 
nationalistic factions of the Turkish constituency. Cakir (2010) notes that following 
this event, the initiative was, at least for a while, off the table.  
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 It should be noted, however, that Turks did not comprise the only 
constituency to resist the initiative. A significant portion of the Kurdish constituency 
was likewise skeptical and/or dismissive of these efforts. The closure of the pro-
Kurdish political party, DTP (Demokratik Toplum Partisi – Democratic Society 
Party) by constitutional court, within a year of the announcement of the  “Opening;” 
and continued arrests of many individuals on allegations of association with the PKK 
(referred to as the KCK Davası) were perceived among the Kurdish constituency as 
proof of the government’s insincerity. As of 2014, discussions on the government’s 
sincerity, the Kurds’ willingness to give up arms, and the possibility of “peace” 
continue amidst increasing turmoil in Turkey, Syria and Iraq.  
 As of 2014, there are several TV channels broadcasting in Kurdish - a number 
of them owned and operated by pro-movement groups or individuals, but others also 
by groups with different affiliations. The field has thus broadened - and thus, also, 
groups that make claims on representing “Kurdishness” have also multiplied (Gürbüz 
2012). This, as I shall discuss, has implications on the boundaries constructed within 
the music field as well. 
 I decided to divide the music scene in the 2000s, into four different segments: 
The “political segment,” which corresponds to the evolution of the market that I 
discussed in the previous chapter; the “world music segment”, an emergent scene 
comprised of a very limited number of groups and performers but which also 
garnered attention from mainstream media, Turkish audience, and the world music 
scene; the “commercial music segment” that is comprised of singers and musicians 
which mostly perform as wedding bands; and finally the “challenger segment,” 
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comprised of actors who are perceived as challenging or making alternative claims 
on Kurdish identity. 
!!
4.3 Findings 
4.3.1 Segment 1: The “Political Segment” 
The political music segment, which dominated the music scene in the 1990s, 
continued to have a significant presence after the 2000s. Yet, its stronghold in the 
market started to become somewhat challenged by a number of other actors and 
developments. With the relaxation of legal limitations, it was no longer as vital to 
have the collaborative support of other actors in the music market, as it used to be, 
nor was it as necessary to be backed by a political organization. Moreover, 
difficulties in financing album production (which influence the whole music market 
in Turkey) as well as certain artistic bottlenecks have led to a period that several of 
my interviewees are complaining about. I will thus explain how the market culture - 
such as the ways of doing business, the content of music - transformed, in 
conjunction with the strengthening of boundaries contra certain “other” Kurdish 
groups.  
 Several producers and artists who noted, in our interviews, that the 1990s 
especially was a time when making political statements – not only through lyrics, but 
also by the sole virtue of singing in Kurdish – was considered, by movement and 
market actors, to be more important than taking artistry into serious consideration. 
The results, however, in the 2000s during a period, particularly, when the movement 
had “lost tempo,” the music market found itself in a void. Ismail’s quote that I 
relayed in the previous chapter particularly referred to this “problem” of not quite 
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knowing what to do in times of “cease-fire”. While the political music segment has 
been trying to change and vitalize its artistic ethos, the results have been somewhat 
mixed, compounded by financial difficulties following the introduction and 
proliferation of digital media. The actors in this segment continue to employ 
grievance frames - they continue to justify the work they do by referring to past and 
continuing difficulties that they encountered within and outside of the market. At a 
panel I attended as an audience, in 2013, a number of actors from the arts and music 
scene (including a representative from “The Center”) spoke about their experiences 
as performers and cultural producers. Stories of restrictions, police custody, and 
censorship were relayed enthusiastically - I took two pages of notes, adding a 
comment that these were all “things I’ve heard before.” One panelist humorously 
noted that “they [authorities] used to say, you’re making this music, you’re inciting 
the young people to go to [join the PKK in] the mountains.” He paused. “Well, I have 
to admit, they were right!” The venue erupted in laughter.   
 As Ismail mentioned, during periods of political change (such as cease-fire) 
musicians and other actors, particularly at The Center, would get together to discuss 
the implications of such change for their music-making practices. I found evidence of 
such discussions in a number of publications where artists and market actors wrote 
opinion pieces (I was able to come across a number of such Turkish-language articles 
spanning the mid-2000s in the monthly publication Tiroj). Additionally, a conference 
on Kurdish music was held in Diyarbakir in 2006, and these issues were discussed 
there as well. One result that emerged from these discussions was a shift away from 
agitative music towards building more “folkloric” repertoire. The focus, in these 
efforts, was on unearthing and (re)creating “cultural resources” (see also Sarıtaş 
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2009).  There was also a shift from groups (i.e., Koms) to individual performers: The 
music groups of the Center started dissolving; while some members reconvened and 
formed new groups, a large number of them continued to perform as solo artists. 
Amongst the younger, more recent entrants to this scene, some have been 
experimenting with forms that are relatively “new” to Kurdish music, such as rock 
and hip-hop. It should be noted that while these developments parallel certain trends 
in the “world music” segment, the political segment continued to frame their 
activities and motivations with a pro-Kurdish normative and political ethos. 
 At the same time, artists based in Europe unbounded by, and also more 
skeptical of, governmental interventions, continued to produce more politically overt 
and reactionary music. The albums of these artists were distributed (legally) by 
producers in the political segment. When conflict between the PKK and the military 
started re-escalating in 2004, agitative music in the local scene also became 
somewhat popular again. There was, significantly strong interest for a music band 
formed by PKK-members called Avaze Çiya (“the sound of the mountains”). While 
their albums were not available on the legal market, they were heavily featured on 
the pro-Kurdish TV channels (Med TV, replaced by Medya TV and later Roj TV) as 
well as through other informal means (mp3 CDs and later through internet channels 
such as Youtube). 
 The Center, according to some criticism I’ve heard, has become too 
“cliquey.” Kerem, a singer and guitarist in an independent (i.e., unaffiliated with any 
production company) rock band, notes that he and his band-members spent a year at 
The Center during which they went almost every day, spent time at the cafeteria, 
drank tea, and conversed with other people going there, but were never admitted into 
$206
an “inner circle” which would lead to them producing albums and taking stage at 
Center-related events. He notes that the Center had been a very important “first step” 
in the 1990s, but it was unable to follow up on its initial promise: 
You open up a cultural center, but if you cannot turn that into a conservatory 
or an academy, if you cannot turn this into a serious perspective and spread it 
to the whole public, then all that you did is in vain. That is kind of what has 
happened here, and it is a serious problem. On one hand, there is a huge 
cultural and public movement, but when you look at the field of arts and 
culture, that is still stuck between the first and second steps. (Kerem) 
[A] Muzik remains the “central” actor in this segment - framed as producing a higher 
ratio of Kurdish productions compared to other companies (many of which also 
produce Turkish music as well). In our interviews, Utku highlighted their archival 
efforts, as well as the “un-orthodox” (e.g., rock and hip hop) music they had started 
to produce as of late. One album he showed me was a collection of songs that had 
been originally Kurdish, but became renowned through their Turkish-ified versions. 
With this collection, he noted that they hoped to bring attention to the original forms 
and languages of the songs.  Another archival album he showed me was a collection 
of lamentations, performed by women – some of whom, he said, may not be alive in 
a few years, but with this collection, would live on forever.  (The album he referred 
to was prepared by a singer/performer based at The Center, and came out in 2013).  
 Utku also played me a rock music album that was, at the time, still being 
prepared. “In the past you couldn’t get people to listen to [rock or blues]. They were 
accustomed only to dengbej songs, or lamentations, or the familiar [agitative] 
Kurdish music styles … but now there are new styles, many new sounds” he said, 
noting that there are even groups in Diyarbakir composing symphonic music. 
Kurdish hip-hop is yet another genre that has gained popularity, particularly through 
$207
the songwriter- performer Serhado, who lives in Europe, but performs occasionally 
in Turkey. His songs involve quite overtly political, reactionary and sometimes 
nationalistic lyrics.  
 Actors affiliated with [A] continue to frame the company as embodying  a 
non-profit ethos that is geared to “serve” the Kurdish people. They view some of the 
other companies as having moved in a more commercial direction. Utku, discussing 
the positioning of [A], and the types of tensions they deal with, delineates [A] Muzik 
from the “rest” as follows: 
I can say this with ease, that no matter how illogical this sounds, [A] Muzik is 
the only organization [in the market] that is not commercial. But of course 
even [A] Muzik is subject to a certain economy. I mean, even if [you have] 
the world’s most beautiful music and composition, if you don’t pay anything, 
you can’t get the [album art] made, you can’t get it [published as a CD] and 
so on. But there are certain [standards] that we can’t do without. For one, we 
make sure that [the music] is worthy of this culture, that it makes proper use 
of language, we pay attention to its content. … you can’t have a situation 
where you say, just because it’s Kurdish, [ok let’s produce it]. In Kurdish 
right now, there are some productions that are so bad you can’t listen to them 
… You have to be respectful of the values, it has to be useful to this culture, it 
will develop this culture. … Of course you may ask, are all your products of 
the same [high] quality? Of course you can’t always approach it with this 
precision, or then you wouldn’t have anything left to produce. !
Again, this quote exemplifies the association of “high quality” music with being 
“respectful of the values” - of not only the public, but the movement - and to serve 
the development of the culture. These are the standards through which [A] 
differentiates itself from the “rest.”  
Economic difficulties – due to significantly lower revenues from album sales, 
following prevalence of illegally downloaded/shared digital media – have meant that 
performers are now expected to pay for the bulk of the costs of producing music 
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albums. While this is the case for most companies in the music market in Unkapani 
(Turkish ones included), Utku argues that [A] Muzik is different from other 
companies in the field, and is trying to maintain its “high standard.” In order to do so, 
[A] is still shouldering a significant amount of costs and production-related labor (if 
not the complete costs of the album), and does this for projects that they find worthy, 
even if they don’t have a guarantee of earning the money back from sales. The 
“worthiness” of new productions is still judged in terms of its propriety with the 
normative structure of the segment, particulary in connection with the frame of 
“making good music to serve the cause.” 
Some of the people who come here [to make albums], they really don’t have 
much money, there are albums from last year for which we still haven’t 
received payment, because they don’t have the money, but they need to 
express themselves somehow. But since [A] does not have commercial 
concerns, we are able to do some things within the company, for example, we 
make our own graphic art, we don’t add any extra cost for the graphics, we 
try to do it ourselves. … we have such options. Other than that, we are a 
company that is in tune with, and respectable to, the values of the public. 
Because if [a product] carries the [A] label… we have a very large 
responsibility in the emotional sense. There are many people who are no 
longer with us, but we [hold the rights to] their recordings. There are people 
who lost their lives because of these struggles, who paid great prices, there 
are people whose hands and fingers were smashed because they played 
Kurdish music. [A] Muzik carries the responsibility of all of this, as a whole. 
So [A] is unlike the other firms, the other firms that make Kurdish music. 
[Utku] !
The “other side of the coin” is that this ethos sometimes translates to a lack of 
interest in pursuing commercial concerns - which, as detailed in the previous chapter 
on the political music scene, is also problematic as it means difficulties for artists to 
reach their audience, and also to make a living through music. Muhsin, one of the 
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best-selling artists and who started his musical career at The Center, noted that his 
most recent album had been produced by a Kurdish-owned European-based 
company. While this European company is does have business deals with [A] Muzik, 
it is, in Muhsin’s words, more “formal” in its dealings with performers, as it operates 
within the EU; whereas deals with [A] Muzik have been verbal as opposed to 
written, and grounded in interpersonal relationships, which could, depending on the 
situation, be to the benefit or the detriment of an artist’s financial interests. 
Emre, one of the leading producers in the 1990s, chose to disengage from the 
political music scene to a large extent, and prioritize the artistic logic in deciding 
what to produce. He explained; 
 As I said, in the 90s, until the 2000s, … it was a time when all the music and 
 arts had a more hardline political approach. But those [political] concerns no 
 longer held much meaning to  me after 2000. So I don’t see much of a point in 
 making [those kinds of albums] anymore. I  would like to go artistically  
 deeper from now on. I would like to look into the musical, the more artistic 
 aspects of Kurdish music, I want to continue with cultural concerns. (Emre) !
 In our interview, Emre noted that he had recently been producing a very small 
number of Kurdish albums (he gifted me with two of those albums, both featuring 
individual young singer-songwriter-musicians) and he was only going to work with 
(mostly young) artists that he thought to be “special.” Thus, he was distancing 
himself from an overtly-political stance of producing political music for the sake of 
the movement, as well as a more commercial approach of producing numerous 
albums for performers who could afford to take on production costs. His comments 
on the lack of relevance of political music also implies a moral choice: it is no longer 
in the best interests of the Kurdish people to produce such music, what Emre feels 
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“needs” to be done is to produce fresh and original sounds that are still decidedly 
“Kurdish.” 
Changing Boundaries 
Amongst the more hardline pro-movement performers and other actors, the sense of 
communality and boundaries against other segments and outsiders became not 
weaker but stronger. Tahir argued that this actually translated into a stronger 
influence of the movement amongst its adherents - and adherents of the movement 
formed a very sizable portion of the Kurdish community in Turkey. Tahir notes that 
the movement “has a cultural dominance in addition to a political one,” admitting 
that this sometimes leads to a monopolistic situation in which those who don’t quite 
possess certain qualities and sensibilities are ostracized. This is increasingly so, 
according to Tahir, in the 2000s: 
 … today the movement is even more dominant [among the Kurds], it is an 
 even larger movement for freedom, and this has implications for every  
 domain, including the market. If you look at the market, for an artist, what is 
 the field in which the market’s products will be consumed? It is the Kurdish 
 public, and today 70 percent of the Kurds are adherents of this movement, or 
 they have actively participated in it. … even [among the Kurds in] Europe the 
 movement has dominance. So of course, [the movement] shapes life, and it 
 promotes its own artists, so therefore the artists [that the movement] endorses 
 are able to survive. (Tahir)  !
Tahir’s comments also point towards the way that a particular type of Kurdish 
community - with political inclinations and artistic styles -  was imagined by the 
movement and, relatedly, by the market for Kurdish music: 
 “… this war has been going on for the past 30 years, and it has also created 
 its own artistic style … it is a structure that [influences everything]  from hair 
 styles to clothing styles, it is a cultural structure [bir kültürel yapılanmadır], a 
$211
 Kurdish society has been created [artık bir Kürt toplumu yaratıldı]. I don’t 
 say this in a positive or negative sense, but [as a matter of  fact] … it has  
 become a life style.” (Tahir) !
 Those who did not conform to the “life style” could have a hard time entering 
or staying with the political segment. I heard several stories in which disputes and 
political disagreements within music groups led to some artists pursuing individual 
careers within the political segment, or also disengaging from this segment 
completely. While these cases were often not discussed openly, it was often possible 
to read between the lines, or to trace these “departures” through the companies that 
the performer recorded with, the venues where s/he performed. For instance, the lead 
singer of a popular group from the 1990s was no longer part of this scene, but 
continued to perform in concerts at university festivals. When I inquired about her, 
several people from the political segment responded “I don’t know what she is doing 
or where she is, we are no longer in touch.”  
 There are different types of moral boundaries erected and enacted (or not 
enacted) against those who are not part of the pro-movement field.  The relationship 
between actors in the political music segment and the world music segment, for 
instance, is more or less cordial. Even though actors may point out their ideological 
or artistic differences and criticize one another for what they perceive as lacking in 
those areas, various collaborations have also taken place or have been attempted. On 
the other hand, as I shall detail further in the “challenger segment,” performers and 
other actors who collaborated with the state, as well as Kurdish organizations that are 
not aligned with the PKK, were often marked as “traitors” by the pro-movement 
community.  Thus, in the 2000s, the political-normative frames served not only to 
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unify the political actors around a collective identity, but took on a perhaps more 
important role of “excluding” actors - particularly through branding them as traitors- 
when they did not conform to the political ideals that this segment continued to 
espouse. This could translate into a hostile stance,  and even physical threats towards 
artists who were seen as stepping over boundaries. 
 The normative-political boundaries of the political segment expanded, on the 
other hand, to include the (somewhat ideologically re-oriented) dengbej music. 
The re-invention of dengbej as part of the political music scene 
Dengbej music, in the 2000s, underwent a “re-invention,” with endorsement and 
support from the Kurdish movement (Hamelink and Baris 2014; Scalbert-Yucel 
2009). My informant Dicle argued that this was, in part, an obligatory shift from the 
“jacobin and modernistic attitude” held by the movement. As mentioned earlier, the 
ethos of the period included a move towards “seeking the roots” of “Kurdish 
culture,” and to this end, the dengbej were an ideal repository of music and tradition. 
Dicle noted that Kurdish dengbej music was, despite being beloved by the older 
generation, frowned upon and even mocked by the younger and more politically 
active generation as a “backwards” relic of feudal times. In the post-2000 era, the 
dengbej  was recast as a vessel of “public memory” and as “transmitting” cultural 
heritage. By 2012, I would often hear a version of this sentence about the dengbej 
being recited - for example, at a dengbej concert I attended in Istanbul, in the row 
behind me, a (presumably) Kurdish man was telling his Turkish companion: “Since 
Kurds had no written culture, it was the dengbej who orally transmitted legends and 
history.” 
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 This re-invention not only included the valorization of dengbej by Kurdish 
politicians, thought leaders, and pro-movement activists, but also included a number 
of material developments: for example, the establishment of dengbej houses  in the 
region and the employment of dengbej by the pro-Kurdish municipalities. The 
dengbej house of Diyarbakir (Mala Dengbejan Amed) is a venture that has also 
received funding from the ministry of culture and tourism as well as the EU 
(Scalbert-Yucel 2009). Thus, the dengbejs regained their cultural and normative 
legitimacy (W.R. Scott 1995) amongst the pro-movement constituency. The dengbej 
house is a popular tourist destination: during my visit in 2013, groups that had come 
to Diyarbakır on business or for conferences were brought in masses to the house. 
The dengbej greeted these groups enthusiastically, performed a selection of their 
songs, and also gave brief explanations in Turkish.  
 The re-popularization and re-legitimation of the dengbej, however, also 
entailed a “re-orientation” of the tradition into a somewhat pro-movement mold. 
Stories told by dengbej, according to Hamelink and Baris (2014), and as also relayed 
to me by Dicle, historically did not refer to a common “Kurdish” national cause, but 
were characterized by much more local affiliations (such as to a feudal lord), and in 
fact are somewhat resistive to being incorporated within “state structures” regardless 
of the state or state-like structures being Turkish, Kurdish, or otherwise. Yet, such a 
tendency towards such alliances with tribal structures – which, for instance, are 
evidenced in songs about internal (e.g., tribal) fights – have been deemed, by 
activists and Kurdish studies academics alike, as “primitive” (Hamelink and Baris 
2014). Thus, songs that are about love and about rebellion against the Turks have 
been given more visibility by the dengbej projects in the 2000s, and dengbejs 
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sometimes refuse or are prevented from singing about “internal battles” (Hamelink 
and Baris 2014). Moreover, Hamelink has noted (personal communication) that it is 
difficult to find and contact any dengbej today who are not politically aligned with 
the movement. However, such dengbejs must exist: there are dengbejs who perform 
on the state TV (TRT6), for instance. Moving through networks of actors that are 
affiliated / aligned with the movement means that access to these “other” dengbej is 
more difficult to attain.  
 Dengbej albums, as noted in the first part of the thesis, were mostly recorded 
in homes (especially in the 1970s) and circulated covertly in the 80s and 90s - but 
many (remaining) dengbej also recorded albums in Unkapani after the legalization of 
the market - thus, they also became a part of the formal market. Moreover, some 
home recordings have also been digitally cleaned and remastered. While [A] has 
issued a number of dengbej recordings,  a larger portion of recordings have been 
issued by other companies in the political segment (producers Nizam and Mehmet, 
whose interviews I quote from throughout the dissertation, have produced a large 
number of dengbej albums.) That they are managed in a way to serve the pro-
Kurdish political cause has also meant that their entry into the world music scene is 
very limited. Nonetheless, several artists who perform in the political music as well 
as world music segments have drawn from dengbej repertoires, “covering” or re-
interpreting these songs, and performing them at concerts. 
Continued Marginalization and Lack of Representation in the Market 
Actors in the political segment continued to draw attention to their marginalized 
position in mainstream culture. Productions of Kalan, Sony and Ada (from the World 
Music segment) could be found in some (and not all) mainstream music stores (such 
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as D&R, Dost, Remzi Kitabevi) when I started to write this dissertation - although it 
often took me a while to locate them, as they were placed either under “Turkish folk 
music” or “Other.” Towards the end of the dissertation, there was more variety in 
these stores, including a few albums produced by [A] Muzik and some other 
companies from the Political and World Music segments. In contrast, at “cassette 
shops” in (1) the region and (2) in Kurdish-inhabited neighborhoods in large cities, it 
was possible to find a large selection of Kurdish music. One of my informants was 
the owner of a cassette shop in Esenler, in Istanbul - I met the owner while he was 
visiting a company in Unkapani, purchasing CDs to sell at his shop. He was a 
Turkish man, but aware that most of his clientele is Kurdish, sold both Kurdish and 
Turkish music in his shop. The relative absence of Kurdish music in the 
“mainstream,” however, is still a sore point for many actors I talked to - Nizam, for 
instance, told me that I wouldn’t be able to find the albums he produced “at music 
shops in Etiler or Beşiktaş,” drawing attention perhaps to not just a marginalization 
in terms of language/ethnicity, but also in terms of social class: Etiler, in particular, is 
one of the upper-class neighborhoods in Istanbul.  
 Another issue actors in the political segment complained about was the 
continuing absence of venues to perform live music. While the artists in the world-
music also have difficulty finding places to perform, the stage is even narrower for 
the political music segment actors. This partly has to do with their own preferences – 
some artists in this segment, for example, prefer not to perform in venues that sell 
alcohol. As explained by Musa, this is a political stance. Kurdish music and language 
are seen as pure and politically sacred – and alcohol is perceived to be a 
contaminating influence. The few venues that are still available to the artists, then, 
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include weddings and political gatherings (sometimes called “political evenings” – 
siyasi geceler). While such performers avoid türkü bars, restaurants seem to be 
viable – the “album presentation” (lansman) of a former member of Koma 
Berxwedan, for example, took place at a restaurant (which regularly features live 
music with dinner) in Esenler, a predominantly Kurdish-inhabited district of Istanbul.  
These types of venues also lend themselves more readily to musical genres that are 
oriented towards “entertainment”. As Kerem notes, in such contexts, even the more 
politically active artists have fallen prey to the trends in “dance” music:  
There are night [events], for [political organizations], and what do the 
[political] groups play? They take a saz and play, şemmame şemmame , le le 27
lo lo, [as if] this constitutes our music. This is not your music. Your music 
kept itself alive in the hardest conditions, even when it was said to be finished 
and destroyed, in the villages, in the towns. If you want to keep this music 
alive, you need to create something new, but when you turn it into tavern 
music, just so that people can dance the halay, you mustn’t really think 
you’re keeping it alive. But that’s what’s being done now. … I think Kurdish 
art is experiencing an internal struggle these days. As much as it has been in a 
struggle with the state that denies its presence, it is also in a struggle within 
itself. (Kerem, performer) !
 Thus, Kerem draws attention to the replacement of state policies with an 
internal crisis of not figuring out “where to take the music.” 
Finally, the political-normative frames changed with regards to the ways in which 
royalties and “making money” were viewed. Whereas illegal circulation and piracy 
were viewed as normal and necessary during the 1990s, they started to be viewed in 
a very negative light, particularly in terms of standing in the way of making sales and 
generating the revenues necessary for (1) performers to make a living and (2) 
producers for financing new productions. Ismail, who has sustained his popularity as 
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 Şemmame is a popular govend, i.e., dance song.27
a performer since the late 1980s, recalled a time he went for a concert in the region. 
He was walking on the street when he was approached by a teenaged fan who told 
him “ape [uncle, used as a term of respect and endearment] I love you so much, I 
downloaded all of your songs and albums from the internet.” Ismail was torn 
between his appreciation of being loved so much, and a disdain that fans were 
downloading, rather than buying, his albums.  
 The distinction among the two major and more visible (at least from a 
mainstream point of view) segments – the world music segment and the political 
music segment - is also reinforced by legal arrangements made regarding the 
payments of royalties that are accumulated through legal internet streaming channels. 
The institutionalization of royalty payments is relatively new in the context of the 
music market in Turkey, and still a work in progress. There are three unions that are 
responsible for the distribution of royalties to members: Mü-Yap, the union for music 
producers; MESAM, the union for “authors” of musical products (i.e. composers and 
lyricists); and Müyorbir, the union for performers of music. In the case of many of 
these unions, there are two different types of membership –primary and secondary. 
While I was conducting my fieldwork, there were three “primary members” which 
were involved in producing Kurdish albums: Kalan, Ada, and Sony (i.e. the parent of 
the “Pel” division) and none were from the “Political Music Segment.” Moreover, 
the owners of Kalan and Ada are both currently on Mü-Yap’s board of directors. The 
other companies – including [A] Muzik – are “secondary” members. The way that 
Mü-Yap works is through the collection and subsequent division of all royalties 
incurred through various channels, amongst the primary and secondary members. 
Some of the main sources of royalties are the GSM operators (such as Turkcell and 
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Avea) and a major internet service provider (TTNet) which provide download or 
streaming access to most albums produced in Turkey. According to producers who 
are secondary members, the larger part of royalties are divided amongst the primary 
members, with the secondary ones receiving a much smaller fraction of royalties. 
Moreover, according to producers, Kurdish music albums are not properly labeled or 
represented on royalty-paying streaming/download services. Emre expresses his 
frustrations with this system in the following excerpt: 
In the digital arena, TTNet for instance pays royalties for all music albums. 
People can listen to [albums through the TTNet website]. In terms of 
categories, they have ethnic, arabesk, pop-arabesk, fantazi-arabesk, 
everything… but not even the K of Kurdish. Within the ethnic [category] they 
have people like Neşet Ertaş but [no Kurdish]. [Kurdish music] is in the 
“other” section. Other… If you already possess some knowledge about 
Kurdish music, if you can spell Kurdish [names], like Şivan Perwer or Ciwan 
Haco ... then you can find them. If you write v instead of w, you cannot find 
them. So… it’s not just the physical space, but also in digital spaces… In the 
avea or turkcell [services] also, now people mostly consume music through 
digital spaces and that’s where revenue comes from. … but there are very few 
actors in the digital arena [which pay royalties],. … Today in the digital arena 
in Turkey, they collect royalties of approximately 70-80 million TL … but 
when you compare it with the number of albums, and then think about the 
Kurdish population of the country, and look at the number of Kurdish albums, 
the royalties that Kurdish music receives is probably not a thousandth of that 
money. I also quit MÜYAP membership 2 years ago. I’ve produced  22 or 23 
albums by Şivan Perwer and he’s a great star, but I don’t receive 1% of the 
royalties that Ankaralı Turgut’s producer receives, whoever that producer 
might be. So when you look at the [Kurdish music] scene, it’s economically 
under siege and impossible to repair. So once upon a time there was DGM 
(state security court) and there were the [prohibitive] laws. Today neither of 
those exist, but Kurdish music also does not exist in [the minds of the 
majority] … it doesn’t exist as a category.  !
This excerpt not only indicates the actor’s grievance regarding the continued 
marginalization of Kurdish in the marketplace, but also the marginality of Kurdish 
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(language and identity) to the extent that it still has not become “normalized:” still 
lacking cultural legitimacy, despite having gained some regulative legitimacy.  
!
4.3.2 Segment 2: The World Music Segment 
!
Istanbul was, historically, a multi-ethnic city housing numerous musical traditions 
and performance venues, particularly centered in the Pera (now Beyoğlu) 
neighborhood. An “entertainment enclave of non-Muslims, especially Jews, Greeks, 
Armenians and Levantines” (Aytar and Keskin 2003: 147) during the [late] Ottoman 
era, and housing many cafes and meyhanes (winehouses), it remained a popular – 
and socio-economically diverse -  center for entertainment after the foundation of the 
Republic as well. The number of “entertainment” spaces and venues started to 
multiply and diversify particularly after the mid-1980s (Aytar and Keskin 2003). 
 The (re)emergence of Istanbul (and within Istanbul, to a large extent, 
Beyoğlu) as home to a “multi-cultural” entertainment scene took place more or less 
in the late 1990s/early 2000s (Degirmenci 2008; Stokes 1999). A number of actors 
contributed to this process. For one, were some music companies, such as Pozitif 
Yapım/ Doublemoon Records,  Kalan Muzik, and Ada Müzik. Second, there were a 
number of performance halls, bars, cafes, and other commercial ventures. Babylon, a 
bar/performance hall specializing in jazz/fusion was one of the primary “cultural 
intermediaries” to set the stage for a world music scene in Istanbul (Degirmenci 
2008), and was followed by other similarly minded venues established throughout 
the next two decades. Publications and periodicals promoted the concerts and night-
clubs/ performance halls and lauded the “diversity” that this scene featured. German-
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Turkish director Fatih Akın’s internationally successful 2005 movie Gegen die Wand 
(Head-On) featured some of the musicians based in / performing in Beyoğlu. Akın 
later made the documentary Crossing the Bridge, which focused solely on this music 
scene, drawing even more attention to the venues, performers, and production 
companies that co-created the scene. 
 Degirmenci (2008) cites two different approaches to the world music scene in 
Turkey. One approach involves creating “fusions” of “local” sounds and Western 
instrumentation. The company Doublemoon Records (affiliated with concert 
promoter company, Pozitif Organizasyon), has been active in this genre, promoting 
Turkish “world music” on the global scene as well as the local one. A few prominent 
examples of this type of music in the Istanbul scene include “dance music” 
performed by Roma musicians (clarinet performers Selim Sesler and Hüsnü 
Şenlendirici are two prominent artists in this genre), “sufi-electronica” (fronted by 
“Mercan Dede”, a DJ who also performs with the ney), and “oriental hip-hop” (an 
example cited in Degirmenci [2010] is the performer Ceza) among others - many of 
which have been featured in the aforementioned Crossing the Bridge movie.  
On the other hand, performances and productions of folk music (including  that do 
not make any claims of synthesizing “Western” sounds) have also come to be framed 
as “world music.” Degirmenci (2008) has noted that this has involved the re-
articulation and re-construction of “locality,” “ethnicity,” and “spirituality.” A good 
portion of Kalan’s productions fall into this category - the company has re-mastered 
and re-issued recordings from the early to mid-20th Century, has sponsored projects 
of ethnomusicological research throughout Thrace and Anatolia, and has issued the 
results as anthological CDs accompanied by informational booklets.   
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 This “world music scene,” particularly the branch headed by Kalan, does 
involve a number of artists or groups performing Kurdish music – yet, this number 
was somewhat limited . Performers from the political segment have been, to a large 28
extent, absent from the “world music” stage. The few Kurdish performers who did 
become a part of the “world music” scene/ stage positioned themselves - or were 
guided by producers to be positioned-  in a manner that is symbolically distinct from 
the collective ethos of the political music segment. While personal relationships and 
collaborations between the actors in these two segments have taken place, this has 
been on a rather limited scale.  The production aesthetics and lyrical content of the 
music was also quite distinct from the “agitative” music style. Musical arrangements 
and sound engineering in the “world music scene” were highly influenced by trends 
in “world music/world beat” (Degirmenci 2008). A small number of studios and 
musicians worked on the majority of “ethnic/ world” music productions that were 
made in this period (Bates 2008), whereas the political segment worked with the 
studio founded by artists from The Center, or smaller, more amateur recording 
studios.  
 In Turkey, discussions on multi-culturalism, pluralism, or ethnic/ religious 
minorities have often been entwined with and branded as involving “politics” – yet 
the normative/political frames and discourses associated with multi-culturalism are 
markedly distinct from those associated with the pro-Kurdish movement. This was 
reflected in the attitudes, public speeches, and musical productions of actors in the 
“world music” segment – including the Kurdish actors in that scene. An emphasis 
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 In Fatih Akın’s movie, for example, the inclusion of Kurdish music was limited to Aynur Doğan, 28
performing a kılam (a dengbej song) inside a Turkish bath (the justification being for acoustic 
purposes). Hasan Saltık was also interviewed for his contributions to the field with Kalan.
was made not on exclusively Kurdish cultural and political rights and liberties, but 
on a multi-cultural heritage of Anatolia. The approach by some of the actors in the 
world music scene – particularly as represented by Kalan Muzik – often stated 
intentions to “save from extinction” and “represent” the cultural artifacts and musical 
heritage of these communities. 
 In contrast with the ethno-political orientation of the political segment, this 
“world music” sound, and “multivocality” oriented political approach in the music 
scene arguably succeeded in making some Kurdish music and artists more accessible 
to a non-Kurdish audience.  The audience members in the world music segment were 
mainly well-educated, urban Turkish citizens; concerts took place in jazz festivals as 
well as smaller live music venues that catered to a middle/upper-middle income 
constituency. In terms of audience, there were overlaps amongst the constituents of 
the audience for the “political segment” and the “world music segment” - but for 
some Kurds, the world music segment was both politically undesirable (not 
sufficiently radical or pro-Kurdish) and also, in terms of concert prices, economically 
difficult to access. On the other hand, for Kurds with more moderate political views, 
the world music scene offered a middle-ground and possibilities for dialog with the 
Turkish and Kurdish constituencies. The case of Kalan Muzik - the way they frame 
their production ethos, and the way the company has been received by audience and 
mainstream (Turkish) media, and their somewhat limited success amongst the 
Kurdish audience is quite exemplary. 
The Case of Kalan Muzik: Kurdish Music and Mainstream Success 
Kalan Müzik was established in 1991 by Hasan Saltık, a producer of mixed ethnic 
(Turkish and Alevi-Kurdish) background, and his wife, Nilüfer Saltık (also of 
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Turkish and Kurdish background). Hasan Saltık had previously been working for a 
company owned by a relative in Unkapanı, and had been involved in the production 
of an instrumental album of Kurdish music which featured, on its cover, an elderly 
person with his mouth covered with tape (as relayed to me by producer Emre from 
Unkapanı). Saltık started working with Grup Yorum, a band affiliated with the radical 
left-wing movement, in the late 1980s, before establishing his own company. Grup 
Yorum had attained some notoriety due to its politically charged song lyrics, and also 
for performing a Kurdish song live at a political event before 1991 (Kahyaoglu 
2010). 
 The Saltıks’ decision to enter the music market is quite different from the way 
that the producers in the political music segment framed their entries. Nilüfer Saltık, 
in our interview, talked about the confluence of commercial opportunities and artistic 
concerns that presented themselves in the early 1990s:  
During that period, the music sector was very active ... also [profitable] in 
terms of income... there were all these people who would sell their land and 
arrive here [in Istanbul] and open up a shop in Unkapanı, we were able to 
catch that time at its very end...  we caught that time while the producers of 
the 70s and 80s were still active and the türkü (folk music) singers from Urfa 
and Diyarbakir were famous. … Hasan [Saltık] was working for another 
company at the time, and one of the albums [he produced] there became very 
successful. We were young and newly married, we said, why don’t we 
establish our own company, because the company owner is making money on 
these things we work on... so we said let’s do it ourselves! (N. Saltık) !
 Hasan Saltık has added that while he worked for the other company, the 
owners/managers did not always allow him to produce the albums he wanted to make 
– thus he was motivated to break away and establish his own company. Once he did 
so, a chance encounter set him on the path that would come to define the company: 
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I travelled abroad and was able to examine the music markets. The Greeks 
have made a series out of Rebetiko music, the music of the people who 
migrated from Anatolia. The Spaniards recorded flamenco pieces from the 
20s and 30s onto CDs. The Americans made a CD about Tanburi Cemil Bey. 
I thought, why not do something like this in Turkey? We started to research 
opportunities for [re-mastering] music belonging to Anatolian cultures, and 
also for producing new music. We started out with the idea that we would be 
an alternative company. (Interview with Gülru İncu Çeler, Star Newspaper, 
February 16  2005) !
 The decision to produce the albums of artists – both past and present – 
performing Anatolian musical repertoires was, in part Nilüfer Saltık’s idea. In our 
interview, she talked of growing up listening to folk poet/singers such as Neşet Ertaş. 
Ertaş was virtually unknown in the Turkish music scene in the early 1990s. He had 
migrated to Germany, and was making a living by performing at weddings. Even 
though many “folk singers” in Turkey were performing and recording songs that he 
and his father (Muharrem Ertaş) had composed or compiled, he wasn’t receiving 
recognition or royalties. The Saltıks, in Nilüfer Saltık’s words, brought him back to 
Turkey and helped him receive some of the respect, recognition, as well as the 
royalties he rightfully deserved.  
 Nilüfer Saltık is somewhat scornful of what she refers to as “the Turkish elite 
perspective” that has valorized Western classical music at the expense of local talents 
and traditional repertoires. She frames their work in Kalan as a cultural service: 
helping to bring some balance to the scene, by producing music that represents the 
co-existence of multiple ethnic and/or religious communities and musical traditions. 
In her words: 
Throughout the Republican era, people have been sent abroad for Western 
musical education, for violin and piano, as part of the “gifted children” 
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projects… of course, this [rightfully took place], it wouldn’t be right to reject 
that at all, but we already had so many gifted people in Anatolia. People like 
[Aşık] Mahsuni, Neşet Ertaş, Muharrem Ertaş, Çekiç Ali, these were already 
gifted people and they were nourished by this land [bu topraklar], they 
experienced the pain and love and tragedies of this land and created their 
musical works. My heart lies on [their] side, I see myself closer to them. Of 
course, we have produced albums for [artists who make Western-influenced 
music], and we will keep doing so, that’s something else. But we also made 
albums for the Anatolian folk poets, and we made [albums] for the other 
communities that have lived in Anatolia, the Assyrians, the [Y]Ezidis, the 
Armenians, the Kurds, the Pontians… The kind of perspective we have is, 
even if it is only a community of 100 people, if they are different in some 
way – in terms of language or religion or whatever it might be, we [produce 
their music] to serve the idea of pluralism, and for its archival value. And 
don’t think we make money out of all these albums, we don’t. For example 
there’s the Ezidis album, it is accompanied by a book of 100 or 200 pages, 
and it consists of 2 CDs. There is no way we can make [profit] selling that. 
But the purpose is to provide documentation of something that belongs here, 
to present it to the future generations. It is a cultural service. !
 Some of the keys to understanding how Kalan has been “branded” by 
themselves, their audience, and by the media can be found in this passage: an artistic 
logic that is based on promoting the ethnic, religious and cultural “pluralism” – 
including the Turkish and ethnic minority “masters” who have been neglected by 
official policies at the expense of Western classical music; the “non-commercial” 
ethos which governs these efforts to preserve and transmit Anatolian multi-cultural 
heritage. These are reflected in several media reports throughout the years that Kalan 
is performing a “cultural service” – akin to being an “unofficial ministry of culture”, 
an epithet employed by several local and foreign journalists.  
 Two important turning points in Saltık’s career, related to his involvement in 
such productions, was receiving the Prince Claus Fund award in 2003, and being 
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featured in Time Magazine as an influential “anthropologist of music” in 2004. These 
two distinctions arguably brought a new type of spotlight onto him in Turkey – that 
of “cultural ambassador”. Nilüfer Saltık noted that these distinctions also led to 
albums produced by Kalan presented to foreign dignitaries as gifts – as “proof” that 
ethnic minorities enjoyed equal rights in Turkey, that they were able to produce and 
disseminate their music. This was ironic, she said, “considering that in 2004, Kurdish 
music was yet to be broadcast on television.” 
 Kalan has also actively sought to representation and recognition on the global 
world music scene. One way has been through arranging appearances at world music 
festival -  annual organization – in 2012, for example, Café Aman, a Greek (Rum) -
Turkish Rembetiko ensemble represented by Kalan, was the only participant at 
WOMEX (the World Music Exposition) from Turkey. Selda Öztürk, a member of 
Kardeş Türküler, a Kalan-produced music group, has noted in a published 
interview  that Kalan Müzik sends promotional albums to international music 29
agencies and companies. On one occasion, the music supervisors of the Hollywood 
film “Kingdom of Heaven” received and listened to Kardeş Türküler’s “Hemavaz” 
album and were intrigued by the song “Suleymano”. They got in touch with Kalan 
and Kardeş Türküler, and commissioned new compositions to be used as part of the 
score in the movie and also issued in the soundtrack. Kalan’s visibility in the world 
scene has led Charles Gillett, director of BBC’s world music program, to comment 
that [he] “learned about the music of Turkey through Kalan” (Hürriyet Newspaper, 
16 May 2009).  
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 Selda Öztürk interview, conducted by Ferid Demirel in Özgür Politika newspaper. June 7 2005.29
 Hasan Saltık has framed his venture  - in both our interview and in published 
interviews - as a “non-profit foundation” rather than a “profit-seeking business” but 
as a kind of “non-profit foundation.” In a published interview, he noted:  
 We received many offers of financial help, from organizations in Germany, 
 The Netherlands, and the USA. But we never take sponsorships from outside 
 sources, we don’t want anyone to say “Wow, they are doing business with so-
 and-so’s money”. Kalan works with its own  resources and even provides  
 resources, it works with the mentality of a [non-profit] foundation.  We’re not 
 a wholly commercial business. We also don’t sign [binding long-term]  
 contracts with our artists. We don’t force them to stay with us for five albums, 
 we don’t ask for 20 percent of their concert income.  30!
This does not mean that the company does not try to sell their albums, but Hasan 
Saltık told me in our [unrecorded] interview that they seek a balance between 
productions that will potentially become bestsellers - such as movie or TV 
soundtracks. The company uses the profit they accrue from these more 
“commercially oriented” productions to finance the “non-commercial” productions 
(e.g.,anthologies, folk music, young performers from ethnic minority communities) 
that he personally cares about. Thus, even within the company’s own catalogue, 
Saltık constructs a boundary between the “profane” music that appeals to the 
mainstream audience and the “sacred” - read: politically significant - music that will 
have a limited following. Producing the profane is morally justifiable only because it 
serves the sustenance of the sacred.  
 The sacred is perpetuated and reproduced not only through producing 
anthological or archival albums, but also through new and contemporary 
productions. When working particularly with younger artists, Hasan Saltık – and in 
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 Hasan Saltık interview with Menderes Özel, Milliyet May 30 201230
some projects, Nilüfer Saltık as well – and other producers, musicians, and 
researchers working for the company, have a great deal of influence on how the “end 
product” will sound. In our interview, Hasan Saltık described his role with some 
artists as a work of “re-invention.” Some of this work of reinvention he has done, 
particularly with younger artists, includes changing the artists’ outer appearance and 
dress styles, teaching them how to stand and act on stage while singing, how to 
respond to questions - particularly ones regarding politics - in interviews. Nilüfer 
Saltık described the careful work the company puts into creating “sounds” in the 
following excerpt from our interview, and emphasizes the company’s and producers’ 
strong influence in this process as a distinction from other companies in the market: 
... [the performer] might have the resources, like an ore, a flicker of light. [the 
performer] might have a voice, a composition …. You take it, it is already 
there, but you present it in such a way, you prepare a repertoire, make [the 
musical] arrangements. You do things that haven’t been done, that haven’t 
been tried, but do it in a way that doesn’t spoil what’s already there, but 
rather, that supports and strengthens it. … so it really has to be formulated 
well, it really has to be processed well, just like you know you might have 
very good vegetables, organic tomatoes and all that. But what type of food 
will be prepared, that’s the producer’s job. What kind of arrangement should 
be made for this voice, which instruments will be used, where will the voice 
rise and where will it fall. Which song will be the one to make an entry [to the 
market]… Producers generally do not leave these decisions to the artist, 
because the artist’s, or the soloist’s personal views or considerations might be 
different. The producer has a more objective viewpoint. Of course, I’m only 
talking about Kalan, not about other companies. (N. Saltık) !
 I have heard of cases in which musicians sent a finished “master copy” to 
Kalan, and Hasan Saltık agreed to publish it under the Kalan label – however, these 
have been exceptions rather than the rule. Kalan has its own studios, and produces its 
own distinctive sound (Bates 2008 discusses how different types of “sound”s are 
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produced in different recording studios in Istanbul) and has its own distinctive 
“style” in terms of how the music should be arranged and promoted. The company’s 
preference is to be involved in producing albums from scratch, and reflect its 
owners’/producers’ criteria and artistic vision with each artist and album. In one case, 
a well-known performer affiliated with Kalan wanted to exercise more control over 
who would work on the album and how the end-product should sound - this 
performer ended up deciding not to work with Kalan any longer. This type of 
contract does not fit into every artist’s or group’s idea of an ideal relationship with 
the production company. Yet, for those who do, the end results are often critically 
received as sounding “different” and of “higher quality” when compared to the rest 
of the music scene. This distinction is reproduced at points of sale - Kalan’s albums 
are sold in many mainstream chain book and music stores (such as D&R, Dost 
Kitabevi, Remzi Kitabevi etc - all of which carry very few, if any, Kurdish music 
albums from the political segment). Interestingly, Kalan’s albums often have their 
own separate section, setting them apart from Turkish mainstream music as well.  
Kalan and the Kurdish Music Scene 
Two of the more popular Kurdish-singing acts in Kalan’s roster have been Kardeş 
Türküler and Aynur [Doğan] (although the latter started working with a different 
record company in recent years.) Kardeş Türküler grew out of a folk-music ensemble 
at Istanbul’s Boğaziçi University. Performing songs in a number of languages - 
including Turkish, Kurdish, Armenian, among others - their first album came out in 
1999, issued by Kalan. They rose to prominence in the early 2000s, however, after 
recording a soundtrack for the movie “Vizontele,” which achieved box office 
success. Their concerts at university festivals in major cities, as well as their “Eastern 
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Turkey tour” in the 2000s were very successful. And, since then, they have also been 
performing annually at the “Harbiye Açıkhava Tiyatrosu,” a major open-air concert 
venue in Istanbul.  
 The response of Kurdish audience to Kalan-affiliated artists – including 
Kardeş Türküler and Aynur – in the region as well as living in the major cities – has 
generally been very warm. Concerts in the region have drawn large numbers of 
audience, and continue to do so. Several of my Kurdish informants – including some 
of the producers – have spoken enthusiastically about Kardeş Türküler. Cem and 
Talat (both without any ties to the music industry) have argued that Kardeş Türküler 
contributed to the relative “normalcy” of Kurdish language and music within Turkey 
today. Members of Kardeş Türküler, aware of this role that has been attributed to 
them, have also been active in promoting and raising awareness for the pro-Kurdish 
cause, with some members going as far as voicing support for the pro-Kurdish 
political candidates. 
Distinction of the World Music Scene 
The consumers who buy Kalan’s (and the albums produced by the other companies 
in this segment) are perceived to be mostly well-educated Kurds, and also, 
importantly, Turks – importantly, a certain “type” of “Turk,” as relayed by 
informants, who lives in the large cities, has received higher education, is “politically 
sensitive” about issues related to ethnic and religious minorities. The Kurds who 
listen to this music are also perceived as embodying similar characteristics and 
dispositions to the aforementioned Turkish audience. The music also serves to unite 
constituencies of different ethnic backgrounds, but of similar concerns, or a 
willingness to learn more about the multicultural heritage. When I asked Veysel, a 
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performer with Kardeş Türküler, about whether they and the Koms (of the political 
segment) have the same audience constituency, he emphatically replied that they did 
not. He said:  
There are overlaps, of course, but on the other hand it’s impossible 
that we have the exact same audience. For example, when there’s a 
Kardeş Türküler concert, the concertgoers are composed of people 
from all of the [ethnic] communities [in Turkey]. Of course an 
important part of that is the Kurds. There are a lot of Alevis, and I’d 
say especially of the unjustly treated [mağdur] world: the 
Armenians, the laborers [emekçiler] … Kardeş Türküler brings 
many different segments [kesim] together, and especially when we 
first started, we saw a lot of things such as a Turk coming to our 
concert and hearing Armenian music or Kurdish music for the first 
time.” (Veysel, performer) !
Thus, rather than being divided by ethnic lines, this audience constituency is united 
around this “shared” music, which also sometimes corresponds to or generates 
camaraderie and a shared political orientation. This is particularly observable during 
live performances of Kurdish artists at a select few venues in Istanbul. Musa, the 
owner of a bar & performance hall - and one where Kalan performers and other 
“world music” type performers give concerts, reflects on the type of audience who 
comes to the venue: 
The people who come to hear Kurdish music [at my venue] are mostly 
university students. Because the music performed here is an urban music. So 
it appeals to that type of audience ... who [also goes to] the theater, the 
cinema, the opera. For example [name of artist] is a very different color in 
Kurdish music. But not every Kurd prefers to [listen to him]. It is a very 
specific segment. So it’s mostly urban Kurdish youth, urban Kurds. For 
example at [another artist]’s concert I made some observations about who 
was there. It was mostly students. There was a group of academics, and they 
were speaking Kurdish. A group of lawyers. Women, feminist women. 
Professionals. It was a very interesting mix. The common ground was that 
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this is [artist’s name]’s concert, and it is this specific [polyphonic, urban] 
music. We also have customers who are foreigners, at almost every 
concert. ... and of course the people of other communities in this country, who 
are not Kurdish. They come, they  listen very carefully, and even though they 
do not understand Kurdish [language], but they listen to the music with even 
more interest. This is about the music, the universality of the music, the 
language of music... so it’s not just Kurds [in the audience], but of course, the 
Kurds [dominate] the audience. (Musa, venue owner) !
Musa is very much involved with the customer base of his performance venue - he 
chats with customers, and is open to holding “event nights” for causes and 
organizations, including for LGBTT groups, feminist organizations, and pro-Kurdish 
causes. He moreover wants to be involved with promoting young and promising 
performers  who, in his words,  have “musical pursuits” – that is, who experiment 
with different sounds, and appeal to a more urban audience. In his words: 
When I opened this place, I didn’t think of it as a venue for Kurds, but as an 
alternative stage. Kurds are one part of this, maybe the most dominant part, 
but as a part of multiplicity. [I am] selective, I don’t just let any Kurdish artist 
on stage just because s/he is a Kurd.  !
In the interview, Musa took care to express the differences of his venue from the 
completely commercially-oriented türkü bars (which I shall mention further).  and 
also noted that some of the more politically oriented artists do not appear on stage at 
his venue because it is an alcohol-serving place. Even though Musa himself struggled 
with the decision to serve alcohol, it is easy to see that he is distancing himself, to 
some extent, from the exclusively political and agitative music background. In order 
to cater to the type of young, well-educated audiences in mind, an alcohol-serving 
venue is more appropriate.  
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 While the “world music” producers and performers do not align themselves 
with the political music scene, neither do the “political music” actors perceive of this 
segment, including Kalan, as part of their scene. I have heard a variation of the 
statements “Kalan doesn’t really make Kurdish music/ Kalan is not a Kurdish music 
company, they only produced a few Kurdish albums” from a number of informants. 
Kalan, similarly, does not make any claims on focusing on Kurdish music more than 
others. The way Kalan positions itself seems to be a somewhat unique standing, 
though with some similarities to one other company in particular, Ada Muzik. Ada 
also positions itself as “embracing” the musical wealth of Anatolia, by working with 
“artists of different cultures and different languages, and continuing to produce 
albums in Kurdish, Circassian, Homshetsi, and Greek languages” . Kalan and Ada 31
have also collaborated on a number of occasions, and the owners of both companies 
are in the directorate of the Trade Association for music producers, Mü-yap. In our 
interview, Nilüfer Saltık also mentioned Ada as the another company which operates 
on principles similar to those of Kalan. 
 Some collaborations were attempted between the actors of the “world music” 
segment with the actors of the “political music” segment – a noteworthy attempt was 
between the members of the music group Koma Amed, based in The Center and 
Kardeş Türküler of Kalan. Vedat Yıldırım, one of the lead singers of Kardeş 
Türküler, noted in Akkaya (2008) that the two groups disagreed artistically with 
regards to the extent to which one should experiment with traditional forms: The 
members of Koma Amed found some of Kardeş Türküler’s re-interpretations/ fusions 
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of traditional works to be a “distortion” of traditional forms. This sentiment was 
repeated to me by a number of performers - particularly those who had started their 
artistic careers at The Center. While performers at The Center also experimented with 
fusion and Western instrumentation, they felt that the way in which Kardeş Türküler 
did this- sometimes mixing a number of songs, or writing new lyrics altogether - was 
taking it too far. This, it seems, fell against their moral-political understanding of 
“preserving” the heritage.  
Moral Boundaries Amongst Political Segment and World Music Segment 
The relationship between actors in the world music segment – in particular, Kalan - 
and actors in the political music segments is somewhat ambiguous. There have been 
(attempts at) collaborations between musicians, and a degree of sociability seems to 
characterize most of their interactions – which includes playing backgammon in the 
“courtyard” of the 6th block in Unkapanı, where all the companies are located. But, 
upon inquiries in interviews, some of the tensions come to fore. During my very first 
interview with regards to Kurdish music – before I had any idea about the presence 
of differences between the different companies - a producer in Unkapanı, remarked, 
when I commented on how I’d seen Kalan’s Kurdish productions in D&R (a chain 
bookstore): 
It’s not only from you, but I’ve heard it from other [Turkish] friends as well. I 
like Kalan Müzik, I respect Hasan [Saltık] and he’s a good friend. But Kalan 
Müzik has not really produced [that many] Kurdish albums. He’s produced 
Aynur’s albums, and our Turkish media especially paid attention to Aynur. ... 
I’m not criticizing Aynur either, Aynur is also our friend, but we have albums 
that have sold ten times more than Aynur’s albums. But since the Turkish 
media does not pay any attention, [Aynur] is what people know. But go to the 
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places where [Kurdish] albums are sold, I mean, go to the region . If you see 32
100 CDs in a shop, perhaps 50 of them are [my productions]. But here [in 
Istanbul] for example, in certain places – such as Etiler, or in Beşiktaş, maybe 
you can see Aynur’s CDs. But today, [name of a Kurdish singer] sells much 
more than Aynur. Kalan Müzik has produced a few albums, but the media has 
paid a lot of attention. (Nizam) 
Reactions to Kalan’s work did involve praise at Hasan Saltık’s vision and success in 
being “at the right place at the right time” – particularly with respect to supporting 
the Kardeş Türküler project, which, according to one producer, was an innovative 
and fresh approach to both Kurdish and other ethnic musics. However, this “right 
place, right time” also meant, in the perceptions of some interviewees, that he was 
not “present” when the persecutions faced due to producing Kurdish music was high. 
Dicle, a book publisher – and thus an “outsider” to the field with many “insider” 
contacts, explained some Kurdish artists’ and producers’ disdain for Kalan and the 
others who entered the scene “later” (i.e. in the post-2000 period), as follows: 
as far as I know, [Kalan] started to produce and sell that kind of music once 
the price [bedel] to be paid had subsided  and the gains were higher. And 
maybe that’s why they’re recognized by the Turks as well. But these other 
organizations that I’m talking about, they started doing this work when the 
bedel was high and the profit was none. And they’re still doing it. I mean, 
back then you would get arrested for doing this work, forget about the money, 
there was no money in it. This was like a field of combat, I mean, some 
people wrote books and went to jail, some engaged in politics and got killed, 
and there was the sense that “this is what we’re doing.” So during that period, 
when the losses surpassed the gains by manifolds, you couldn’t do it on a 
personal [independent] level, so that’s why it was done by organizations. 
Kalan started doing this after the 90s, after 95, after Ozal’s time and after the 
restrictions had been loosened. (Dicle) 
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 When talking to non-Kurdish individuals, Kurds often use the term “bölge” to refer to the highly 32
Kurdish-populated Eastern and Southeastern provinces. However, amongst themselves – and after I’d 
conducted fieldwork for a while - I’ve heard the usage of “Kurdistan” more often.
Kalan has not been completely divorced from controversy or from being on the 
receiving end of legislative restrictions. Since it was founded, Kalan has been 
producing the albums of Grup Yorum, a band affiliated with a radical left-wing 
organization. The members of this band have, throughout the years, been arrested 
several times and their albums have been intermittently banned (Kahyaoglu 2011 for 
a detailed account of Grup Yorum’s legal entanglements.)  In his role as the producer 
for Grup Yorum, Hasan Saltık was also tried at the state security courts in the 1990s. 
Moreover, some of Saltık’s Kurdish-language productions also created legal issues. 
Kalan’s first Kurdish language production in 1992, an album named  “Umut Yüklü 
Bahar” contained Kurdish songs and thus led to court proceedings . The company 33
also lost its license for a period in 2002 due to the usage of the word “Kurdistan” in 
an album that had been issued back in 1993. Hasan Saltık has described this 
problematic period as “I was stopping by the DGM  courthouse every day on my way 
to work”.  
 Moreover, individual artists and groups have experienced discrimination, not 
unlike the artists and groups of the political segment. Even though Kalan’s albums 
were sold at mainstream music shops, the Kurdish performers found that they still 
could not get their albums to be played on radio and television. The singer Aynur 
noted in a published interview  that despite legality, “owners of TV stations, 34
producers of tv programs and general editors of newspapers individually prohibit 
something that is legally free. These are people with prejudices.” In the same 
interview she recalls how the producers of TV programs would tell her that she could 
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appear on their program if she agreed to sing only Turkish songs. Hasan Saltık, 
echoing Ahmet Kaya’s declaration from 1999, ran paid ads in a number of 
newspapers, declaring that they had shot a music video for a Kurdish song and were 
looking for “brave people to broadcast this video” (relayed to me by Nilüfer Saltık). 
The video they produced was for Kardeş Türküler’s rendition of a popular folk song 
“Kara Uzum Habbesi” (a version that was sung with both Turkish and Kurmanji 
Kurdish lyrics) in 2004, the news channel CNN Turk ran it once. Other channels 
refused to do so. Producers, editors, TV-station owners were, at the time, still worried 
about repercussions they might face (e.g., complaints from viewers, loss of 
advertisers from more nationalistic companies etc) were they to run or advertise 
Kurdish music. In 2013-2014, at the time of the writing of this dissertation, further 
progress seems to have been made with regards to featuring Kurdish music 
(particularly of the variety produced by Kalan) on television – artists such as Aynur, 
Rojin, and Şivan Perwer have appeared on television shows in which they performed 
music, and were also interviewed. 
 That being said, there have been a number of occasions in which Kalan has 
demonstrated a more symbiotic relationship with authorities. Saltık supervised the 
campaign music for future prime minister Bülent Ecevit, the leader of the DSP 
(Democratic Left Party). During this government’s tenure, however, Kalan faced the 
aforementioned period of difficulties and closure. Later, when AKP was in power, 
Saltık was able to strike a deal giving him access to re-master recordings and 
produce albums from the archives of TRT - although this deal fell through after a few 
albums were produced. (Nilüfer Saltık told me that Hasan Saltık was unhappy with 
the “bureaucratic” and restrictive culture of TRT that he had to deal with while trying 
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to work with the archives). Pointing out such collaborations, producers and 
performers in the political segment told me that Kalan has always been on “good 
terms” with the government -regardless of which political party is in charge. This 
also falls contrary to the political segment’s oppositional stance, where the 
government is, at best suspected of trying to assimilate the Kurds, and at worst, 
repressing them completely. Kalan’s legal difficulties do not lend themselves to a 
camaraderie from the political actors’ perspective - they feel that the “price” they, as 
the pro-Kurdish actors paid, has been much higher.  
 On the other hand, Kalan’s political stance has been perceived as more of a 
“middle ground” position by actors and audience who find the political-moral 
framing of the political segment to be too hardline and alienating.  Moreover, a 
number of informants (particularly audience members who do not define themselves 
as particularly aligned with the Kurdish movement) have commended Kalan’s ability 
to attract Turkish audience. The following quote from Talat is an exemplary critique 
of the political segment limiting itself to a narrow artistic space: 
The Center, for instance, could have converted that place into something 
larger, such as an academy, and could have doubled the [artistic] productivity 
in the period after 1995. If you look at today, does the same productivity even 
exist? There are no groups that I can think of, that comes out of The Center 
and that we can say makes really great music. For example, [group name], I 
think, is at a standstill. After [name of popular album], they made an album 
called [name of another popular album]. But after that, I don’t think they 
produced anything good. I think this is something that has decreased musical 
productivity … with all the experience they gave, they could have become at 
least as popular as Kardeş Türküler. … I mean when [a popular Kurdish 
group from the political segment] plays a concert in the West of Turkey, the 
audience that goes to listen will still be [mostly] Kurds. But Kardeş Türküler 
has a much broader audience. I think when this politicization takes place at 
the extreme, the groups become buried somewhere. They could have done 
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things differently, they could have played a different role towards solving the 
Kurdish problem, or in making Kurdish music more popular. For example, 
whose music video was first shown on Turkish television? It was Kardeş 
Türküler’s, not some some group from The Center. (Talat) 
 Sony Music, which also entered the business of producing Kurdish music 
with a subsidiary label, Pel Records (based in Germany, although they have an office 
in Beyoglu and not in Unkapani) has produced (a) the latest albums of some of the 
world-wide famous artists of Kurdish music, such as Şivan Perwer and Ciwan Haco 
and (b) taken over some of the younger popular Turkey-based artists, such as Aynur 
and Rojin. Sony’s entrance to the market has been interpreted by most of my 
informants - particularly by producers and performers - in both the political segment 
and the world music segment as opportunism. 
The “Independents” - A Subsegment of  The World Music Scene 
There are a number of groups/artists who, rather than pursuing longstanding 
agreements or contracts with recording companies (and the ideological / political 
stance or financial entanglements that such affiliations bring about), produce and 
perform music in a more “independent” manner. A common ground amongst these 
artists/groups is that they are somewhat critical of the way music is produced and 
Kurdish culture is “represented” by the companies in Unkapanı and, and are looking 
for novel ways in which they can engage in self-expression. This is, perhaps, best 
explained by a quote from Kerem, the rock musician. He complains that all of the 
companies in Unkapanı have a certain opinion on what Kurdish music should 
“sound” like – if a Kurdish music album does not feature any bağlama, for example, 
the producers are unlikely to produce it. When he and his band-members took a 
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demo to a number of companies, none of them were interested, because their work 
did not conform to certain stereotypes: 
There is an understanding, with which people want to dress Kurdish music, to 
dress the Kurdish arts. And this is, at least to some extent, accepted (by the 
artists). What is this? Kurds sing songs with le le lo lo. … everybody expects 
that you take your saz in your hand, and you start to sing and play. But this is 
no longer the case, we tried to explain, along with some other other artists, 
that this was no longer the case. … I suppose [it will be different for future 
generations’ musicians]. (Kerem, performer) !
 The independents have a hard time finding ways to “sell” their work (through 
albums or live performances). Opportunities for performance are still irregular, and 
sometimes do not even generate any revenue. Many bands and artists still perform at 
festivals on a volunteer basis, or they “rent” concert spaces and try to bring in 
revenue from ticket sales. Because being a professional musician does not provide a 
steady income, many musicians are obliged to hold regular day-jobs. Other options 
that might be available to non-Kurdish musicians – such as busking – are also not 
perceived to be feasible. Political events (“evening programs”) often hire artists and 
groups that are affiliated with the political music segment.  Kerem notes that he and 
his band are able to perform live very infrequently, and these performances require a 
lot of effort on their part: 
Kerem: We recently gave a concert in Diyarbakır. We usually take stage at 
events held by this organization and that... at the latest one, Diyarbakır Sanat 
Merkezi (Diyarbakır Center for the Arts) invited us. It was a concert without a 
budget. They say, we’ll pay your travel expenses, can you come? We said 
yes… but some of our friends there are people who try to make a living out of 
music… You go from here to Diyarbakır, you give a concert, then you come 
here and organize a concert for yourself. And there are two concerts you can 
give per year, one is a concert in Diyarbakır without even a budget, and the 
$241
other is here where you rent a bar and give a concert there. You try to survive, 
somehow. 
A: That’s how you did the concert at [well-known performance hall that 
features world music]? 
K: Yes we went there and had a talk, then we gave some tickets at our friends 
at the universities, asked them if they could sell them, and they did. 
A: So you basically rented the hall? 
K: Exactly. A friend who lives abroad came in the summer and said, “you 
should rent a minibus, put your instruments in it, and take it all with you, go 
around the country and give concerts on every town square.” Yeah right 
[laughs] He thinks it’s all so easy, he lives in America, that’s [what they do] 
there. No way you can do that here! !
 While Kerem and his band members are personally politically supporters of 
the Kurdish movement (one member of the band is the vice-mayor of a city in the 
region), other independent artists who do not demonstrate political engagement with 
the movement might have an even more difficult time. A published interview with 
Jan Axin in 2006 hints towards tensions between an independent artist and the 
political music segment : 
Interviewer: Do you think dominant Kurdish politics is systematically 
opposed to musicians like yourself who are not engaged [with the 
movement]? 
Jan Axin: This is a very difficult question. Well, who am I [what is my 
significance] that they should maintain a systematical political stance against 
me? But, this much is for sure, a politician always looks at whether you are 
on the same side as him/her and acts accordingly. Of course, anyone who is 
involved with the arts tries to build his own structure, within his own world. 
Despite the presence of a politics that ostracizes this, I am trying to persist. 
But at the end of the day, we all share the same past. Therefore I don’t want to 
say that they are trying to ostracize us. We are pretty much bothered by the 
same things in this world. What more could you ask for? But I would have 
liked to receive some support … I’m not doing anything wrong, after all. !
$242
 Artists and groups who work in closer association with production companies 
and cultural are sometimes able to make use of the producers’ connections – one 
producer noted that artists sometimes ask them for help, and producers find 
themselves acting as agents, managers, and publicists for the artists and bands. 
However, Kerem’s band is completely independent – having no affiliation with 
production companies, recording studios, and other organizations, they rarely get 
invited to the events in which other groups perform, and therefore have to hunt out 
performance opportunities, often renting venues with their own resources and hoping 
to make a profit through their share of ticket sales. Once again, this situation is quite 
different from what young, and “independent” Turkish artists experience. Jale, an 
Arab-Turkish artist currently affiliated with Ada Müzik, has narrated how her earlier 
years were also full of struggles to receive recognition from a recording label. Her 
earlier experiences included regular performances as the lead singer of a “house 
band” at a jazz club, writing jingles for commercials, and singing at promotional 
events, finally being signed on by a major record label, thanks to connections that led 
her to become “mentored” by a famous singer-songwriter. However, this story of 
“ascent” includes elements that are unavailable to most, if not all, singers who 
perform in Kurdish. Thus, artists and groups un-affiliated with any recording 
company, and performing in Kurdish, have even more difficulties in becoming full-
time artists and receiving recognition, when compared to (a) Turkish artists/groups, 
and (b) Kurdish artists/groups who are affiliated with organizations or record 
companies.  
 In the case of Kerem’s band, however, they have managed to form a 
following. Kerem notes that, during their first “major” concert, at the performance 
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hall they rented (which often features Balkan music), the audience was quite sizable, 
and were singing along to their songs. The venue’s managers, surprised by and 
delighted at this level of attention, actually asked them how soon they could schedule 
their next performance. Kerem’s band went on to perform at a few other similar 
performance halls, including Musa’s performance venue. However, Kerem was still 
somewhat pessimistic about the future of the group. They had produced three albums 
on their own efforts – working on every single aspect of the process on their own, 
recording in their “home studio” (to the complaint of neighbors), making their own 
graphics for the album cover, promoting themselves through the website Myspace, 
selling their CDs through their own connections. He doubted that they would ever 
make a fourth album. 
 Another “independent” group I interviewed was composed of four young 
men in their early 20s (two of whom were not Kurdish) who had yet to produce any 
albums. They were at a stage where they had a repertoire, but were trying to decide 
how to proceed. Unsure whether they fit into either the world music or the political 
music segments, they were seeking advice from a more senior musician who worked 
with Kalan (and whom I interviewed, which is how I came to meet them). Quite 
distinct from many other musicians I interviewed, they sang in a mix of different 
languages and dialects: their songs, they told me, mixed Kurmanji and Zazaki 
(Kurdish dialects) with Turkish, English, and French. Describing their style as a 
musical analogue of “Brechtian” theater – incorporating many different musical 
styles and samples in one song, they were obviously outside the more “typical” or 
“mainstream” segments of wedding singers, political musicians, and even world 
music- actors. They described their music as follows: 
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We do make music that is somewhat close to traditional Kurdish music, but it 
also does not fit certain molds, so we can’t really call it a completely 
traditional Kurdish music. I mean, there are some traditional forms of 
Kurdish music, we use them, with an emphasis on Zazaki, Asım is from Hınıs 
and I am from Kiğı, so there is a musical world that we grew up in... so we do 
have a tendency towards Kurdish music, but we also don’t want to be limited 
by Zazaki, we don’t think our style is quite like that. We make a music that is 
quite avant-garde. (Hüseyin, performer) !
Another group member, Hasan, explained their style even further: 
We took inspiration from Brecht, on his concept of alienation, and how it has 
been used in theater, how we can use it in music … we try to apply that on 
some of our compositions. Our aim is, whether on stage or whether someone 
turns on the music and starts to listen, we don’t want to trap that person inside 
the music. If there is pain there is pain, but we don’t want to leave that person 
inside the pain, we want to leave them outside of it. Because in the 
mainstream forms, when people [start listening to] tonal music, they get lost 
in it. … in a Hollywood movie, if a thousand people enter the cinema they 
emerge as one. But with the Brechtian cinematic language, a thousand people 
…emerge as a thousand. In cinema, Godard has applied this style, in theater, 
Brecht has applied this. We question how we can do this with music. (Hasan, 
performer) !
 The reason I present a detailed description of this group’s activities is to draw 
a comparison between the concerns and logics (social, political, and artistic) of 
musicians who came of age with the strong influence of political organizations and 
the social movement, with younger musicians who were not necessarily involved 
with these organizational structures, or the ethos of the political movement. While 
they have somewhat similar musical influences – the young musicians often also 
count Şivan Perwer, Ciwan Haco, the dengbej and prominent Alevi musicians among 
the music they grew up on – they “problematize” their identities and express their 
relationship to their communities in different ways. These young musicians, who 
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grew up in Istanbul, are much more concerned with artistic expression on a more 
individual level. The older musicians I interviewed, particularly those performing 
music that drew from the “agitative” tradition, were concerned with a political and 
communal Kurdish identity. The younger musicians see this politicized and 
populistic approach inevitable for the 1990s: “Had we been doing music 20 years 
earlier, we probably would have had the same mentality” says one group member, 
but they do not find this approach as relevant today as it used to be. 
!
4.3.3 Segment 3: The “Commercial Segment” 
The findings I present in this section are based on my interviews with actors from the 
“political segment" and the “world segment.” According to these actors, there is a 
segment in the market that produces “easy to consume” commercial music. The 
production values are “low,” the albums cost significantly lower to produce, the 
songs are not necessarily original but are re-interpretations of popular songs. 
Moreover, many performers in this segment do not record albums, but merely play 
music live at weddings, celebrations, and at türkü bars. With the exception of an 
informal conversation with a performer, I did not interview any actors from this 
segment. Yet, I felt it is necessary to discuss here how the more “dominant” actors in 
the field perceive of this segment, and how they distinguish themselves, morally and 
politically as well as artistically by referring to themselves as contra this segment.  
The actors of the political segment - particularly those who were active in the 1990s - 
see the commercially orientation as adopted by producers and artists who don’t care 
much about the politics and see the music as a way of making money. These are, 
incidentally, people who who have not “paid the price” in the past. In a sense, these 
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people have no excuse - whereas the early 90s performers and producers were 
burdened with the difficulties and restrictions and thus sometimes had to forego 
“quality”, in recent years this is no longer the case. Thus, “just anyone” can become 
involved in production and performance. Ismail notes how the relationship between 
market actors in this model is a purely financial one, and ends his observation on a 
moral note: 
You see that some have really turned it into a [profit-making scheme], and 
there are some channels, local TV channels [that broadcast such music]. It’s 
like whoever pays [gets their video to be broadcast], we see all these absurd 
music videos, and absurd songs, bad voices, really terrible things. But this 
public does not deserve this! [E bu halk buna layık değil!] (Ismail) !
“This public” deserves to be bequeathed with proper music - What is unspoken but 
understood is that this public, that has undergone such difficulties and repression and 
taken part in a great struggle, hence this deserving status.  
Arabesk and Halay 
Two genres that surged in the 2000s, the arabesk genre and some versions of govend/
halay (dance music), were cast as artistically and morally problematic, particularly 
by actors in the political segment. By directing critiques at the arabesk and “wedding 
music” performers, the actors in the political segment were able to constitute 
themselves as morally correct actors as opposed to those that they perceived and 
demarcated as commercially motivated.  This demarcation is linked to the changing 
meanings of “success” in the post-2000 period. In the 1990s, when the political ethos 
was dominant, actors based success in relation to their ability to awaken  patriotic 
feelings, to mobilize support for the movement, and the ability to keep performing in 
a politically tense atmosphere. Artist Ismail’s narrative that I quoted in the previous 
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chapter, on how people applauded them, not just for the music, but for their part in a 
(cultural) struggle, gives an idea of at least one way that “success” was evaluated. 
Other factors such as album sales, concert attendance, requests to appear on Roj TV, 
and an artist’s/ group’s ability to make money were lesser measures of success in the 
1990s, or were deemed as “success” to the extent that they indicated the support of 
the public for the pro-movement musical activities. Yet in the post-2000 era, these 
“typical” market-based measures of success seem to play a stronger role in 
encouraging people to take part in the music scene & market. Thus, the political 
actors are foremostly disdainful of what they see as a “dilution” of the meaning of 
success, and are also upset that such parameters of success (which they refer to as a 
“lack of standards”) leads to the prevalence of “arabesk”, “halay” forms of music 
that they see as “easy to consume.”  
 Many performers who entered the scene in the 2000s, by engaging in 
commercially motivated musical production, are blamed for benefiting from the 
“prices paid” by the actors of the 1990s music scene. In Ismail’s words: 
… we started to see that there were people just coming out, taking advantage 
of this [peace] process and who have no affiliation with any organization or 
anything, they are one by one making albums and that atmosphere, which had 
been created by all that sacrifice and all that labor, in a sense that atmosphere 
started to be used by others. And in that period, people who had previously 
never opened their mouths, let alone [express] their Kurdishness, suddenly 
they started to become the kings and queens of Kurdish music. I don’t want to 
name any names, but I think you can see for yourself, when you look back at 
the years 2001, 2002, who emerged, people who hadn’t been in the market 
before, and suddenly they took over all that [history] as if they had carried 
[Kurdish music] to this day, as though they had been the ones who labored. 
So then it became a market, a serious economic market. These artists who did 
this only for the money, who made songs just for weddings, only halay 
albums, started to emerge. Of course, perhaps some of them were true artists, 
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but I’d say 70 to 80 percent are people who don’t know anything about this 
[past struggle], they started becoming known with one song, one music video. 
(Ismail) !
 Ismail’s terming the post-2000 period as “so then it became a market” [pazar 
haline geldi] is particularly noteworthy here - he sees the political scene of the 1990s 
as somehow transcending, or existing outside of, “the market.” In contrast to the 
politically motivated producers who emphasized their lack of interest in making 
profit from Kurdish music, the commercial segment actors were blamed for having 
produced/performing solely with the commercial intentions, or attaining fame. These 
companies are often accused of making low-quality productions and for not paying 
royalties if they used songs that have already been registered in the names of other 
artists. Moreover, as the argument goes, these performers and companies were able to 
find a place in the market thanks to the efforts of the pioneers in the past who had 
“paid the price.” Ismail’s quote is exemplary in this sense: 
There are so many [small] companies, many of them very make-shift, they 
are owned by a single person, the guy goes and establishes a company in his 
own name and distributes [the productions] by hand. Maybe they’re not even 
legal, they might even use fake bandrols. They do it informally, they form 
local studios, production companies, and both produce and distribute the 
albums … like piracy, on the local level. You don’t even need to form a 
company, you buy an original CD and you make copies, distribute personally 
… you can make a color photocopy [of the album cover] … there are lot’s of 
these makeshift companies. This also means that our labor is stolen. (Ismail) !
A number of different factors are cited, by the political music segment  actors, behind 
the popularization of “commercially-oriented” music and the emergence of these 
makeshift companies – including, especially, the “halay singers”. One is that the 
Kurdish public actually encourages this type of commercial production, which is 
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easy to listen and dance to. Ismail to a certain extent blames the public who has not 
quite grasped what the “right” music should sound like - in other words, the audience 
of this music is seen as lacking cultural capital: 
The public has not really understood [what art is about], the public doesn’t 
really know. The public likes popular stuff, love [songs]. They haven’t yet 
reached an artistic [maturity], and thus they [don’t know] what kind of music 
they need, what kind of music it should be… they don’t know what is the 
type of music, or art, or type of artist that is appropriate to their life styles. 
They look at it very spontaneously. They look, and if they like the song, they 
don’t even really look at the lyrics, but if they find the music pleasant. Or if 
the song contains some [words or phrases] that they like, they say, oh how 
lovely, and they support [the singer], they hire [the singer] for their wedding, 
they even sponsor [the singer]. They sponsor what they like, but not the right 
thing. I’ve witnessed that many wealthy, economically well-off people have 
supported not Kurdish artists, but other people. !
“Arabesk” on the other hand is blamed for being regressive, and for being grounded 
in Turkish influence. Some interviewees cited Abdullah Ocalan’s claim that the 
Turkish state promoted certain arabesk singers (such as Emrah, Ceylan, Ibrahim 
Tatlises) who were of Kurdish origin, to perform arabesk in Turkish, as a way to 
pacify Kurds. Xemgin Birhat, in a published interview, explains the reason for 
arabesk’s popularity - and the problems that are associated with this popularity - as 
follows: 
 … in the 90s, the Kurds migrated to the metropoles, and met with serious  
 economic and  social problems. At the same time, the leadership [önderlik, 
 which refers to Abdullah Öcalan] was arrested and the movement for freedom 
 underwent political transformations.  This led to a serious depression in the 
 Kurdish community. … arabesk music [became popular] because it addressed 
 these feelings. [In this music] what addressed our community’s feelings were 
 such themes as the unfairness of life, sometimes a fatalistic  attitude and  
 sometimes suggestions for solutions. So what is the problem here? The   
 problem is that this lifestyle and the music that is associated with this type is 
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 distant from the authentic Kurdish culture and fighter personality. If you look 
 at these friends who perform  arabesk music, you will find arabesk  motifs in 
 their appearances, their lifestyles, the cars that they drive. So what is being 
 criticized here is not the music but actually the life philosophy it represents. 
 (interview with Yeni Özgür Politika, cited online ) 35!
 In both critiques, it is possible to see the dissatisfaction as part of a failed 
attempt to shape Kurdish lives and identities in a way that aligns with the Kurdish 
movement. Nonetheless, in addition to the demands of the audience, the dynamics of 
the market are also blamed for the abundance of low-quality, low-cost productions. 
As several informants have admitted, working as a band/artist “for hire” is an 
economically viable option. In the 90s, when cassette sales were plentiful – despite 
pirated copies (which, allegedly, sometimes were put in circulation by the producers 
themselves) – the revenues from sales were almost guaranteed to exceed production 
costs. In such a context, firm owners/ producers were willing to finance the 
production of new albums, especially if it was an artist that they trusted would “make 
money”. But after digital media (first mp3s, then later online streaming) created a 
heavy dent on album (now CD) sales, producers stopped being willing – or, in some 
cases, able – to finance productions. Rather, they expected the artist to shoulder most 
of the cost, and would share in the revenues after the album was in the market. 
Within this scheme, artists and production companies alike complain that they make 
very little to no money.  
 Performers in the “commercial segment” sometimes produce one album or 
two that they use as a “business card,” as one performer from this segment noted. 
The album gives potential hirers an idea of what the music sounds like. Thus, the 
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performer, who often has to finance the album costs, thinks of it as an investment for 
making a living through performing at weddings and other celebrations. There are 
many performers who do not even produce a single - yet they may have a music 
video that they circulate on the internet or on the increasing number of Kurdish-
language private television channels broadcasting locally or through satellite. Word 
of mouth and informal networks are still an important device for these performers to 
gain commercial success.  
 It should be noted, moreover,  that several of the performers within the 
political segment also make a living through performing at weddings, bars, and 
political events - otherwise they have to hold “day-jobs” to be able to perform music 
as a second career. As mentioned, there are a limited number of venues where 
Kurdish groups and singers were able to perform. Ismail notes that four or five 
weddings a month can contribute to making a decent living. These “wedding 
singers”, he notes, “don’t have any concern for going somewhere, giving concerts, 
saying ‘look this is what Kurdish music is like’.” Yet, the political segment singers, 
even if they have to make a living through similar means, are seen as embodying 
political ideals, and working to instill them in their audience. 
 In addition to weddings, music is often performed live at “türkü bars,” which 
are venues in which  a singer and musicians perform a mix of popular folk music – 
often starting with Turkish, and through the long night, mixing it up with Kurdish, 
ending with long rounds of halay. Musa, the owner of a bar/performance hall that 
features performers from the world music segment (as well as some political-
segment), for instance, frames his venue as the opposite of the türkü bar. He says, of 
the younger, more urban audience:  
$252
People are disgusted by the bar culture, they are disgusted because they have 
observed how those places are money traps [he literally calls them “storage 
units for making money”, para kazanma deposu], they are disgusted because 
of the bad music, the low quality music that they feature. An alternative [was] 
necessary. (Musa, venue owner) !
Thus, performing particular types of music both problematized in moral terms - their 
failure to contribute to “Kurdish culture” and their non-adherence to the “Kurdish 
identity” that is favored by the movement, as well as their purely commercial 
intentions, are reasons that they are kept outside the boundaries of this field. Yet, 
working with the state-run TV channel is perceived as an even worse and more direct 
affront to the movement in addition to being opportunistic. Thus, it is a greater cause 
for disbarment.  
!
4.3.4 Segment 4 - The Challenger Segment 
Tahir’s quote that I presented in the beginning of the section - that the war has 
created its own “lifestyle” amidst widespread support from the Kurdish society, and 
that a “Kurdish society has been created,” as well as Xemgin Birhat’s comments on 
arabesk not adhering to the fighter ethos, are both grounded in the idea that there is a 
morally “right” kind of Kurdish society and Kurdish individual: one that embodies 
the ideological and moral tenets of the pro-Kurdish movement, and which enacts this 
pro-movement orientation in different aspects of their lives, from the music that they 
choose to listen to the way they present themselves in terms of bodily and other 
consumption practices. Yet, there are obviously alternative and competing 
“Kurdishness”es that are at play within Turkey - and these “other” Kurds are also 
envisioned as the internal (as opposed to the Turkish-external) Others. Gurbuz (2012) 
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has noted that prominent Kurds, or pro-Kurdish figures, who receive the “traitor” 
label in the recent years are those who were perceived to be collaborating or 
ideologically aligning with the AKP - the ruling political party which, according to 
several of my interviewees, has its own agenda of creating “proper Kurdish citizen” 
subjects who are pro-Islam, pro-government and anti-separation (which can refer to 
federation / autonomy / …). The Kurdish politician, Emine Ayna, has been quoted as 
stating “No one who becomes a [parliamentary] candidate through the AKP can 
[rightfully] say ‘I am a Kurd’. This is unacceptable, because AKP’s policies deny the 
Kurds” (quoted in Tezcur 2009). Thus, the traitor (in Kurmanji, “ceş”) trope has been 
employed as a powerful way of drawing moral boundaries amongst “rightful” Kurds 
and those who are not. Thus, the market is another place where proper Kurdishness is 
embodied and enacted - whereas the boundaries are drawn against those who do not 
embody and enact this propriety.  
 The state, in the late 2000s, took on a new role - in addition to its place as the 
“oppressive other,” it also became more involved in Kurdish cultural production, 
particularly through TRT-6, the state-run television channel. On one hand, many 
Kurds signed up to work with/for TRT-6 and saw it as a favorable development. On 
the other hand, TRT-6 was disparaged, particularly by pro-movement actors, as yet 
another effort by the state to “assimilate the Kurds” – this time, by instrumentalizing 
Kurdish language as a tool for assimilation. Kurdish individuals who joined TRT-6 
were likewise disdained, with some prominent individuals labeled as “traitors” by 
pro-movement actors and media, and TRT Şeş dubbed as “TRT Ceş” in a humorous 
twist. An exemplary pro-movement reaction to TRT-6 can be found in a press release 
issued by the MKM (a Kurdish cultural center in Istanbul). This press release was 
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read by a Kurdish stage actor, and was attended by artists, members of BDP (the pro-
Kurdish party) including MP Sebahat Tuncel. The release directly addresses the state 
and expresses anger towards various policies which, throughout the years, restricted 
the usage of Kurdish language and the performance of Kurdish music. The recurring 
theme in the speech is one of skepticism: that the initiative and the TV channel are 
mere ploys employed by the AKP to receive more votes from the Kurds. This 
statement serves not only to voice opposition against the state, but also to warn the 
Kurdish public - the moral boundaries thus are re-enforced. 
 In a morally precarious position, in the eyes of the political segment, are 
performers and public figures who choose to work with TRT. The singer Rojin, who 
accepted the offer to present a daily talk show, for example, was subject to much 
disdain. In interviews, she states that she has even received threats - an account that 
was, in fact, verified by an acquaintance of mine affiliated with The Center. The 
decision of Nilüfer Akbal to host her own program on TRT-6 was also met with 
surprise amongst the political-actors: one musician told me that he and Ms. Akbal 
used to be friends, but following her deal with TRT, he had “stopped saying hello to 
her.” Artists who work with Kalan, Ada, or Sony (or other companies that are outside 
the political segment) on the other hand, did not provoke such strong reactions from 
the pro-movement actors. For instance, Aynur was referred to as producer from the 
“political music” segment as a “friend.” While some disdain existed amongst some 
artists and producers with regards to the attention she received from Turkish 
mainstream media, she was not referred to, as a person or an artist, in negative terms. 
(According to an informant from the “world music” segment, Aynur was offered to 
present her own music program on TRT-6, but she declined). 
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 Rojin’s involvement with TRT started on an optimistic declarations from pro-
government sources as well as the artist herself. Noting that she saw the 
establishment of TRT-6 as a sign of goodwill, Rojin also put symbolic distance 
between herself and the pro-movement actors: 
My purpose has always been for all the [audience] in this country to hear me. 
That’s why I sang my songs in Turkish and Kurdish, despite having stones 
thrown at me. … Some of the people who criticized me [later] also sang in 
both Turkish and Kurdish. This means I was doing it right. I was criticized for 
wearing comfortable clothes, and for putting on makeup, when I taught 
lessons at some organizations. Now I see that those who criticized me are 
walking around dressed in punk attire. What TRT has taken is a historical 
step. Artists who were previously unable to make their voices heard in Turkey 
will be able to do so through the state channel. (Quote from Özarslan 2009 ) 36!
 Only a few months later, however, Rojin’s contract with TRT was terminated. 
While TRT blamed the artist for her consistent tardiness, Rojin denied these claims, 
and issued a press release in which she argued that she was given no agency in her 
“own” program: 
… there were such pressures on me and my program that it was evident 
[they] were trying to empty the program of all its content and cause it to 
finish its life cycle. Imagine a program presenter, who goes into her own 
program without knowing what the topic will be and who the guests will be. 
That the programmer’s – that is, my -  recommendations for guests are 
completely disregarded; many things I say on air are [censored], everything is 
interfered with. That [they] treat the program as a potential crime, and me as a 
potential criminal. Of course this station was one of the most important steps 
in the historical process of the Kurdish problem, one of the most important 
developments, and it was expected that not everything could happen at once. 
It wasn’t hard to imagine that some limitations would be placed, but I could 
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not accept these [limitations] to exceed [a certain point] and that I would be 
completely disregarded . 37!
 It seems – at least according to Rojin herself – that neither the Center, nor the 
TRT allowed her to “present” herself and her program in a manner that she found 
suitable – in effect, it can be read that she has, at different times, resisted both sides 
of these “hegemonic” forces (Turkish state and the Kurdish Movement) that have 
tried to shape Kurdish subjectivities. However, she was unable to fit into either of 
these spheres. After Rojin left, her program was taken over by singer Berdan 
Mardini. One of my informants expressed anger at Mardini, noting off the record that 
Mardini had never sung a word of Kurdish before 2009, yet now he was being 
promoted by the state as “the prince of Kurdish music.” 
 An account somewhat similar to Rojin’s was told to me by Melih, a journalist 
who worked for TRT-6 when it was initially founded. He noted (in an unrecorded 
informal conversation) that even though he had a pro-movement history, he felt that 
the government’s move, through the establishment of a TRT station, was a step in the 
right direction. He moreover felt that TRT-6 provided jobs for Kurdish speakers, 
which was a positive development. However, after working there for a number of 
months, he too quit, as he had a hard time getting along with the (Turkish) 
management.   
 The pro-movement stance has argued that the state, via TRT, is attempting to 
pacify and “water down” the Kurdish identity, by featuring only halay or “folkloric” 
music, and not very high-quality ones at that; i.e. with simplistic musical 
instrumentation relying on electrical instruments rather than virtuosity of acoustics, 
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and also sung with incorrect lyrics or diction. This type of music, as the argument 
goes, is simplistic and easy to consume – both alienating audience from stylistically 
more complex genres, and also encouraging musicians to produce this type of easy-
to-sell music. Thus, a pro-movement morality, which is dedicated to the 
“advancement” of Kurdish culture to higher, “global” standards, frowns upon such 
production and consumption. Moreover, they framed the channel as refraining from 
the word “Kurdistan” and demonstrating support for the Turkish military. An 
overarching theme in their criticism was that TRT-6 was not “really" Kurdish- it was 
an epitome of an assimilated and pro-government – and thus inauthentic - version of 
Kurdishness.  
 Another issue that infuriated pro-movement actors (as well as some world 
music segment actors) was TRT’s usage of their copyrighted material without paying 
royalties. While TRT, in the beginning, had requested music videos from production 
companies, and asked if their affiliated artists would prepare programs for TRT, most 
of the Unkapanı firms had not complied. When I asked the reasons, in an interview 
in 2011, Nizam noted:  
[TRT-6] emerged suddenly and we still don’t know exactly what they’re 
doing. I mean, right now still some words, some letters are prohibited, other 
people can’t use them anywhere else, but they are allowed to use them on 
TRT-Şeş. Now, in some places, some letters, like w, q and x, they are 
prohibited, but TRT-Şeş is allowed to use them. That is inappropriate. 
(Nizam, producer) !
 Despite the companies’ refusal, TRT-6 aired songs performed by many 
popular Kurdish-singing artists – including Aram Tigran, Ciwan Haco – 
accompanied by “music videos” put together in the TRT studios consisting mostly of 
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stock footage of the Kurdish-populated cities. One such example is the video for Ay 
Dilbere, performed by Aram Tigran, which is accompanied by scenes of daily life 
from the historical sites and markets in Diyarbakir, Urfa, and other towns in the 
region. The video has been uploaded by a user onto the streaming video site youtube, 
and several commentators draw attention to the allegation that the government did 
not allow Aram Tigran to be interred in Diyarbakir (he passed away in Armenia) as 
had been proposed by the BDP-led Diyarbakir municipality. Yet, according to the 
commentators, the government (which they felt was being represented by TRT) 
shamelessly broadcast Tigran’s song.  
 Other actors also have entered into the efforts to “define” different 
“Kurdishness”es through arts and television broadcasting. One such effort is Dünya 
TV, which, admittedly, was rarely mentioned in my interviews (with the exception of 
Nizam, who mentioned that Dünya TV also played their music without permission or 
paying royalties) – the “Other”  was, most commonly, TRT-6. Dünya TV is 
reportedly owned by the Gülen Foundation (Gurbuz 2012), and broadcasts culture 
and music in addition to religious programs in Kurdish. One interviewee (Dicle) also 
mentioned that the TV station Kurdiyek, founded by the Kurdish Cultural Institute in 
Paris (whose pro-Kurdish orientation is somewhat distinct from the pro-PKK line), 
was also opposed by PKK. Dicle thinks this is to be expected within the flow of 
things – “they are opening a new shop right across the street from your shop” – an 
analogy for describing the rivalry between efforts to hold the authoritative position in 
terms of arts, culture, and identity – and such rivalry is often marked by each of the 
opposing parties calling the other a traitor or a poseur. 
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 A final and significant observation I made regarding the government’s foray 
into the Kurdish music scene was the “return” of Şivan Perwer to Diyarbakır in late 
2013. Perwer made a series of public appearances with then prime minister Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan. Throughout the years leading up to 2013, Perwer had had a number 
of falling outs with the PKK-line Kurdish movement. An informant told me that 
PKK members had even accosted Perwer on the street in Europe, once, and had 
broken his bağlama. (“It was a good bağlama, too” noted my informant, with slight 
bemusement.) Perwer’s visit was seen by some Kurds as an unnecessary alignment 
with the government, and a betrayal of the “struggle.” Some reactions I read in the 
social media went as far as proclaiming that “[they] would throw away every single 
Perwer recording [they] own and never listen to him again” whereas others were less 
harsh but equally sorrowful. Journalist and academic Mahmut Çınar, for instance, 
lamented Perwer’s return as “someone else” and not his true self (Çınar 2013 ). 38
 This turn of events forms a stark contrast to the initial “return” of Ciwan 
Haco – a singer and songwriter who never lived within the borders of Turkey, to 
begin with, but was from a family that was originally from the city of Mardin. Haco 
was raised in and exiled from the neighboring town of Qamishlo across the border of 
Syria. His first concert in Turkey took place in 2003, in the city of Batman, and was 
attended by 300 thousand people (which was more than the city’s population). His 
second concert in the hometown of his musical imagination, Diyarbekir/Diyarbakır, 
was reportedly attended by 1 million people. The documentary “The Road to 
Diyarbekir” depicts the excitement and wild energy surrounding his “return,” 
juxtaposing the joy, anxiety, and sorrow of Haco with an overflow of emotions from 
$260
 http://bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/151398-hazin-bir-donus-hikayesi38
the Kurdish audience, some of whom are seen wearing colorful dresses that are 
normally reserved for weddings and Newroz celebrations, on the way to the concert. 
One imagines that under different circumstances, and after following a different 
trajectory, Perwer’s return would have generated double or triple the audience and 
emotions. Yet, it generated tentative appreciation from pro-government Kurds at best, 
and moral indignation from Kurds who distance themselves from the government, at 
worst. 
 Kurds perceived to be pro-state or pro-government were deemed “traitors” 
and sometimes targeted by the PKK-line movement in the 1990s, as well - as in the 
examples of village guards who were executed by the PKK. However,  a pro-state 
“producer identity” did not emerge as part of my data regarding the 1990s. There 
were singers of Kurdish origin in the marketplace - some of them performed music 
that was adapted or translated from Kurdish songs (traditional as well as newer 
compositions), but many of them did not overlap into performing Kurdish music 
until the 2000s. Such singers as Ibrahim Tatlises, Mahsun Kirmizigul, Ozcan Deniz 
(who, incidentally, is the nephew of Sakiro, a famed dengbej) are often viewed in a 
rather negative light by the pro-movement Kurds and the “political segment” actors.   
!!
4.4 Discussion 
In this chapter, I explored the changes - and in particular, the segmentation of - the 
market that accompanied the gradual lessening of state-imposed restrictions during 
the 2000s. With the relaxation of restrictions, producing, performing, and circulating 
Kurdish music ceased to carry some of the risks it carried in the 1990s. Following the 
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gradual lessening of surveillance, censorship, album recalls, and court cases, the 
scene became more open to a variety of producer-identities, rather than being limited 
to those who were politically motivated and thus willing to bear the risks. I detailed 
that, while the political-normative logic continued to be influential for some 
companies, performers, and other actors; a variety of other companies, employing 
different (combinations of) logics, emerged in the scene. This is in line with the 
argument that the heterogeneity of logics held within an industry accounts for 
different practices and also is linked to the segmentation of the market (Goodrick and 
Reay 2011; Kraatz and Block 2008; Marquis and Lounsbury 2007;  Thornton, Jones, 
and Kury 2005).  
 While there was a degree of diversity in the market in the 1990s, there was 
still a more or less “market culture” (Spillman 1999) around which the actors and 
audience united. Thus, I find that segmentation is contingent upon changes in the 
institutional environment in ways that provide opportunity space for the market. In 
the case of Kurdish market, this was brought about by changes in legislations, which 
was also followed by gradual changes in societal norms and understandings 
regarding Kurdish music. Developments in the social and political sphere were, 
moreover, accompanied by changes in the broader music market, and in particular, 
the popularization of a world music/ ethnic music scene in Istanbul. With a growing 
number of Kurdish artists also finding a place within this scene, a “world music 
segment,” which attributed a higher weight to the artistic logic, also emerged. The 
producers and performers within this segment, moreover, are gradually becoming 
included in the more mainstream music and nightlife scene: thus, one of the emergent 
segments is slowly heading towards widespread recognition and legitimation. The 
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pro-government “challenger” segment emerged after the government’s “Kurdish 
Initiative” project, and in particular in connection with the state-broadcaster, TRT, 
establishing a Kurdish language channel. Finally, the more relaxed political 
atmosphere also led to the emergence of a “commercial segment” shaped 
predominantly by a commercial logic.  
 Segmentation also corresponds to different audiences - and thus, to different 
rules, regulations, and “social imaginaries” (Spillman 1999) of the market. The 
political segment envisions a constituency that is more pro-movement. The actors of 
the world music segment envision a more educated audience that, while it may have 
ethnic affiliations, also is united by urbane-ness and the ethos of several ethnic 
groups “living together in harmony.” While there are overlaps amongst the audiences 
of these first two segments, they both also have distinct audiences. The commercial 
segment appeals to audience of lower cultural and economic capital - Kurds living in 
the “margins” of large cities, as well as some of the smaller cities and towns in the 
region. It is a convenient type of music - consumed at weddings, celebrations, or 
even for dancing on the street. The “challenger” movement envisions a “citizen” that 
is faithful to the Turkish government, and keeps a distance to the pro-Kurdish 
political-normative logic.  
 Sandıkcı and Ger (2010), in discussing the emergence and normalization of a 
parallel normative (taste) structure, also note that a diversity of “styles” started to 
emerge within this structure. By elaborating on the different processes that generated 
the different segments within the market, I contribute to this research. Moreover, by 
noting that the changes in political-normative logics and the emergence of different 
ideological positions in the market, I also show how the changing environment not 
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only leads to a “softer” style, but also to somewhat “softer,” if not less firm, 
practices. The agitative style losing its relevance, the lesser sense of collective 
identity among producers, the departures of some actors into other (e.g., world 
music) segments include some of these instances of “softening.” However, while the 
“surface” of this segment may have become somewhat softer, the boundaries remain 
erected, particularly against those who are perceived to be pro-government traitors.   
The lessening of marginalization and stigmatization both led to and also followed 
this “softening.” But, particularly for the performers and producers of the Political 
Segment, an “integration” into the mainstream market has not been possible. This is 
reflected in actors’ accounts on still finding it difficult to sell their music through 
mainstream retailers, or finding performance halls other than weddings, political 
events, and turku bars for their performers. In contrast, the (albeit limited number of) 
performers from the World Music segment have found more success: large-scale 
concerts, mainstream TV appearances became more common around the beginning 
of this decade. I conclude by noting that the relative inclusion of this segment is 
possibly due to the guiding logics and ethos being of a more “palatable” political 
variety. The political segment’s political orientation, in contrast, may still be 
perceived as too threatening, the world music scene may provide more space for 
common political grounds with a more mainstream audience. 
 The frames and meanings that shape the political-normative proto-
institutional logic (which is still influential in the political segment) have also 
changed since the 1990s, and are somewhat contingent upon the political status quo. 
Frames of grievances, activism, and national consciousness, in particular, tend to 
become more important during periods of high tension, although these frames are not 
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quite as strong as they were in the 1990s. The collective identity and, in particular, 
practices of collaboration have shifted somewhat, in connection to the drop in 
revenues and the difficulty in financing new albums. Yet, normativity remains a 
powerful tool for distinguishing amongst the collective identity within the segment, 
contra its others, in line with discussions on the role of morality in generating and 
maintaining social distinction (Lamont 1992, 2000; Saatcioglu and Ozanne 2014) 
within a market that is seemingly unified by its actors’ ethnic background and 
dominated-ness. In the 2000s, while the state remains as the external “Other” to be 
resisted against, there are now internal “Other”s that also are opposed. In other 
words, boundaries against “internal Other”s gained salience in the 2000s - whereas 
an emphasis on unity amongst actors, contra the state (and, relatedly, the Turkish 
public) was visible in my data on the 1970s, 80s, and 90s. Performers (or other 
actors) in the “challenger” segment, as well as other performers who did not partake 
in the struggles of the 1990s, are castigated to different degrees. While pro-
government actors receive the label of “traitor,” the other “internal others” are not 
derided as harshly.  
 The increased salience of boundaries towards “internal others” after the 
2000s, and the variety of the intensify and nature of these boundaries, also 
necessitates a discussion on affective distance (Karakayali 2009) within the Kurdish 
community. This salience seems to point towards two dynamics occurring 
simultaneously. On one hand, the emotional structure that is constitutive of the 
political segment, and the pro-movement public, remains strong - and continues to 
intensify, powered by continued grievances and the still somewhat contentious 
political atmosphere. Yet, the emergence of other segments also points towards the 
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lack of fixity of emotional structures. Even actors who were habituated into these 
structures may, for various reasons, change their political orientations - and in turn, 
the pro-movement actors in the market may orient themselves in a “negative” and 
exclusionary manner with regards to actors in these other segments. Thus, the 
harshness of boundaries erected amongst market segments indicates both the 
dynamics of “intensification” of some emotional alignments, but also the shifting of 
alliances and the accompanying changes in emotional orientations.  
 The social distance  (Karakayali 2009) between the political segment and the 
three new segments seems also to be of varied intensity and nature, in accordance 
with the disjuncture between the PKK-line political orientation and the ideologies/
logics which shape these “other” segments. For example, there is some “disdain” 
from the political actors towards some of the World Music actors - particularly in 
terms of the attention they receive from Turkish media, and their broader 
opportunities in finding mainstream shelf space and performance venues. 
Nonetheless, the political actors characterize their relationships with world music 
actors as “friendly,” mentioning how they  “like” or “respect” the world music actors. 
With some of the world music actors also participating in pro-movement concerts 
and events, the social distance between these two groups is not high, and is 
characterized by cordiality. Yet, the relationship between political and pro-
government (from the “Challenger segment”) actors openly hostile. Moreover, the 
way that political actors talk about the pro-government actors conveys a cultivated 
strangeness. In more than one occasion, emphasis was made on the “difference” of 
the actors in the challenger segment: they dress and behave “differently,” for 
instance. Or, refraining from “saying hello” to a performer who used to be in the 
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political segment, but who “sold out,” indicates that this performer has been 
relegated to the status of an unrecognized stranger. The changes in the socio-political 
environment seems to have laid the groundwork for competing social imaginaries of 
Kurdishness to gain visibility - with some posing more direct threats to the pro-
movement political imaginary. However, more research is needed - particularly to 
understand the ways in which members of these “other” groups perceive of their own 
alignments and their social distance. The “legitimation” of certain groups, 
individuals, and organizations, as mentioned earlier, may also be related to their fit 
with emotional structures - thus the delegitimation of certain individuals, groups, and 
organizations may also be linked with affective distance, enacted through a 
cultivation of strangeness. Thus, how and when affective orientations change, 
“strangeness” is cultivated, and even escalates into tension and violence within 
proximate groups (Karakayali 2009; see also Block 1998) within a community 
deserves further scrutiny.   
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CHAPTER 5: EPILOGUE 
!
5.1 Conclusion 
This dissertation is concerned with the emergence and evolution of a market for 
Kurdish music in Turkey, detailing the market’s entwinement with the political 
processes of community-building and its co-constitutive relationship with a resistive 
political movement. I start from the emotionally-charged, illegal, and dispersed 
practices of cassette circulation, and follow with the legal - and also centralized - 
market activities. In chapter 2, I detailed the practices of circulating cassettes that 
constituted tactical resistance (De Certeau 1988; J.C. Scott 1990) and emotionally 
shaped the “imagining” (Anderson 1983) of a community and its boundaries. I 
showed that an emotional structure that is constitutive of a resistive “community” - in 
its alignments with “us” as well as its delineation from the “other(s)” - are in part 
shaped through the emotionality generated by the circulation of music cassettes. A 
politicized collective identity thus emerged. In chapter 3, I detailed how, after 
legalization, the circulation of music encountered the dynamics of a formal music 
market, and the emergent market culture (Spillman 1999) was shaped by actors’ 
framings of their experiences as well as by their appropriations of frames from the 
Kurdish political movement. A proto-institutional logic, centered by these political-
normative frames, coordinated business and artistic practices, and also negotiated 
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field-level tensions. In chapter 4, I explored the segmentation of the market, 
following changes at the broader socio-political environment.  
 Chapter 2 is based on a standalone article (Kuruoğlu and Ger 2014) detailing 
the illegal circulation of Kurdish music cassettes in Turkey during the 1970s, 80s and 
90s.  I demonstrated the entwinement of materiality and emotionality, and discussed 
the structuring potentiality that this entwinement generated. Cassettes, as they 
circulated, materialized relationships – real and imagined, inter-personal and 
communal, associative and disruptive – and in so doing, became “sticky” (Ahmed 
2004) with the emotions they elicited. Through time, and through circulation, this 
“stickiness” intensified. As such, a nexus of materiality and emotionality emerged. As 
cassettes circulated, they also “affected” those with whom they came into contact, 
infusing people with their positive and negative emotionality, orienting them toward 
acting and feeling in ways that struck bonds as well as disconnections, and also 
perpetuated circulation. Thus, resistive practices of cassette circulation played an 
important part in shaping collective dispositions: a “structured and 
structuring” (Swartz 1997) emotional structure, or in other words, an emotional 
habitus (Kane 2001) emerged and intensified. A repertoire of cassette-centered 
experiences served to generate a sense of a unified “us” as well as of distance to the 
“other,” the state – the contentious relationship which significantly shaped the 
emotional habitus that structured this emergent community. In this way, I argued that 
objects and consumption experiences serve not only harmonious, but also divisive, 
oppositional, and resistive relationships and communalities. In that process, just as 
ideologies can be experienced as “structures of feeling” (Williams 1977, 1979; see 
also Thompson 2005), a person’s engagement with ideology and politics may be 
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shaped by emotions. Finally, I suggested that the “stickiness” and intensification of 
an emotional structure may help explain the enduring affiliations people uphold with 
certain communities and the perseverance of resistance. I thus noted that 
materialities, markets, and consumption can serve the generation and intensification 
of emotional structures that relate to the unification of communities, and the 
enactment of resistance – processes of great political import. 
 The imagining of a resistive community and its boundaries also relate to the 
cultivation of a “politicized collective identity” (Simon and Klandermans 2001) - one 
that was significantly shaped by tense and combative relationships with the state, and 
feelings of being stigmatized and marginalized (Sandıkcı and Ger 2010) or, in other 
words, of being dominated (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). Tactical, infrapolitical 
(DeCerteau 1988; Scott 1990) as well as organized resistance (Tarrow 2012) - and 
accompanying movement ideologies -  emerged as a response, and shaped circulation 
as well. While circulation helped to cultivate a resistive stance, a resistive political 
movement, led after the 1980s by the PKK, was also involved with music circulation 
while trying to disseminate its ideological agenda. With legalization in 1991, 
circulation was legalized:   carried out in a centralized, but also state-regulated (and 
restricted) manner: thus, circulation became a “business” that took place at the 
juncture of state regulation and the resistance against the state. How a market culture 
emerged and evolved, and how actors navigated this process at this juncture was my 
concern in chapter 3.  
 The stigmatization and domination of the Kurdish constituency translated into 
difficulties gaining access to and attaining legitimacy (W.R. Scott 1994) within 
“mainstream culture.” Market actors who had been habituated into the resistive-
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politicized collective identity, however, continued to enact their roles as producers, 
performers, arrangers, studio engineers, distributors, and retailers of Kurdish music. 
“Framing” stands out as a rhetorical device that shaped market culture. Pre-legal 
experiences of music circulation, as well as the lived “local” experiences after 
legalization, were framed: market actors “diagnosed” their situation - particularly 
their grievances related to their disadvantaged position both in larger society and 
within the music market - and they also “prognosed” appropriate market practices 
and activities. Moreover, interactions with the Kurdish political movement took place 
- while the movement’s frames were appropriated by market actors, the movement 
also appropriated music circulation toward its pursuits. Music - the “object” of 
exchange -was seen as an important device for disseminating ideology, awakening 
political consciousness, and for serving and showcasing Kurdish “culture” - 
particularly in terms of “progress.” Grievances, particularly as experienced with the 
state, served as motivation rather than deterrence, for engaging with the market. 
Business practices were accordingly shaped in ways that would serve the collective 
goals of the community: producers perceived of themselves as “activists” of a 
political cause; collaborations were made and networks were formed, motivated by 
this politically-grounded collective identity. Artistic and commercial decisions 
similarly took on a political bend. 
 As such, I detailed how a market that does not adhere to broader level societal 
norms, values and understandings, and only partially sanctioned by the law can 
nonetheless exist as an “alternative” marketplace. Its “alternative”ness is not 
necessarily volitional - but is inherently linked to the socio-political environment, 
and the way that its actors frame and respond to the structural conditions that both 
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enable and restrain them. I showed that the political-normative frames that actors 
generate, adapt, and articulate, became entrenched in the market throughout the 
1990s, and shaped the “normal” way of performing Kurdish music, producing 
Kurdish-language albums, and in general, doing business in the market for Kurdish 
music. An alternative “legitimate” order, an accordant political-normative “proto-
institutional” (Lawrence et al. 2002) logic, and a particular market culture thus 
emerged. The political-normative logic not only addressed the tensions at the societal 
level - particularly as experienced in relation to the state and in terms of 
stigmatization and exclusion from mainstream culture - that are reflected at the level 
of the field of music production; but also addressed and negotiated the field-specific 
tension amongst artistic and commercial logics. Importantly, I also demonstrate that 
the workings of “formal” markets may be linked to informal / illegal practices of 
circulation / exchange. The moral and emotional structures that shape illegal 
practices, as evidenced in the second chapter, also greatly influence the emergent 
logic that shapes business and artistic practices, as I detail in the third chapter. I note 
that the frames which shape and legitimate the market culture are also grounded in 
and shaped by the emotional structures that characterize and delineate that market’s 
core constituency. I propose to explicate the role of emotionality and emotional 
structures in the legitimation of new social ventures - such as markets - as future 
research. 
 In chapter 3, I also contributed to consumer research literature on stigmatized 
and marginalized (consumer) communities: I note how a constituency’s dominated 
and stigmatized position in society may shape the terms through which a new market 
emerges, and that the market’s (oppositional and resistive) culture may be shaped by 
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its very lack of legitimacy. Rather than seeking inclusion (Coskuner-Balli and 
Thompson 2013; Scaraboto and Fischer 2013; Ustuner and Holt 2007; Ustuner and 
Thompson 2012) into mainstream culture, the stigmatized constituency may instead 
engage in the creation of an alternative market culture, in a manner that is similar to 
the generation of a “parallel taste structure” (Sandıkcı and Ger 2010) or a 
“countervailing market” (Thompson and Coskuner-Balli 2007). While the role of 
ideology in the shaping of such parallel/countervailing markets is evident from the 
extant literature, the emphasis has been on the community-building and oppositional 
practices of consumers. How producers collectively partake in constructing an 
alternative/ oppositional / counter-cultural normative orders and, accordingly, a new 
market culture; and how they appropriate and (re)produce ideology in doing so is less 
clear. I explicate how market actors engage in framing processes: drawing from their 
past and present, personal and collective experiences of circulating music / doing 
business in the market; and also drawing from and adapting the frames of the 
neighboring social movement. Thus, both existing political ideologies (Crockett and 
Wallendorf 2004) as well as  “partisan knowledge” (J.C. Scott 1998) shape the 
frames that market actors employ. Frames are, moreover, re-articulated and re-
produced in relation to changing political, socio-economic, and technological 
conditions. Thus, multiple ideological and experiential resources shape the market 
culture, as well as market actors’ political and communal alignments.   
 In chapter 4, I detail the segmentation of the market, linking it to the shifts in 
the socio-political as well as technological environment. The relaxation of legal and 
normative restrictions on Kurdish music production, performance, and broadcast; the 
emergence and popularization of a “world” and “ethnic” music scene; the changes in 
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album formats and the availability of online streaming contributed to the changing 
atmosphere in which music production took place. Particularly with the relaxation of 
restrictions, spaces opened up for market actors to disengage from the political-
normative logic, and engage with different logics, and thus different business and 
artistic practices. The four segments that emerged in the 2000s - the “Political,” 
“World Music,” “Commercial,” and “Challenger” segments - I argue, not only relate 
to different norms of doing business and different meanings attributed to the 
“objects” of exchange, but also to different “social imaginaries” (Spillman 1999) of 
the Kurdish audience-public.  
 The political-normative logic continued to be dominant in the “Political 
Segment,” yet the logic and its constitutive frames were adapted in a way to address 
the changing environment.  The Kurdish performers and companies within the 
“world music” segment, on the other hand, adapted an ideological stance that was 
informed by frames of “cultural heritage” and “multiplicity.” I noted that this more 
accessible ideological positioning, which was also reflected in artistic decisions, was 
influential in constituting this segment as more “palatable” for a middle-class, well-
educated Turkish audience - thus enabling inclusion into mainstream culture, to some 
extent. On the other hand, the more contentious political-normative orientation of the 
“Political Segment,” as well as the accordant imaginaries of “Kurdishness,” may still 
be seen as mainstream Turkish audience as too extreme. I propose that a further 
inquiry into the structural conditions and the internal dynamics that are required for a 
politically contentious field / organization / product to become integrated into the 
mainstream, is necessary. 
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 With segmentation, the boundaries between, rather than unity amongst, 
market actors became more salient. Particularly for actors in the Political Segment, in 
addition to the State as the “external” Other, actors of different segments are 
constituted as “internal” Others. This is particularly prominent in the way that actors 
enact boundaries towards the actors that they perceive as collaborating with the state 
(as with those who work with the state-run television) or rival Kurdish organizations. 
These actors, cast as “traitors,” are seen as cooperating with the state’s efforts to 
generate de-politicized and anti-movement Kurdish subjects. Symbolic boundaries 
are also erected and enacted against actors who entered the scene after 2000 - 
including the actors in the World Music and Commercial segments - although to a 
lesser extent. More research is necessary to address how actors in different segments 
differentiate themselves from their others. However, the findings in chapter 4 suggest 
that each segments actors’ engage in different framing processes. Political-normative 
frames are thus relevant in generating and maintaining moral boundaries that 
constitute social distinction (Lamont 1992, 2000; Saatcioglu and Ozanne 2014) 
within the market.  
 With chapters 3 and 4, I thus contributed to the emergent literature on market 
creation and evolution within the discipline of consumer research (Giesler 2008, 
2012; Humphreys 2010a,b; Karababa and Ger 2011; Press et al. 2014). I show how 
paths that do not involve legitimation within the mainstream culture are possible to 
the creation of a new market, and detail the role of producer-actors in navigating this 
process, by creating, adopting, and employing ideological frames. Like Karababa and 
Ger (2011) as well as Humphreys (2010b), I draw attention to the importance of the 
state as an actor in market creation and in shaping market culture, but note also that 
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the state can shape the market by the very limitations and delegitimating influence it 
imposes. While an alternative market may, in time, be normalized (Sandıkcı and Ger 
2010) or legitimated (Karababa and Ger 2011; Humphreys 2010a,b), I note that 
environmental changes, as well as the adoption of more “palatable” ideological 
frames, may be necessary for this to happen. 
!
5.2 Limitations 
I am aware that there are many limitations to this research - taking a particular 
theoretical orientation regarding market formation and institutionalization, for one, 
has meant that I did not engage with a broad range of literature on cultural 
production as well as music performance - including the confluence of music with 
social movements. Shifting the focus away from the music “itself” to material 
circulation (chapter 2) and the legal market (chapters 3 and 4) was the reason for this, 
but I also feel that further discussion on music production and arts/aesthetics may 
have benefited my analysis.  
 In writing this dissertation, I relied on the memories of my informants 
regarding events and emotions that transpired in the past - some dating back as early 
as the 1970s. My other data sources - printed interviews and articles, as well as 
informal conversations - were mostly also based on memories. The emotionality that 
is generated by and associated with the cassettes comes out strongly in informants’ 
narratives, and are very similar across accounts. Thus I think the accounts of the 
informants are representative of the “emotional economy” that circulation generated, 
and that the oral historiography does not pose a limitation. 
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 For the third and fourth chapters, however, this reliance on actors’ narratives 
potentially poses a limitation. The data I collected are not supported by “hard facts” 
such as court documents, contracts, sales figures, revenues, or other statistics, which 
would help me assess, a la Humphreys (2010a, b), the shifts in legitimation. 
However, even if I had found the opportunity to gather such data, I am not sure of 
how “factual” this data would be: there was a great deal of “off the record” activity; 
in terms of sales, contracts between companies and artists, as well as in dealings with 
law enforcement. Yet, I think I negotiated this potential limitation by placing 
emphasis on how actors “framed” ideologies, experiences, and activities. The 
“market culture” (Spillman 1999) is shaped by the frames that are shared amongst 
market actors. Detecting and analyzing the “frames” draws attention to how the 
actors perceive and narrate the market culture - and thus, justify the market and its 
activities to what actors see as their constituency, the “social imaginary of the 
market” (Spillman 1999). 
 While I tried to gain some understanding into how the frames and ideologies 
of the Kurdish movement figured into the music market, a more thorough reading 
and understanding would have been beneficial. Moreover, with comprehension of 
Kurdish language, I might have been better able to track references or allusions to 
movement frames and ideologies as they figured in the “product,” the music. 
 In chapter 3, discussed the emergence and shaping of a “collective identity” 
of Kurdish market actors in the 1990s as opposed to the state - yet, comparing these 
findings with those I present in chapter 4, I wonder if there were other “internal 
others” (e.g., Kurds who cooperated with the state) and what, if any, involvement 
they had with the music market. This did not emerge from my data on the 1990s, but 
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upon reflection, I realize that it is not something I asked about or prompted for. 
Moreover, the majority of the primary data regarding the 2000s was gathered from 
interviews with actors from the political and world music segments, as well as 
observations at concerts and events attended by actors (particularly performers) from 
these segments. Published materials - in particular, interviews - with actors from the 
Challenger Segment were also helpful in my analysis. However, particularly for 
future research, a better emic understanding of the experiences of the Challenger and 
Commercial segments is necessary.  
 Another limitation of this research is the dearth of female interviewees.  The 
overwhelming majority of producers, sound engineers, and other studio personnel are 
men. Most musicians are also male, but there are many female singers. I contacted 
three singers, but we were unable to schedule interviews - busy schedules and 
vacations were cited as reasons. While I did draw from printed interviews with 
female performers, and engage in some unstructured conversations with female 
audience, only four of my informants were women. One worked as a producer, and 
was the wife of the owner of a company in the world-music segment, while the 
others had more marginal involvement with the music scene as professionals. While 
my focus was not on gender in the music market, how gender figured into the 
emergent political-normative structure that shaped the market would have made an 
interesting component to this research. 
!
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